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These three tales of converts to Islam also
have in common that they all deeply affect-
ed the American imagery and brought
about a reawakening, or even the discovery
of an interest in the Islam of converts, which
until recently – with few exceptions – was
mainly considered to be a phenomenon
limited to the black Muslims movement of
Elijah Muhammad and nowadays of Louis
Farrakhan (of whom John Allen had been a
follower), and consequently almost thought
of as an 'ethnic' oddity.
In Europe, attention paid to conversion to
Islam has begun to gather momentum in
the last years and has opened up to research
into the role of some Sufi groups, trajecto-
ries of the feminine conversions, and the
role of converts in Muslim associations. N e v-
ertheless, literature on the matter remains
rather scarce, especially when compared to
that of the so-called 'new religious move-
ments', some of which have a smaller mem-
bership compared to converts to Islam.
The highest number of conversions to
Islam is brought about by a cause that has
little to do with the search for spirituality,
namely marriage (following the Islamic
rules, a non-Muslim male cannot marry a
Muslim woman without converting). Such a
reason for conversion may contradict the
principle of freedom of religion and of con-
science as it developed in the West, but is
normally lived without special problems by
people who, often, are hardly religious, and
are consequently little disturbed by this
c h o i c e . These conversions have generally
no great impact on the lives of the individu-
als and of the couples, and often not even
on that of their offspring. As a matter of fact,
conversion under these circumstances is a
means to reach another aim (marriage), not
an end in itself.
However, other trajectories to conversion,
which, like the previous ones, can be called
'relational', even if far less numerous, are the
ones that have the greatest impact: on the
lives of the individuals, but also on that of
the Islamic communities in Europe. In the
list can be included the 'discovery' of Islam
through meeting Muslim believers, while as
a tourist or on a business trip to Muslim
countries, or through meeting an immigrant
in Europe and eventually falling in love with
him or her (it is the case of several mixed
couples, even when the conversion is not
compulsory, as in the case of a non-Muslim
woman marrying a Muslim man). 
A different model of conversion is that of
the 'rational' conversions. Here we can refer
to the intellectual conversions, 'cold' so to
speak, which are due to the reading, even
by chance, of the Qur'an, for all sorts of rea-
sons and in the most diverse situations: ei-
ther received as a gift, as happened to one
of the most well-known European converts,
former pop singer Cat Stevens, who became
Yusuf Islam, or because it was found in the
prison library. Others became acquainted
with Islam through books of Islamic mysti-
cism, notably Sufism, which have attracted a
wide Western readership. Other books that
have influenced certain conversions are
those of traditionalist authors such as René
Guénon, Fritjof Schuon, and Titus Burck-
hardt, all of whom became Muslims.
Sufism is, however, a specific way to enter
Islam, or rather a special facet of it, and
leads to embracing Islam through the role
of the t u r u q, not often connected to the
'Islam of the mosques'.
For many converts the background of
conversion is political, both (even extreme)
right and left: Islam, the religion of praxis
that does not distinguish by principle be-
tween the 'city of men' and the 'city of God'
but rather willingly superimposes them,
seems to constitute an ideal way to 'spiritu-
alize' a militant commitment that previously
was only social or political. It is not merely
by chance that we find these converts in the
leadership and in the intermediate centres
of the Islamic associations in Europe, in the
mosques, and in promoting political initia-
tives such as requests to be recognized by
the state. In short, they are closely in touch
with the Islam of the immigrants.
F u n c t i o n s
A distinction can be made between the
actual and potential functions of converts –
with the aim of trying to understand the dy-
namic and evolutionary aspect of the
process. One can speak of a function of cul-
tural mediation, of linguistic translation,
and of interpretation, in a broad cognitive
sense. In practice, the following acquire
great importance: the contribution in terms
of social know-how; the pooling of a net-
work of relationships (including the politi-
cal, institutional, and religious ones), which
already exist and which can be developed
further; the peculiar intellectual function
that is shown through the capacity to medi-
ate and to produce culture both within the
community (books and reviews, but also
testimonies and sermons) and, chiefly, out-
side of it through the contribution made to
the formation of the image of Islam (confer-
ences, public relations, and on a larger scale
the simple explanation of personal behav-
iours like wearing the h i j a b: as one of our in-
terviewees stated, 'I am a walking symbol').
In a more general sense, the converts con-
stitute (and are perceived as) a crucial ele-
ment in at least three fields. They offer legit-
imation in the eyes of society: a function ful-
filled especially by the intellectuals who
have converted. They are present also in the
academic milieu, for instance among the
orientalists, and they contribute to produc-
ing the image of Islam and its contents. The
converts also provide confirmation for the
benefit of the migrant community, especial-
ly those with a weaker sense of identity:
their s h a h a d a, when enunciated in an Islam-
ic centre, or in publications, are a 'proof' of
the superiority of Islam and a confirmation
of the rightness of their faith for those immi-
grants who are often less integrated and
less well-educated. Finally, they comprise
an element of g u a r a n t e e: a convert is a citi-
zen – and a militant or an Islamic leader as a
citizen can not be expelled, or surrendered,
to this or that native Islamic country.
If that is the present situation in several
European countries, in spite of s i g n i f i c a n t
variations of weight and importance be-
tween the one and the other (which ought
to be analysed individually), the potential
situation, the possible evolution of the func-
tion of the converts, is not the same. Indeed,
some of the present functions served by the
converts are transitory: for instance, they fill
a gap in terms of leadership and cultural
elaboration because of the lack of immi-
grants capable of doing so. However, they
could be substituted by a new leadership,
which may come from abroad but will more
likely be produced within the second and
third generations of immigrants, something
that is currently happening in several Euro-
pean countries.
Nevertheless, the lasting importance of
the converts must be emphasized, mainly in
the institutional interface and in the ' p o w e r
games', which are linked to the national or
regional representation of Islam, particular-
ly with respect to the host society and its in-
stitutions: a role that the passage of genera-
tion among the Muslim communities will
not be able to cancel in the short term, even
though one might hypothesize that the
overestimation of their role in cultural and
organizational leadership that is now attrib-
uted to the converts – very visible in some
countries, namely those where immigration
The visibility of converts to Islam in the media has re-
cently undergone an exponential increase – mainly
in the United States. There was the case of Jonny
Walker, labelled 'Jonny the Taliban', born into the
wasp upper class, who was apprehended as m u j a h i d
in Afghanistan. Then there was José Padilla, the
would-be terrorist who was seized in an airport
loaded with explosives. Finally, John Allen Williams
came on the scene. Of Jamaican ancestry, born in
Louisiana, this former American soldier in the Gulf
War became the serial killer that terrorized Washing-
ton in October 2002 by killing 13 people in cold
b l o o d . These three tales have nothing in common,
apart from the fact that all three protagonists are
converts to Islam. 
Converts and the
Making of
E u r o p e a n I s l a m
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Gamal Abdel Nasser meets Malcom X in Antwerp. In response to the
ongoing debate on the flaws of multiculturalism and the alleged
deficiencies of Islam, preventing Muslims from embracing Western
modernity, some migrant activists have started a counter-cam-
paign in Western Europe. The most outspoken representative of a
young generation of activists is Dyab Abou Jahjah, who left
Lebanon for Belgium in 1990 to study political science. In 2000 he
founded the Arab European League, a movement that claims to
have over 400 members and many more sympathizers in Belgium.
Today, the movement is gaining popularity in neighbouring coun-
tries, too, and the Netherlands’ branch of the
League will be formally opened soon. Unlike most
migrant activists and representatives, forced into
a defensive position, in particular after 9/11, Abou
Jahjah calls for the restoration of Arab and Muslim
dignity and pride among the migrant communi-
ties. Countering apologies, self-critique, and gestures of goodwill
by most migrant representatives, Abou Jahjah has taken up the
cause of migrant culture and faith demanding the acknowledge-
ment and reproduction of cultural diversity. He equates integration
with assimilation and therefore rejects it. He is severely opposed to
the Belgian political establishment, accusing it of curbing Muslim
inhabitants’ civil rights and portraying Islam as a criminal belief.
Antwerp’s white right-wing Flemish Bloc party, being part of that
establishment, constitutes his main antagonist. But given that
mainstream political parties in Europe increasingly adopt right-
wing issues and that the media are eager to cover any signal of
Muslim maladjustment, the non-conformist Abou Jahjah is now
empowered to provoke angry responses from among the nation’s
élite and that of its neighbours. 
Abou Jahjah’s fame is of very recent date. He first became known
when the League was among the initiators of a complaint filed
against Ariel Sharon and others for their responsibility in the mas-
sacres of Sabra and Shatila in 1976. The complaint was lodged with
the Belgian Public Prosecutor’s Office in June 2001 following the
recognition of the principle of the exercise of universal jurisdiction
by a Belgian court in a case against four Rwandan nationals for war
crimes earlier in the same month. The case was dismissed last June,
but by then Abou Jahjah had proven his talent for holding the lime-
light; in a series of incidents and interviews within one year’s time
he evolved from a pro-Palestinian activist to a spokesperson of a
disgruntled Muslim youth. In November he was arrested after riots
in an Antwerp suburb following the murder of a Belgian citizen of
Moroccan origin by a next-door (white) neighbour. Antwerp police
accused Abou Jahjah of having incited Moroccan youth to rampage
the neighbourhood and the Belgian Prime Minister branded the
League as a criminal organization, also because it had taken up pa-
trolling the streets of Antwerp in order to tape possible ill-treat-
ment of migrant youth by the police. High-ranking politicians in the
Netherlands, including some ministers, joined the parade and
vowed that they would do their utmost to prohibit the League from
spreading to their country. In the meantime, lack of proof com-
pelled the Belgian authorities to release the culprit after a few days:
a migrant hero was born. However, many – also among the migrant
communities – argue that Abou Jahjah is detrimental to the cause
of these communities and that he represents no-one but himself.
But in the ‘soap opera’ that migrant and identity politics in Western
Europe has become, Abou Jahjah needs little effort to find his
niche. His good looks, flamboyant style, and fluen-
cy in Dutch are well received among Moroccan
youth and make him an attractive media personal-
ity. Some of his language comes close to that of
hip hop and other modern music cultures (see
Khedimallah, pp. 20–1, and Nawaz, p. 22).
In his political thinking Abou Jahjah combines Abdel Nasser’s call
for an Arab renaissance with Malcom X’s demand for respect and
justice for oppressed minorities, embracing the latter’s appeal to
seize these rights and not to wait patiently until they are granted
( w w w . a r a b e u r o p e a n . o r g ) .
Abou Jahjah’s shift from Nasserite Arab activism to migrant
spokesmanship points to the emancipation of youth of Muslim
background who are, unlike their parents, well versed in European
languages and cultures, but who react against growing pressures
to distance themselves from their heritage. Interestingly, they con-
strue Islam as a cultural rather than religious and societal system,
albeit that some Islamic notions are used to appropriate and au-
thenticate notions such as democracy. 
Ostensibly in contrast is the Somalian-born Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who
came into the spotlight by publicly declaring that she no longer
considers herself a Muslim, principally because of the inferior sta-
tus of Muslim women who are, in her view, lowered to son-bearing
machinery. Her step was no doubt a brave one, but the way in
which she was readily adopted by the main conservative party in
the Netherlands and offered a seat in parliament, indicates that her
situation is not totally different from that Abou Jahjah: their indi-
vidual careers largely depend on the agitated state of public de-
bate and rapidly changing political moods. The processes of inclu-
sion and exclusion dominate the political field and various notions
of being Muslim or being Western, or both, compete. In the 1990s
the position of Muslims living as minorities in the West and else-
where came under discussion among s h a r ica-oriented thinkers (see
Masud, p. 17). This discussion poses daunting challenges to Islamic
legal reasoning, which is founded on the assumption that Muslims
are (or will or should be) a majority population. Minorities and ma-
jorities, dominating cultures and minor cultures – new vocabularies
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Professor Henry Munson has made some thought-
ful and important contributions to the study of pol-
itics in the Islamic world. Unfortunately, his latest
contribution descends into a facile and false di-
chotomy between Daniel Pipes and John Esposito.
Daniel Pipes, Martin Kramer, et al have become no-
torious for espousing the most militant and ex-
treme views of Jabotinskyite ultra-nationalism. In
the case of Pipes, this has led to blatantly racist dia-
tribes in publications like the National Review,
where he complained of a Muslim 'invasion' of the
West. In his latest book, he accuses American Mus-
lims of a nefarious plot to take over the US govern-
ment and national institutions in order to establish
an 'Islamic state' in the US. Esposito has never in-
dulged in such sweeping and inane bigotry against
any group and it is frankly insulting to counterpose
him with someone like Pipes. 
It is disturbing to see that Munson has partially
incorporated some of the ideologically driven
claims of Likudniks like Pipes and Kramer. This is a
broader transparently orchestrated campaign to
discredit academics who might stand in the way of
the current hate campaign against Muslims being
conducted in the neo-conservative-evangelical
mass media owned by the likes of Rupert Murdoch
and Conrad Black. This has included attempts by
Kramer, a scholar based in a right-wing Israeli think-
tank, to testify before Congress that American
scholars who do not share a foreign Likudnik agen-
da should have their funding cut. It is ironic that
Kramer in his latest monograph claims that the field
of Middle Eastern Studies has failed because it did
not predict the 9/11 attacks. A colleague of mine,
Mujeeb R. Khan, was with Kramer at the University
of Chicago during Operation Desert Storm. While
Khan explicitly warned in lectures (and subsequent
articles) that massive US-led destruction in the Is-
lamic world would inevitably lead to radicalization
and devastating attacks upon America, Kramer,
both at the time and subsequently, discounted the
danger for the US of following a neo-conservative
agenda of destructive interventionism in the Islam-
ic world. John Esposito has also long warned that
the failure of the United States to support democ-
ratization and equitable socio-economic develop-
ment in the Islamic world would also lead to ex-
treme radicalization and nihilistic violence as repre-
sented by al-Q aci d a, Gamaat Islamiya, and the AIG
of Algeria. It is instructive that most scholars of
Egypt, Afghanistan, and Algeria note how brutal re-
pression of efforts at democratic reform directly led
to the spawning of such extremist groups and the
marginalization of moderate voices. It is also in-
structive that both Pipes and Kramer in their jour-
nal Middle East Quarterly have repeatedly warned
against promoting democracy and human rights in
the Muslim world because insufficiently pliant
regimes would be elected.
Finally, I remain disturbed that Munson failed in
his scholarly duty to carefully read Esposito's oeu-
vre, which is considered by a great many scholars of
Muslim politics to be at the forefront in its pre-
science and analysis. Esposito in his earlier work
and latest book Unholy Wars has repeatedly point-
ed to the danger of intolerant and extremist radi-
cals. More importantly, he has pointed out that
such militancy is a direct result of brutal tyrannies
that forestall the possibility of gradual and pluralis-
tic reform. Esposito's path-breaking work is now
more important than ever. If we are to forestall
murderous and unwinnable 'clashes of civilization'
involving billions of people around the globe, it is
vital that mainstream reformist and democratically
inclined Muslim thinkers and movements – which
have always existed and to which Munson seems
suddenly oblivious – in Indonesia, Malaysia, Pak-
istan, Uzbekistan, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, and Mo-
rocco be engaged by Western scholars and institu-
tions. This sort of scholarly engagement was pio-
neered by John Esposito and it offers humanity the
only course for escaping horrific cycles of violence
along racial, religious, ethnic, or ideological divi-
s i o n s .
M .  H A K A N  Y A V U Z
M. Hakan Yavuz is assistant professor of Political Science
a tt h e University of Utah, USA.
E-mail: hakan.yavuz@poli-sci.utah.edu
R E T R A C T I O N
An error was made in ISIM Newsletter 10, which we
would like to hereby rectify. On page 19, in Dr Farian
Sabahi's article 'The Literacy Corps in Pahlavi Iran
(1963–1979)', the author was referred to as 'He', but
should have been 'She' in the following: 'She is au-
thor of TheLiteracy Corps in Pahlavi Iran (1963–1979):
Political, Social and Literary Implications'. We apolo-
gize for this oversight.
Wo r ksho p Rep o rt
A N N E L I E S  M OO R S
and the nation-state; and activism, civil soci-
ety, and the public sphere. 
Discussing the production of knowledge
about Islamic family law brought to the fore
the urgency of developing a reflexive stance
on the power/knowledge nexus in different
local and historical settings. Tracing the histo-
ries of scholarship in the field of Islamic family
law asks for investigating the ways in which
research dealing with Islamic family law has
been organized and institutionalized. It raises
questions about the politics involved, be it in
terms of colonial powers controlling their
colonial subjects or present-day states trying
to get a grip on minorities defined as Muslim.
This also includes the programmes set up in
Western academia for Muslim students deal-
ing with such topics as family law. 
Processes of codification are central to an
understanding of contemporary debates on
Islamic family law. In order to investigate the
various historical trajectories of such process-
This meeting was the third in a series. The
first workshop, convened by Anna W ü r t h
and Jamila Bargach and held in Berlin (June
2000), set out to create a network of schol-
ars employing social science perspectives
and methodologies in the study of family
law. The second workshop, organized by
Abdullahi an-N acim and Laila al-Zwaini
(ISIM, 'Rights-at-Home') at the annual Euro-
pean Institute Meeting in Florence (March
2001), discussed concepts of family, state,
and civil society in Muslim societies. Legal
and sociological perspectives were em-
ployed in order to discuss such issues as de-
bates on family law reform in the 1990s and
relations between family law and human
rights issues. This third workshop focused
on 'Scholarship and Activism' within the
framework of a comparative and historical
approach. Three main issues were highlight-
ed: the production of knowledge about Is-
lamic family law; processes of codification
es these need to be linked to the formation of
nation-states. More detailed investigations of
processes of codification point to the diversi-
ty in positions held by religious functionaries
and state institutions, and argue against see-
ing either the state or religious authorities as
a monolithic bloc. Researching the local
specificities of processes of codification and
the participants involved brings to the fore
the relations and tensions between increased
state control, a potentially flexible legal sys-
tem and issues of accountability, in particular
regarding their effects on the more vulnera-
ble members of society.
Both the production of knowledge about
family law and processes of codification inter-
sect with the third main issue of debate, that
is the various forms of activism related to fam-
ily law, and the ways in which these relate to
associational forms that are part of civil soci-
ety and the more informal networks operat-
ing in the public sphere. Particular attention is
not only to be paid to the agendas of activists
and the ways in which they interact with their
publics (or not), but also to their frames of ref-
erence, such as local traditions and customs,
international human rights law, Islamic legal
traditions, and insights from the social sci-
ences. Finally, all three topics require paying
attention to transnational forms of coopera-
tion and influencing that have become in-
creasingly important both in the production
of knowledge, in processes of codification,
and amongst activists. 
Presentations were given by Gamal Abd an-
Nasser, Jamila Bargach, Nathalie Bernard-
Maugiron, Léon Buskens, Bettina Dennerlein,
Ivesa Lübben, Annelies Moors, Tazeen Mur-
shid, Dorothea Schulz, Lynn Welchman, Inken
Wiese, and Anna Würth. 
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From 5 to 7 July 2002 a workshop on 'Scholarship
and Activism in Islamic Family Law' was held at the
Freie U n i v e r s i t ä t Berlin, organized jointly by the In-
terdisciplinary Centre 'Social and Cultural History of
the Middle East' at the Freie U n i v e r s i t ä t Berlin (Katja
Niethammer, Anna W ü r t h), the AKMI (Arbeitskreis
Moderne und Islam at the Wissenschaftkolleg Berlin,
Georges Khalil), CIMEL (Centre of Islamic and Middle
Eastern Law at SOAS, London, Lynn Welchman) and
ISIM (Annelies Moors).
A co-authored publication by the network outlining
the discussions and major themes is planned for 2003.
Scholarship and
Activism 
in Islamic Family Law
A Naqshbandi
T é l é m a q u e
Şe r i f M a r d i n
delivering his
l e c t u r e .
A N N O U N C E M E N T S
V a c a n c y ISIM Academic
D i r e c t o r
On 13 November 2002 Professor Şe r i f
Mardin (Sabanci University, Istanbul) de-
livered the fourth ISIM Annual Lecture at
the University of Nijmegen. His lecture fo-
cused on the impact of Les aventures de
Télémaque, fils d'Ulysse by the 18t h- c e n t u r y
French author Fénélon on 19t h-century Ot-
toman intellectuals, in particular in Khali-
di-Naqshbandi circles in Istanbul. 
Şerif Mardin is the author of path-break-
ing studies on Turkish intellectual and so-
cial history, including The Genesis of Young
Ottoman Thought (1962) and Religion and
Social Change in Turkey (1989). His lecture
will be published in the ISIM Papers Series.
The ISIM invites applications for the position
of Academic Director, who is also simultane-
ously the holder of the ISIM Chair of Islamic
Studies in the modern period at Leiden Uni-
versity. The Academic Director is responsible
for the overall guidance and planning of the
Institute's research programmes, the Ph.D.
degree and post-doctoral programmes, and
international cooperation, including ex-
change programmes and academic meet-
ings, all conducted in association with the
ISIM Chairs at the other ISIM participating
universities. As holder of the ISIM Chair at
Leiden University the candidate will be ex-
pected to teach and supervise undergradu-
ate and graduate students. In administrative
affairs the Academic Director is assisted by
the Executive Director, who is also in charge
of the publications and outreach.
Candidates should possess an established
international reputation in the study of
modern Islam and Muslim societies, wide-
ranging academic contacts, expertise in the
field of academic management, and excel-
lent communicative skills.
This Directorship/Professorship is a full-
time position, preferably commencing in
September 2003. The salary will be com-
mensurate to the candidate's background
and qualifications. Female candidates are
especially encouraged to apply.
Applicants may wish to consult the ISIM
website (www.isim.nl) as well as that of Lei-
den University (www.leiden.edu).
Review of applications will begin
on 15 January 2003. 
Applicants should send a full CV,





For further inquiries, please contact:
Prof. Dr Peter van der Veer,
Chair of the Search Committee
E-mail: vanderveer@pscw.uva.nl
In cooperation with the University of Cape
Town the ISIM is organizing a Summer
Academy in Cape Town in Autumn 2003
on ‘Islam in Public Life in Pluralist Soci-
eties’. The Academy will invite experts and
students (Ph.D. and post-doctoral) to ex-
amine the ways in which Muslims engage
in the public sphere through five sub-
themes: secularization, law, state, media,
and consumption. S e c u l a r i z a t i o n will be
sub-theme through which the general
changes in Muslim societies can be exam-
ined. A comparative examination of Mus-
lim societies will provide a key to under-
standing the transformation of social and
political practices based on Islam. L a w i s
pervasive in Muslim societies as a personal
code to judicial practice. It is the one com-
mon medium to comprehend the precon-
ceptions and expectations of Muslims. Al-
though the s t a t e seems to sometimes dis-
appear in the new form of globalization, it
continues to have far-reaching power and
significance. Islam and public life is not re-
stricted to state systems, but the modern
nation-state cannot be ignored. The m e d i a
in all forms plays an important role in mod-
ern global societies. The employment of
new media in religion provides new possi-
bilities and transformations for Islam in
public life in both local and global con-
texts. Finally, c o n s u m p t i o n defines an often
neglected dimension of contemporary
public life. Consumption patterns in Mus-
lim contexts may indicate much more than
philosophical and political treaties about
Islam. 
More information the Summer Academy and how
to apply will be made available in on the ISIM
website in the second half of January 2003.
Islam in Public Life
in Pluralist Societies
S u m m e r
A c a d e m y
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R e p o r t
L A I L A  A L - ZW AI N I
The ISIM programme 'Rights at Home: An Approach
to the Internalization of Human Rights in Family Re-
lations in Islamic Communities' held its second series
of Sounding Board Meetings in Tanzania from 19
until 23 June 2002. The venue was in Dar es Salaam
from 19 to 20 June, and on the island of Zanzibar
from 22 to 23 June. The meetings were organized to-
gether with the NGO Sahiba Sisters Foundation in
Dar es Salaam, a Muslim women's network to pro-
mote a positive role of Muslim women in Tanzanian
society. 
Rights at Home 
Tanzania Sounding
Boards 
Sahiba Sisters was represented at the Sound-
i n g Board Meetings by its executive direc-
tor, Salma Maoulidi, and several young staff
members. The two permanent members of
the project team of Rights at Home, Abdul-
lahi An-N aci m (Emory University, Atlanta,
and Visiting Professor ISIM) and Laila al-
Zwaini (Programme Coordinator), were this
time accompanied by Farish Noor, a young
Malaysian scholar and fervent human rights
activist, at the time also an ISIM Visiting Fel-
low. The Zanzibar meetings were co-orga-
nized by Saleh Mreh Salim from Mreh Tours
and Safaris. Involving an organization of this
particular kind draws attention to the lack of
connections between the women's organi-
zations on the mainland and on Zanzibar,
which in its turn is dictated by the still cur-
rent political distance between the two for-
merly separate territories, an issue that was
to come up repeatedly during the discus-
s i o n s .
The concept of the meetings, similar to
the first Sounding Board Meetings in Yemen
(see ISIM Newsletter 10, p. 4), was to bring to-
gether representatives from different re-
gions, gender, and professional and person-
al backgrounds, such as human rights ac-
tivists, scholars, ulama, social welfare offi-
cers, teachers, lawyers, childrens' rights ad-
vocates, and others in order to discuss
themes related to 'Rights at Home' from dif-
ferent perspectives, and jointly explore
strategies and activities to promote autono-
my for women and socialization of children. 
Each session started with a short presen-
tation by one of the local participants, fol-
lowed by a general discussion in which the
group focused on identifying priority issues,
strategies, and actors. Presentations were
held on women's emotional and reproduc-
tive health, family law legislation and de-
bates, the application of Islamic principles
in court, Islamic and cultural practices, and
street children. Also, participants addressed
some concrete domestic violations, and ex-
amined attempted strategies for relief. 
The often frank discussions eventually
narrowed down to two main concerns: the
difficulties that the Muslim community in
Tanzania faces as a minority group (e.g. in
acquiring emission time in the public media
and the creation and operation of Islamic
schools), as well as the lack of, but strong
desire for, an adequate programme for Is-
lamic education in its broadest sense.
In addition to the meetings, the project
team visited several NGOs and other grass-
roots organizations in Mwanza, a large city
on the southern shore of Lake Victoria, to
gain more realistic insight into their activi-
ties and difficulties. The non-religious NGO
Kivulini ('In the Shade'), for instance, deals
specifically with the issue of domestic vio-
lence and has developed a model for coop-
eration with street leaders, community offi-
cers, and Islamic authorities to find redress
in cases of domestic abuse. Its experience
shows that the Muslim community and the
Islamic authorities in Mwanza (as in other lo-
calities) often do not react and even turn
their backs on female victims of domestic vi-
olence. The woman then faces the dilemma
of standing up against her husband at the
cost of being expelled from her own com-
munity, or suffering the abuses in silence. 
Another (Islamic) NGO in Mwanza, Tawfiq
Islamic Women Organisation, aims at the cre-
ation and support of Islamic institutions, such
as schools, hospitals, and orphanages. Their
work is mostly voluntary, and their main con-
cern is the lack of support from the Tanzanian
government. Their present teaching material
and methods are mainly inspired and provid -
ed by Wahhabi organizations. Historically,
Tanzanian Muslims predominantly belong to
the Shafici madhhab, with also flocks of
Hanafis, Ismailis, Ibadis, and Bohras. An exam-
ple of a madrasa that is exercising its own
best efforts to compile a school curriculum
with a specific view to the local Muslim cul-
ture, is the very lively Madrasat al-Nour on
Zanzibar, which offers education up to the in-
termediate level. Interestingly, this school
was created in 1967 by a Yemeni from the
Hadramawt, underscoring the existing con-
nections between Muslim communities
around the Indian Ocean.
In its next phase, 'Rights at Home' will es-
tablish closer cooperation with several local
partners to jointly engage in developing
and implementing activities as proposed
during our visit, such as pre-marriage edu-
cation for youths; an education programme
for women on their basic human rights in
Islam and within their society; the drafting
and effectuation of a model marriage con-
tract that specifies rights and obligations for
both spouses (e.g. an HIV/AIDS test, mainte-
nance); sensitization meetings for area lead-
ers, sheikhs (Islamic scholars), and q a d is (Is-
lamic judges); and the establishment of a
network of Muslim groups to promote
human rights.
The third series of 'Rights at Home' Sounding Board
Meetings will be held from 15 to 17 January 2003
i n Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and will bring together
participants from several countries of the Southeast
Asian region.
Four meetings, following the first, have taken place within the
ISIM and Felix Meritis lecture and debate series 'Islam, Authority,
and Leadership' in recent months. The venue was Felix Meritis,
European Centre for Arts and Sciences, Amsterdam. The themes
and speakers of these meetings were the following:
– 'Would the Muslim Intellectual Please Stand Up!', 20 June
2 0 0 2
Speakers: Nathal Dessing (ISIM), Haci Karacaer (Director, Milli
G ö rüş, the Netherlands), Saoud Khadje (Dar al-Ilm, Institute
for Islam Studies), and Fouad Laroui (researcher and writer). 
Moderator: Ab Cherribi. 
– 'A Lonely Planet Guide for Muslims', 19 September 2002
Speakers: Tariq Ramadan (College of Geneva and Fribourg
University, Switzerland) and Abdulkader Tayob (ISIM Chair,
University of Nijmegen). 
Moderator: Peter van der Veer (ISIM Co-Director).
– 'Your Constitution is Not Mine!', 10 October 2002
Speakers: Famile Arslan (lawyer), Sadik Harchaoui (public
prosecutor), and Marc Hertogh (Associate Professor of socio-
legal studies, University of Tilburg). 
Moderator: Steve Austen (cultural entrepreneur, publicist,
and consultant). 
See also Sadik Harchaoui's article in this N e w s l e t t e r, p. 12.
– 'The Rib of the Man', 7 November 2002
Speakers: Gijs von der Fuhr (Amsterdam Centre for
Foreigners), Seyma Halici (Women's group, Milli G ö rüş), and
Fenna Ulichki (Moroccan Women's Association in the
Netherlands). 
Moderator: Steve Austen (cultural entrepreneur, publicist,
and consultant).
The concluding meeting of the series will be held on Monday, 27 January 2003.
A report of these five meetings will be published in ISIM Newsletter 12. 
D E B A T E  S E R I E S
I s l a m ,
Authority, and
L e a d e r s h i p
The First World Congress for Middle East-
ern Studies (WOCMES) took place in
Mainz (Germany) from 8 to 13 September
2002. The conference was held jointly by
the European Association for Middle East-
ern Studies (EURAMES), the Association
Française pour l'Etude du Monde Arabe et
Musulman (AFEMAM), the British Society
for Middle East Studies (BRISMES), the
German Middle East Studies Association
(DAVO), and the Italian S o c i e t à por gli
Studi sul Medio Oriente (SeSaMO).
The ISIM co-organized two panels at
WOCMES. Annelies Moors (ISIM) and Blan-
dine Destremeau (CNRS/IEDES – Universi-
ty Paris I) organized a session on 'Migrant
Domestic Workers to/in/from the Middle
East'. This panel presented the ISIM re-
search project 'Cultural Politics of Migrant
Domestic Labour' to an audience working
on the Middle East, and engaged in dis-
cussion with researchers recently working
on migrant domestic labour. Apart from
an outline of the project by Moors, De-
stremeau discussed the emergence of a
domestic labour market in Yemen; Amira
Ahmed (American University, Cairo) pre-
sented her research on domestic work as
a survival strategy amongst refugee
women in Cairo; and Joy Borkholder (The
Protection Project, Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity) together with Mohamed Matar spoke
on domestic service as a form of traffick-
ing of persons in the Middle East. The ses-
sion launched a network on migrant do-
mestic labour in the Middle East. Those in-
terested in joining this network under
construction may contact Annelies Moors
( m o o r s @ p s c w . u v a . n l ) .
In cooperation with Amr Hamzawy (Free
University of Berlin) and Roel Meier (Inter-
national Institute of Social History, IISH),
Dick Douwes (ISIM) organized the panel
'Taking Islamist Debates and Discourses
Seriously: New Avenues in Research and
Collection'. This panel aimed to broaden
the scope of critical discussion on con-
temporary discursive and programmatic
changes in the Islamist spectrum. It also
introduced a new joint initiative of Egypt-
ian and European research centres aimed
at collecting and analysing contemporary
publications (including pamphlets, grey
literature, tapes, and websites) of Islamist
movements with respect to controversies
on: democracy and civil society, imple-
mentation of the s h a r ica, issues of social
welfare, and authenticity and cultural
identity. Amr Hamzawy introduced the
initiative. The panel included papers by
Gamal Sultan (al-Manar al-Jadeed), 'Cri-
tique and Self-Critique in Egypt's Islamist
Movements'; Dina al-Khawaga (Cairo Uni-
versity), 'New Spaces, New Languages:
The Islamist Discourse on the TV-Channel
Iqra'; and Roel Meijer (IISH), 'The Role of
IISH in Collecting and Preserving the Her-
itage of Islamist Movements'.
Karin van Nieuwkerk (ISIM post-doctoral
fellow) presented a paper on 'Female
Converts to Islam: A Comparison of Online
and Offline Conversion Narratives' in the
panel 'Women and Modernity'.




Z a n z i b a r .
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M A RT I N  R I E X I N G E R
For some time Islamic publishing in the West has
been associated with pamphlets in awkward English
printed on pulp. Strolling through Islamic book-
shops in Britain one immediately realizes how things
have changed: beautifully edited books are offered
for considerable prices. A notable part of these pub-
lications is dedicated to the defence of Islam against
the challenges of Christianity and materialism. Out-
standing examples for this new tendency are the
writings of the prolific Turkish author Harun Yahya
(pseudonym of Adnan Oktar), whose list of Turkish
publications includes about 180 titles, most of them




and John Morris claim that their 'scientific
creationism' is not only based on scriptural
but also on scientific evidence. Harun
Yahya's far from original refutation of the
theory of evolution is based on the latters'
main assertions:
– Chance cannot explain the formation of
proteins let alone the complex composition
of cells whereas a conscious creator can.
– The perfect adaptation of all living crea-
tures shows that they are products of 'intel-
ligent design'.
– Evolutionists have not been not able to pre-
sent 'missing links' between species let
alone higher taxa. The examples proposed
up to now were forgeries.
This connection with Christian 'scientific
creationism' notwithstanding, Harun Yahya
kept certain subjects, which expose the lat-
ter to ridicule in scientific circles, out of his
works. Unlike those who promote 'Flood ge-
ology' or struggle to find evidence for the
existence of pterosaurs in historical times,
Harun Yahya never questions that the earth
is hundreds of million years old and that a
wide range of animals and plants have be-
come extinct. In his popular book K a v i m-
ler'in h e la–k ı, which claims to present archae-
ological evidence for the reports on the
prophets in the Qur'an, he describes the
Flood as an event that did not affect the
whole globe but only Mesopotamia. Finding
archaeological evidence for the prophetical
stories in the Qur'an is another popular sub-
ject in Islamist circles. This is most probably
due to the influence of Mawdudi, whose
Tafhim ul-Qur'an is referred to by Harun
Y a h y a .3 Other main sources are popular
magazines and Werner Keller's Und die Bibel
hat doch recht.
In view of the deep impact of Protestant
creationism it is not surprising that the
same flaws characterize the writings of
Harun Yahya. He takes arguments of biolo-
gists over the details of evolution out of
their context and presents them as refuta-
tions of evolution as such. He also puts forth
unfounded claims like the one that australo-
pitheci had prehensile feet like chimps and
not feet like men, enabling them to walk up-
r i g h t .4
The dangers of materialism
Although Harun Yahya takes great efforts
to endow his writings with a scientific ve-
neer, he frankly states that biology is not his
real concern. His commitment to refute the
theory of evolution was fostered when he, as
a student at the Mimar Sinan Ü n i v e r s i t e s i' s
arts faculty, saw that many of his class fel-
lows succumbed to materialist philosophies
and abandoned Islam.5 He concluded that
Darwinism was 'the underpinning of a dis-
honest philosophy, … materialism', and
hence the base for all ideologies and politi-
cal movements threatening Turkey (Yahya
1999b:1). According to him differentiating
between the theory of evolution and social
Darwinism is futile. Darwin's actual denunci-
ation of slavery notwithstanding, Harun
Yahya alleges that his only intention was to
legitimize colonialism and slavery. The
praise for Darwin by fascists and peripheral
anti-Turkish remarks in his private corre-
spondence enable Harun Yahya to hold him
responsible for the assassination of Turkish
immigrants by German neo-nazis in the
1990s (Yahya 1999a:40ff., 68ff.). The impor-
tance Marxists attach to Darwinism as a fel-
low materialist ideology lets Harun Yahya
draw a direct line between Darwin and the
separatist Kurdish Workers Party, PKK (Yahya
1999a:76ff.). As alternative to the materialist
ideologies he proposes an extremist variant
of idealism that denies the existence of the
material world altogether. The only thing
that exists is the soul in which God creates
sense perceptions. This immaterial soul can-
not be explained with reference to atoms
and molecules. Harun Yahya bolsters his
claim not only with reference to famous
Sufis but also by invoking Berkeley and
Wittgenstein (Yahya 1999b:174ff.). Although
Harun Yahya's primary motivation is political
and obviously anti-secularist, he refrains
from openly challenging Kemalism. He pub-
lished pamphlets that portray A t a t ü r k as a
devout believer who must be defended
against the claim of the materialists that he
was one of them (Yahya 2002).
Harun Yahya's worldview is conspirative.
For the success of Darwinism he holds re-
sponsible a mafia that controls scientific in-
stitutions and journals as well as popular
magazines like National Geographic and T h e
Scientific American. In the writings consid-
ered here he does not, however, suggest a
connection between his attacks against
Darwinism and his second most important
issue, Freemason and Templar conspiracies
(Yahya 2000b). Unlike other recent Islamist
conspirators he does not vilify Jews in gen-
eral. He describes Zionism as a result of a
complot by the Freemasons. Nevertheless
Harun Yahya propagates the theses of Holo-
caust deniers such as the German neo-nazi
Leuchter, which casts doubt of the serious-
ness of his attacks on nazism in his anti-evo-
lutionist writings (Yahya n.d.:77ff.).
Institutionalization at home,
reputation abroad
Harun Yahya has institutionalized his cam-
paign in the Bilim A raştırma Vakfı ( S c i e n c e
Research Endowment), which in 1998 began
to hold major conferences in Turkish cities
to which leading 'scientific creationists'
from America were invited. Secular-minded
scientists, who for some time did not take
the creationist challenge seriously, reacted
with the formation of the T ü r k Evrim Kurulu
(Turkish Evolution Association) that advo-
cates the teaching of evolution in schools
and organizes counter-campaigns.6 N e v e r-
theless Harun Yahya's theses made inroads
into the political mainstream. In 2001 an
ANAP deputy demanded censorship of for-
eign television stations that propagated the
theory of evolution.7 The Bilim A raş t ı r m a
V a k f ı attracted the suspicion of state au-
thorities in late 1999, but the allegations, in-
cluding sexual abuse, proved to be invalid.
However, Harun Yahya's slander campaign
against secular-minded professors of sci-
ence in 1999 led to a lawsuit that resulted in
hefty fines.8
Harun Yahya's works have been translated
into several languages including Arabic,
Spanish, Russian, Serbo-Croat, Urdu, Malay,
and German. In September/October 2001
three lecturing tours abroad were sched-
uled, to the US, Indonesia, and to the British
Isles. The conferences are generally hosted
by Muslim student associations. His articles
appear on many Islamic homepages kept by
organizations or individuals. His interna-
tional reputation is due to the extensive use
of the internet. He may thus be considered
the first Islamic intellectual who has based
his career on the use of this most up-to-date
technology. His writings show that Islamism
has a religious aspect that many studies fo-
cusing on political strategies neglect. In this
respect this ideology is more closely related
to its Protestant fundamentalist counterpart
than has been generally acknowledged
h i t h e r t o .
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The bulk of the publications by Harun Yahya
just reiterates – adorned with beautiful illus-
trations – the basic claims proposed in his
most popular work Evrim teorisinin ç ö k üş ü
(The Evolution Deceit) with detailed refer-
ence to certain phenomena. The religious
response to the theory of evolution – as well
as modern science in general – has been se-
riously neglected by Islamic studies. The few
research works that deal with the topic con-
cern the acceptance of the concept of evo-
lution by secular-minded intellectuals like
I s m aci l M a z h a r ,1 whereas his opposition in
Islamist circles has almost passed unno-
t i c e d ,2 although from early on Islamist
thinkers like Mawdudi stressed the contra-
diction between random selection and the
design of nature by God; and they de-
nounced the harmful effects of the theory of
evolution on society.
Scientific creationism
However, it was not before the 1980s that
the refutation of evolutionism became a
major issue in the Islamic world. This hap-
pened in the most Westernized and secular-
ized country of the Islamic world: Turkey.
Under military and later Motherland Party
(ANAP) rule evolution was not only con-
demned in 'religion and ethics' lessons but
was even deleted from the biology curricu-
lum. This occurred when a quietist version
of Islam was supposed to legitimize military
rule and deligitimize 'leftist materialism' by
promoting 'spiritual values'. In this period
the writings of a new generation of Ameri-
can Protestant fundamentalists were trans-
lated into Turkish. Authors like Duane Gish
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Since independence there is widespread grievance
among Kenyan Muslims who feel that the mainly
Christian regime treats them as second-class citizens
and discriminates against them economically and po-
litically. The government, for its part, has fears that
the influence of some foreign and local radical Mus-
lims could disrupt peace and security in Kenya. The
1992–1994 Muslim disturbances along the coast, the
twin bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and
Dar-es-Salaam in 1998, and the recent bombing of a
tourist hotel in Mombasa for which al-Q aci d a h a s
claimed responsibility intensify these fears. Never-
theless the vast majority of Kenyan Muslims are mod-
erate, reject violent extremism, and work to achieve
equal rights by peaceful means.
Islam and Politics
in Kenya
Kenya's six million Muslims form a signifi-
cant minority, representing 20 per cent of
the population. Their large number, com-
bined with the fact that most of them are
concentrated in economically and strategi-
cally important areas, gives the Muslims, at
least potentially, considerable political
weight. On the coastal strip and in the
towns there, such as Mombasa, Malindi, and
Lamu, Muslims account for more than 50
per cent of the population. On this strip live
the Swahilis (all of whom are Muslims),
Arabs, and people from various African eth-
nic groups that have adopted Islam. Anoth-
er important group of Muslims in Kenya are
the Somalis, who live in the Northeastern
Province. Their number is estimated at
about 600,000. There are also considerable
numbers of Muslims in the large towns, in-
cluding Nairobi. Among Kenya's Muslims
there are various groups and denomina-
tions. Due to the fact that Islamic penetra-
tion into the area came primarily from
Hadramaut, to the south of the Arabian
Peninsula, and was spread by Sunni S h a f ici
shaikhs, the great majority of Kenya's Mus-
lims are Sunni of the S h a f ici s c h o o l .
The Kenyan government, like the govern-
ments of Uganda, Tanzania, and most
African countries, prohibits the formation of
political parties based on religion. There-
fore, religious leaders – Muslim and Christ-
ian alike – set up 'religious' or 'social' organi-
zations through which they can express
their views. Since independence, many such
Muslim organizations have come and gone.
Some of them were regional or sectional,
others nationwide. They are supposed to
deal with educational, religious, and social
matters. Nevertheless, these organizations
have frequently become involved in politi-
cal concerns. The authorities in Kenya, like
those in Uganda and Tanzania, have them-
selves established Muslim umbrella organi-
zations and worked through them to obtain
Muslim support and to influence and super-
vise their activities. Many of the key posi-
tions in these organizations are occupied by
Muslims who support the government,
among them assistant ministers and senior
government or ruling-party officials. The
main Muslim umbrella organization is the
Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUP-
K E M ) .
Since independence, the authorities have
seen to it that Muslims are represented in
the government – in the ruling party and in
public institutions. Muslims have generally
been represented in government by two or
three assistant ministers who are loyal to
the regime, out of a total of forty to fifty
ministers and assistant ministers. The Mus-
lim assistant ministers generally come from
a very small circle. When President Moi
came to power in 1978, Muslims were gen-
erally better represented and, for the first
time, two Muslim ministers were appointed.
Furthermore, in 1982, a Somali Muslim Chief
of Staff was appointed. After the 1997 elec-
tions, there were 30 Muslim MPs out of 210
MPs (14.2 per cent).
There have been other concessions that
the government has made since indepen-
dence to gain Muslim support, especially in
periods of municipal, parliamentary, and
presidential elections, when the political
importance of the Muslims is especially no-
ticeable. Among these concessions were:
making the Muslim festival of Id al-Fitr a na-
tional public holiday in Kenya; enshrining
the position of chief q a d i in the constitution
(the chief q a d i is the highest Muslim reli-
gious official in Kenya and he serves as the
government's adviser in all matters pertain-
ing to Muslims); deciding on issues connect-
ed to inheritance, marriage, divorce, and
w a q f (endowment set aside for religious
purposes) in the s h a r ica courts by q a d is ap-
pointed by the chief q a d i; and taking into
account Muslim values and practices in
areas such as animal slaughter, autopsies,
dress, and identity cards.
Mutual suspicions
Muslim aspirations were not, however,
fully satisfied, nor were their many com-
plaints about discrimination silenced. Mus-
lim discontent was particularly evident on
the eve of the first multiparty elections in
1992. At the same time, government suspi-
cions of Muslim aspirations, rooted in both
historical and recent events, also intensified.
The government's suspicions were first
aroused by political developments on the
eve of Kenyan independence when Muslims
on the coast set up an organization called the
Mwambao United Front (MUF) (Mwambao
means 'coast' in Kiswahili). The MUF claimed
that the Muslim inhabitants of the coast were
a 'distinct social group' and should be grant-
ed autonomy or the option of seceding from
Kenya to establish a separate state or 'rejoin'
Zanzibar. In 1963, when Kenya became inde-
pendent, the coastal population's hopes for
separation or autonomy vanished, although
they have re-emerged from time to time in
different forms and have aroused displeasure
and fear in the government. Likewise, the So-
mali Muslims in the Northeastern Province
desired to join Somalia with which they had
ethnic, linguistic, social, and religious affini-
ties. After the British decided to include this
area in independent Kenya, the Somalis boy-
cotted the 1963 general elections that set the
stage for independence. Thereafter, for sev-
eral years there was unrest, and violent clash-
es occurred between Somali guerrillas,
known as Shifta, and the Kenyan security
f o r c e s .
Since then, the authorities in general
closely monitor Muslim political activities
and take harsh measures when these activi-
ties seem to threaten the government. The
Islamic activities of foreigners in Kenya are
watched especially closely. Nevertheless,
until the emergence of the Islamic Party of
Kenya (IPK), the mutual suspicion between
the government and the coastal Muslims
seldom led to violent confrontations.
The Islamic Party of Kenya
In January 1992, immediately after the
government acceptance of a multiparty sys-
tem for the forthcoming presidential and
parliamentary elections, several Muslim ac-
tivists in Mombasa established the IPK. Until
that time, Kenya had had a one-party sys-
tem. The government refused to recognize
the IPK on the grounds that it was a reli-
gious political party and thus violated the
principle of the separation of church and
state. At this stage, the IPK's demand for
recognition won wide support from Mus-
lims, both from the coastal strip and from
other parts of the country. In Mombasa, es-
pecially, IPK supporters became the main
political force and the government's refusal
to recognize the party caused violent distur-
bances there in May 1992. This was the first
of a series of clashes between IPK activists
and government forces that continued spo-
radically for nearly two years.
The outbreak of violence reflected Muslim
grievances and deep feelings of discrimina-
tion. During the colonial era and since inde-
pendence, Muslims have repeatedly com-
plained that the mainly Christian regime
discriminates against them and treats them
as second-class citizens. For example, they
are normally under-represented in public
institutions. Before colonialism they were
the most culturally advanced group and
were the rulers of Kenya's coastal region,
whereas today Muslims are less advanced
than the Christians and lag behind in educa-
tion. They have been denied land owner-
ship, while Christians from the interior have
been given land on the coastal strip and
control the main sources of income there,
especially tourism. 
Against this background of Muslim dissat-
isfaction, a young shaikh, Khalid Balala, ap-
peared on the scene and became the main
exponent of Islamic extremism in Kenya dur-
ing the violent disturbances of 1992–1994.
Balala demanded the legalization of the IPK,
stressing that in Islam there is no separation
of religion and state and that politics is part
of religion. Initially he enjoyed wide Muslim
support and became the uncrowned head
and spokesman of the IPK, which became
much more radical under his leadership. His
supporters, especially the youth, and some
extremist elements began to clash with the
security forces. Balala publicly demanded
that President Moi's regime be overthrown,
and accused him of despotism and corrup-
tion. He also called on Muslims to be strict in
observing Islamic practices, especially daily
prayers. He demanded that the s h a r ica l a w
be applied in all spheres of Muslim life. Bal-
ala advocated violence to achieve these
aims. 
The wave of violence in Mombasa sur-
prised and concerned the authorities and
reawakened the deep suspicions dating
from the attempts by the Muslim coastal
strip to break away from Kenya at indepen-
dence. There was also apprehension lest the
unrest spread from Mombasa to other Mus-
lim centres, as indeed happened in Lamu
and Malindi. Eventually the government
succeeded in crushing Balala and the mili-
tant Muslims, using the carrot-and-stick and
divide-and-rule tactics. Extremists were ar-
rested and brutal force was used against
them. On the other hand, the regime began
to look more favourably on the demands of
moderate Muslims. In addition, the United
Muslims of Africa (UMA) was established by
government supporters as an opposition to
the IPK.
The 1998 bombing of the US embassies in
Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam by foreign Mus-
lim extremists assisted, it is suspected, by
some locals highlighted again the problem-
atic relationship between the Muslims and
the regime. The government shut down
several Muslim NGOs and deported some
non-indigenous workers who were suspect-
ed of links with radical Middle Eastern orga-
nizations, on the grounds that they posed a
threat to security. The Muslim community
was enraged by the crackdown on the NGOs
and leaders of all persuasions condemned
the government action. They claimed that,
by shutting down only Muslim NGOs imme-
diately after the bombing, the government
had put the onus of responsibility on the
Muslim community. President Moi met with
SUPKEM leaders and made some conciliato-
ry gestures to the Muslims, but radical Mus-
lims continued to criticize the government
and attacked the West in general and the US
in particular. This division between moder-
ates and radical, as well as ethnic, religious,
political, and personal rivalries within the
Muslim community, weaken them in their
confrontation with the regime.
It is likely that Islam as a religion will fur-
ther expand and gain strength in Kenya. In
its non-extremist form, it may well assume a
greater political role in the light of the polit-
ical progress Muslims are making in the field
of education and the increasing numbers of
Muslim intellectuals, journalists, and politi-
cians. The prolonged struggle against gov-
ernment policies has fostered Muslim soli-
darity and self-consciousness, even among
non-observant Muslims. The majority of
Muslims are moderate, tolerant, and prag-
matic and know that the government will
never tolerate secession. The Kenyan gov-
ernment, for its part, needs to be more un-
derstanding and responsive to justified
Muslim grievances, to provide Muslims with
equal opportunities, and make greater ef-
forts to integrate them into government
and public life. 
Arye Oded is a senior lecturer at the Institute of
African and Asian Studies of the Hebrew University,
Jerusalem. He is the author of several books on Islam
in East Africa, among them Islam and Politics in
Kenya (Boulder and London, 2000).
E-mail: msao@mscc.huji.ac.il
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So uthea st As i a
M A RT I N  V A N  B R U I N E S S E N
The 12 October bombing in Bali that killed more than
180 people seemed to vindicate the claims of those
who had been accusing the Indonesian authorities of
deliberately ignoring the presence on Indonesian
soil of Islamic terrorists connected with al-Q aci d a
network. More sober voices commented that domes-
tic power struggles, rather than international terror-
ism, might be responsible for this outrage. It was the
largest, but by no means the first major bomb explo-
sion in Indonesia.
Indonesia has seen many bomb explosions
since the fall of Suharto in May 1998, and in
many cases military personnel appear to be
involved. There are also, however, a number
of small but conspicuously violent radical Is-
lamic movements that engage in jihad in
such places as the Moluccas and Central Su-
lawesi or act as vigilante squads raiding
nightclubs, discotheques, and other dens of
i n e q u i t y .1 Surprisingly perhaps, several of
these militias maintain close relations with
factions in the military or political élite.
Laskar Jihad
The largest and best organized of the vari-
ous Muslim militias – until it was suddenly
disbanded in early October, only days before
the Bali bombing – was the Laskar Jihad,
which was established in response to the
onset of civil war between Christians and
Muslims in the Moluccas, in 2000.2 I d e o l o g i-
cally this movement is very close to the Saudi
religious establishment. Its leader, J acf a r
Umar Thalib, had studied with strict Salafi
ulama in Saudi Arabia and Yemen and taken
part in jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
After his return to Indonesia, he became one
of the leading lights of the Indonesian Salafi
movement, which promoted, Wahhabi style,
an apolitical Islam based on a strictly literal
reading of the Qur'an and h a d i t h. Most mem-
bers appeared to be students or university
graduates and dropouts. Religious leader-
ship is provided by young men, mostly of
Arab descent like J acf a r himself, who have
also studied with Arabian Salafi ulama. 
Laskar Jihad had the visible support of ele-
ments in the police and armed forces. It
moved thousands of fighters to Ambon and
later to other conflict areas in Central Sulawe-
si, West Papua, and Acheh. In all these areas,
a close cooperation with the Indonesian mili-
tary, notably the Special Forces (Kopassus)
developed. 
Following 11 September, Laskar Jihad im-
mediately took pains to distance itself from
Usama bin Laden. J acf a r Umar Thalib de-
clared that he had met Usama back in the
1980s when he fought in Afghanistan but did
not consider him as a good Muslim. The
Laskar Jihad website reproduced a fatwa by
the late grand mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abdu-
laziz bin Baz, in which Usama bin Laden was
declared an erring sectarian and rebel, whose
example no pious Muslim should follow.
In April 2002, the Laskar Jihad challenged
a peace agreement between Ambonese
Christians and Muslims that had been bro-
kered by cabinet ministers. A Christian vil-
lage was raided and part of its population
massacred. Eyewitnesses claim that Laskar
Jihad fighters carried out this raid jointly
with a Kopassus unit. This time, J acf a r w a s
detained and put on trial. While his trial was
continuing, J acf a r announced in early Octo-
ber 2002 the disbanding of the Laskar Jihad
and ordered his followers to return to their
homes. These instructions were in most
places obeyed with a surprising meekness. 
J e m a a h Islamiyah 
The organization most often mentioned
as a likely perpetrator of the Bali bomb mas-
sacre is the Jemaah Islamiyah, which has
been described by some experts as the
Southeast Asian branch of al-Q aci d a. Four al-
leged members of this network are often
mentioned as its chief terrorists: Hambali,
alias Ridwan Isamuddin, a West Javanese ac-
cused of masterminding the bombing of
churches in 10 Indonesian cities at Christ-
mas in 2000, and of taking part in a series of
bombings in Manila in 2000 (still at large);
Abdur Rahman al-Ghozi, an East Javanese,
arrested in the Philippines in January 2002,
who reportedly confessed to having taken
part in the same bombings in Manila in 2000
and in preparations for attacks on US assets
in Singapore; Muhammad Iqbal bin Abdur-
rahman, alias Abu Jibril, of Lombok, author
of a book on the obligation for every Muslim
to carry out jihad, and a recruiter for jihad in
the Moluccas, has been detained in Malaysia
since January 2002 and accused of acting as
a financial conduit for al-Q aci d a; and Agus
Dwikarna, who was arrested at Manila Air-
port in March 2002 when the authorities al-
legedly found a large amount of explosives
in his luggage. Dwikarna is the commander
of a Muslim militia, Jundullah, in his native
province of South Sulawesi. 
Abu Bakar B aca s y i r is alleged to be the
spiritual leader of this network, although he
cannot be directly linked to any of the inci-
dents. All four men named above have an
undeniable direct connection with him,
however: al-Ghozi studied at his school, Abu
Jibril paid a recent visit to the school and
took part in the founding conference of a
militant organization that chose B acasyir a s
its leader, and Dwikarna is a committee
member of that same organization. Hambali
is reported to have lived near B aca s y i r d u r-
ing part of the period the latter spent in
M a l a y s i a .
It is not entirely clear to what extent this
Jemaah Islamiyah actually is a real organiza-
tion with a well-defined membership and
structure of authority. Abu Bakar B aca s y i r
has not been afraid of openly proclaiming
his admiration for Usama bin Laden, but he
denies any direct contact with him. B aca s y i r
is the a m i r or commander of a public associ-
ation of radical Muslims, the Council of
Jihad Fighters (Majelis Mujahidin), that was
established in August 2002. This organiza-
tion has a paramilitary wing, the Laskar Mu-
jahidin, which has trained followers in guer-
rilla techniques and sent them to fight a
jihad in the Moluccas. At least dozens, possi-
bly a few hundred, of its members gained
combat experience in Afghanistan in the
1980s; many more are likely to have fought
in the southern Philippines. 
The term J e m a a hI s l a m i y a h has been used
repeatedly during the past twenty years by
police authorities as the name for a loose
network of radicals in which B aca s y i r, be-
sides another preacher of Arab descent, Ab-
dullah Sungkar, played a central role. They
jointly led an Islamic boarding school near
the town of Solo since the early 1970s, and
they joined the underground Darul Islam
movement opposing the Suharto regime
and striving for an Islamic state. 
They contributed to this movement ideas
that they borrowed from the Egyptian Mus-
lim Brothers (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun). The
struggle for an Islamic state, according to
these ideas, was a step-by-step process in
which the activist had first to engage in
moral self-improvement, then to be part of
a 'family' (u s r a h) of like-minded people who
guide, help, and control one another. These
are steps towards the building of an Islamic
community (j a m aca h i s l a m i y a h), which in
turn is a precondition for the establishment
of an Islamic state. From their Islamic school
near Solo, B aca s y i r and Sungkar set up a net-
work of committed young Muslims, some of
them quietist, some of them militants, all of
them opposed to the Suharto regime, orga-
nized in 'families' that together were to con-
stitute a true community of committed
Muslims, a j a m aca hi s l a m i y a h. 
Facing arrest in the mid-1980s, B aca s y i r
and Sungkar escaped to Malaysia. Accord-
ing to sources close to the Usrah movement,
a Saudi recruiting officer visited Indonesia
in 1984 or 1985 and identified Sungkar's
and another Darul Islam-related group as
the only firm and disciplined Islamic com-
munities (j a m aca h) capable of jihad. Both
were offered financial support to send 50
fighters to Afghanistan. Sungkar found only
four men willing to go, the other group
eight men. The following year, slightly larg-
er groups of volunteers were sent, and so it
went on until 1989, when the Russians with-
drew from Afghanistan. Henceforth, they
sent their militants to the southern Philip-
p i n e s .
For fourteen years, Sungkar and B aca s y i r
remained in Malaysia, living in a village with
a circle of their closest disciples and travel-
ling around delivering religious sermons.
They were visited by radicals from Indonesia
and other regions of Southeast Asia. After
Suharto's fall, they returned to Indonesia.
Sungkar died in Jakarta during his first re-
turn visit; B aca s y i r settled again in his p e-
s a n t r e n at Ngruki near Solo. The establish-
ment of the Majelis Mujahidin in August
2000 gave him a very public profile. 
Other groups
There are a number of other, loosely con-
nected and to some extent competing un-
derground networks that continue the
struggle for an Islamic state in Indonesia.
They go by the old name of Darul Islam or al-
ternatively NII/TII, abbreviations for Islamic
State of Indonesia/Islamic Army of Indone-
sia. They are not known to have been in-
volved in major violent incidents recently.
The Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Front of De-
fenders of Islam), with its members dressed
in white flowing robes and white turbans,
has been conspicuous in numerous demon-
strations in Jakarta. They carried out numer-
ous raids on bars, brothels, and nightclubs
in Jakarta and the nearby hill districts, caus-
ing great material damage but few casual-
ties. Their leader, Habib (Sayyid) Rizieq Shi-
hab, also studied in Saudi Arabia and is a
firm proponent of the application of the
s h a r ica in public life. He appears to have ex-
cellent relations with members of the mili-
tary and political élite. The Front is definite-
ly the least ideologically motivated of the
militant groups listed here, and it is believed
that its successes in bringing demonstrators
to the streets are primarily due to financial
incentives. Not long after 12 October, Rizieq
Shihab was arrested (for reasons apparently
unrelated to the Bali bombing) and the
Front was ordered to disband, which the
members did without any sign of protest.
The ease with which FPI and Laskar Jihad
could be disbanded once the military au-
thorities really demanded so not only indi-
cates the degree to which both have come
under military influence but also reflects the
fact that they accept the (secular) govern-
ment of Indonesia as legitimate in principle
– unlike the Majelis Mujahidin, which wishes
to transform it into an Islamic state and has
not been known to court military or civilian
élite factions. 
N o t e s
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The Violent Fringes 
of Indonesia's Islam
Abu Bakar
B aca s y i r holding a
news conference
in Solo.
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A r g e n t i n a
P E D R O  B R I E G E R
The attack on New York's Twin Towers on 11 Septem-
ber 2001 had negative repercussions all over the
globe, including in Argentina. Since then, leaders of
the Muslim community in Argentina have been invit-
ed by the mass media to explain the causes of the at-
tacks, as if Muslims all over the world were in some
way linked to the terrorists and their ideas. Although
they were approached with respect on many radio
and television programmes, there were clear expres-
sions of discrimination and ridicule of Muslims and
their beliefs.
Latin Islam since
1 1 S e p t e m b e r
At dawn on Sunday, 14 July 2002, the main
cemetery of the Muslim community of Ar-
gentina was the object of an attack. Just a
few miles from the centre of Buenos Aires,
taking advantage of the fact that the ceme-
tery does not have special security, uniden-
tified persons entered and desecrated
about 150 graves. Although the graves were
not completely destroyed and the buried
bodies remained untouched, it was clear
that the intention was to cause as much
damage as possible to the maximum num-
ber of graves. The Islamic Cemetery of
Buenos Aires was inaugurated in 1961, and
there is little movement because – as Zule-
ma Hamze, secretary of the cemetery since
1984, notes – there are only about 4 to 5 fu-
nerals per month.1 The media did put the
cemetery in the spotlight on the occasion of
the funeral of ex-president Carlos Menem's
son, Carlos Facundo Menem, who died in an
accident under unclear circumstances in
March 1995.
The motives of the assailants were un-
known, since no pamphlets were found ex-
plaining their actions and no anti-Islamic
slogans were painted. On Tuesday, 16 July,
the newspaper C l a r í n, with the largest circu-
lation in Argentina, dedicated its editorial to
the desecration of the cemetery. Displaying
the usual confusion between Arabs and
Muslims, C l a r í n ran a headline that read 'The
Desecration of the Islamic Cemetery' and
proceeded to explain that 'aggression of
this nature does not just attack one commu-
nity in particular, in this case the Arabic one,
but all of society.'2 In contrast, for the jour-
nalist R a ú l Kollman, who has investigated
the repeated attacks against Jewish ceme-
teries and is the author of the book S o m b r a s
de Hitler (Shadows of Hitler), acts of violence
against cemeteries are always the work of
the police, who in this way attempt to settle
internal political issues of the country. 'We
are already familiar with this story', writes
Kollman, '[e]very time there is a moment of
convulsion in the Buenos Aires police corps,
a spectacular desecration of graves takes
place…. Just like with the Jewish cemeter-
ies, the attacks were now against Muslim
graves. The idea is to create an international
impact and to put Minister Cafiero (chief of
security of the province of Buenos Aires) on
the spot.'3 Kollman is convinced that the at-
tack on the Islamic cemetery is a discrimina-
tory act, given the fact that 'there is no his-
tory of desecration of Catholic cemeteries,
and here the Muslims are clearly a scape-
goat, as Jews are in other cases.' Beyond the
internal Argentinean political motivations
that the facts may be based on, and even
though the desecration of the graves may
not have been targeted towards Muslims,
the Islamic community did experience it as a
discriminatory act.
Adalberto Assad, president of the ceme-
tery and the Argentinean Arab Islamic Asso-
ciation, believes that 'this is another attack
against our community by people who want
to spread chaos in society. It also goes
against the entire social fabric.' For Sheikh
Abdul Karim Paz of the S h ici t e mosque at-
Tauhid of the Flores neighbourhood, 'it is
the first time that the community goes
through something like this; it is a very bit-
ter moment. The message is terrible and de-
c e i t f u l . '
The desecration of the graves, however, is
not the first violent act against the Islamic
community in Argentina, since two of the
three mosques in the country have been
the target of attacks in the past. In January
2001, strangers threw a bomb against the
façade of at-Tauhid mosque, and in June
1986, a few days before the inauguration of
the mosque on Alberti Street, an explosive
device blew up the windows facing the
s t r e e t .
Personal experiences
When consulted on the subject of discrim-
ination, most of the members of the Muslim
community tend to say that there is no dis-
crimination in Argentina. Imam Mahmud
Husain, ex-president of the Association for
the Spreading of Islam in Latin America and
director of the Centre of Higher Islamic
Studies in Argentina, has tried on more than
one occasion to organize the Islamic com-
munity politically, but his attempts have
failed. Husain compares the experience of
the Muslims with that of Jews, who organize
themselves easily because 'they have a his-
toric experience of persecution, they are in a
hostile environment. The Christian environ-
ment is hostile to Jews, and as a minority
they need to always be represented politi-
cally. This has not been the case with Mus-
lims. We could say that Judaism as a minori-
ty always acts with a minority awareness,
whereas Islam as a minority acts with a ma-
jority awareness. Tradition itself has led
Islam to do so, because it sees itself as all
peoples, all persons, all races, and all cul-
tures. It does not see itself as a minority.'
Nonetheless, until the reform of the Con-
stitution in 1994, advanced by ex-president
Carlos S a ú l Menem, Muslims were discrimi-
nated against at some of the most important
government levels, such as access to the
presidency, which was off limits. As admitted
by his ex-wife, Zulema Yoma, Menem aban-
doned Islam and converted to Christianity in
1966 because his main ambition was to be-
come president of the country and the 1853
Constitution prevented non-Catholics from
holding that position. According to that
Constitution, when taking office the presi-
dent and vice-president had to swear by say-
ing 'I, [name], pledge by God our Lord and
these Holy Gospels, to perform with loyalty
and patriotism the function of president.'4
Once in the presidency, Menem promoted
the reform of the Constitution, and since
1994 the only requirement to become presi-
dent is to have been born in Argentinean
territory or be the child of a native citizen.5
The reform also altered the pledge, and
when taking office the president and vice-
president now vow to 'perform loyally and
with patriotism the function of president (or
vice-president) of the Nation and observe
the Constitution of the Argentinean Nation,
respecting its religious beliefs.'6
It is only when one delves into the person-
al experiences of Muslims in Argentina that
discrimination comes out into the open,
going beyond the typical association of
'Turkish' (which equals Muslim or Arab),
which Muslims have already come to accept
as part of the country's folklore. The archi-
tect Hamurabi Noufouri, son of Syrian par-
ents, is professor of Islamic and Mudejar Art
since 1998 in the departments of Architec-
ture, Industrial Design, Dress Design, and
Textile Design at Buenos Aires University. In
December 2000 he was informed that his
position at the Faculty of Architecture
would be revoked, although he would con-
tinue in the other departments. He was ver-
bally told that his subject, 'although cultur-
ally interesting, is not pertinent to the offi-
cial programme',7 which Noufouri consid-
ered to be an act of discrimination. He
promptly complained in a formal letter to
several academic institutions and to the Na-
tional Institute against Discrimination,
Xenophobia, and Racism (INADI). Noufouri
gave a great deal of publicity to his situa-
tion, and although he never received an of-
ficial answer from the university, in October
2001 he was informed that the subject
would be reinstated to the architecture fac-
ulty. Noufouri, who was a cultural aide at the
Islamic Centre of the Argentine Republic
(CIRA), affirms that despite his problem he is
not discriminated against for being a Mus-
lim, although 'there is always some kind of
differential consideration when they find
out I am a Muslim.'
One of the most symbolic cases of an
openly anti-Islamic attitude took place on
television. In September 2001, after the at-
tacks on the Twin Towers, the journalist
Guillermo Cherasny, known for his public
statements in favour of the military taking
armed action against the democratic sys-
tem, said in a broadcast of his television pro-
gramme B r o k e r s that 'Arabs and Muslims are
damn nazis'. These words gave cause to a
public legal complaint of CIRA against the
journalist – which is not over yet.8
It is still very difficult to determine if the
desecration of graves at the Islamic Ceme-
tery was an anti-Islamic action. The ambigu-
ous relationship between misunderstand-
ing, ignorance, and discriminatory attitudes
against minorities, and the particularities of
Argentinean politics, which always contains
elements of violence, do not allow us to ar-
rive at a clear-cut conclusion. In any event,
regardless of the intention of those who
desecrated the graves, for the Islamic com-
munity of Argentina this was yet another
link in a campaign against Islam that was
only enhanced after 11 September. Concur-
ring with the journalist Simon Birinder of
the Buenos Aires Herald, one could also say
that, more than discrimination, 'it is unfortu-
nate but true, that few Argentines really un-
derstand what Islam is about.'9
N o t e s
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N o t e s
1 . According to the latest data produced by
t h e international community, Kosova's rural
population is the poorest in Europe, after Moldova
and Tajikistan. Unemployment throughout the
country is around 80 per cent, and upwards of
2 0 per cent of the population lives in abject
poverty. See ICG, 'A Kosovo Road Map: Final
Status' (www.crisisweb.org).
2 . Consult the Official Saudi information website for
news on activities of various Saudi 'charities' in
Kosova (www.saudinf.com).
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The Ba l ka ns
I S A  B L U MI
'Albanians have been Muslims for more than 500
years and they do not need outsiders [Arabs] to tell
them what is the proper way to practise Islam.' Mufti
of Kosova, Rexhep Boja's recent retort to the efforts
of Arab NGOs to impose their Salafi practices on
Kosovar Albanians reflects a largely unappreciated
phenomenon in the post-communist Balkans. The
following exposes the questionable manner in which
Western powers have compartmentalized their pri-
orities in the region and how Saudi-based humani-
tarian agencies have filled in the vacuum. At issue is
how Western policies of 'conflict resolution' have left
'ethno-religious' communities at the mercy of inter-
national, 'faith-based' organizations that, in turn, ex-
ploit the poverty and fragmented social conditions
of – in our case here – Albanians. 
I n d o c t r i n a t i n g
A l b a n i a n s
Dynamics of Islamic Aid
As a result of policies that have basically de-
ferred addressing rural Kosova's social and
economic needs to organizations whose
basic modus operandi is the religious indoc-
trination of the population, much of Koso-
va's rural society is being isolated from their
fellow countrymen and the world at large. A
result of such isolation is the increasing vul-
nerability of Kosova's Muslims to hostility
emanating from those very Western gov-
ernments that neglected to address their
initial needs. It is therefore ironic that as
self-proclaimed Western societies cower be-
fore the 'the rise of Islamic fundamentalism',
their discriminatory policies towards Koso-
va's rural 'Muslim' population may prove to
be directly responsible for the production of
Europe's own 'Taliban', which in the future
may indeed prove hostile to 'Western values
and interests'. 
Future t a l i bs ?
The central problem is not doctrinal but
socio-economic. After decades of discrimi-
nation and two years of war resulting in the
murder of much of the adult male popula-
tion in rural areas, Kosova's peasants are liv-
ing in abject poverty.1 Many rural communi-
ties in Kosova have, as a result, become
more or less dependent on outside NGOs.
The most active in rural Kosova has been the
Saudi Joint Committee for the Relief of
Kosova and Chechnya (SJCRKC), which has
provided for the basic daily needs of over a
hundred communities. While food, housing,
and clothing are provided by the SJCRKC, its
primary task has been education. The forced
segregation of the sexes in schools, the
focus on young male education based on
the memorization of the Qur'an, and little if
any emphasis on what many would deem
essential survival skills have attracted the
suspicion of Kosova's indigenous Muslim
and secular leaders. 
As a consequence, open hostility towards
Saudi efforts to control the content of the
spiritual lives of Albanians, the destruction
of many historical sites deemed to encour-
age 'idolatry', and other confrontations be-
tween indigenous forms of religious prac-
tice and what many see as 'Arab cultural im-
perialism' have become manifest. While
small numbers of Albanians from the former
Yugoslavia did go to study Islamic theology
in the Arabic-speaking world (many trav-
elled to study under the now deceased Al-
banian-born scholar, Nasir al Din al-Albani),
the vast majority of Albanians had no previ-
ous cultural contact with the larger Islamic
world. The recent influences from the out-
side, with their substantial aid packages,
have clearly changed this. The nature of this
change is creating an environment that pits
local organizations trying to maintain local
Islamic traditions, as personified by Rexhep
Boja and the Albanian grand mufti, Hafiz
Koçi, against those influenced by imported
p r a c t i c e s .
Despite their efforts, with little or no fi-
nancial resources of their own and the ne-
glect of interest among the members of
Kosova's internationally imposed adminis-
trators, Kosova's leaders are incapable of
providing an alternative to the Salafi educa-
tional practices that are being propagated
in many parts of rural Kosova. The SJCRKC
reported in late 2001 to have invested four
million Saudi riyals in Kosova. Nearly half of
that (about USD 500,000) had been spent to
sponsor 388 religious 'propagators' (i.e. mis-
sionaries) in the immediate post-war period.
What these propagators – whom I would
call experts in post-conflict assessment –
did was identify the communities most suit-
able to their agenda. While there are no offi-
cial numbers published, at least 98 mosque
complexes with and without accompanying
schools have been built in rural Kosova as a
result of their work.2 One can draw compar-
isons to Afghan communities in the 1980s
when large numbers of orphaned and sin-
gle-mother families were also dependent
on Saudi 'charity' in the border refugee
camps of Pakistan. As with Afghans, rural
Kosovars, dependant on the 'generosity' of
others, have become vulnerable to 'foreign'
doctrines and practices.
In many ways local resistance to SJCRKC
has taken on the tone of general hostility to-
wards Arabs that is being beamed across
the 24-hour news programmes watched
with great interest in Kosova. There is a
growing sense among Kosova's urban pop-
ulation, for instance, that by being associat-
ed to the same faith as Usama bin Laden
(there is no differentiation made between
Salafi practitioners in Kosova – locals call
them m u h a j a d d i n – today and Bin Laden),
that Kosovars' long-term desires for inde-
pendence are being in some way jeopar-
dized. As a result, new political lines are
being drawn in Kosovar society, reflecting
more than ever the rural/urban divide that
has historically divided the Kosova popula-
tion (Blumi 2001). In reaction, many among
those who have become reliant on SJCRKC
assistance feel persecuted, a condition that
is politicized by some. Political Islam as it
has emerged in other parts of the world,
therefore, while still at its infancy in Kosova
is transforming to fit local dynamics. One
can follow in the Islamic Community of
Kosova's (Bashkesia Islame e Kosovës (BIK))
journal T a k v i m i, the occasional debate over
the merits of an Islamic party in dealing with
the political and social issues plaguing
Kosova today. Indeed, advocates for the cre-
ation of an Islamic party in general reveal a
growing sense of political power in rural
Kosovar society, one that is becoming more
interventionist when it comes to influenc-
ing cultural mores and articulating a distinc-
tive voice for rural Kosova. 
A l b a n i a
Interestingly, Albanians are not destined
to take the 'Taliban' route. Indeed, Muslims
in Albania have successfully thwarted the
penetration of Wahhabi extremism in their
communities. Unlike rural Kosova, parents
in Albania always had a number of options
for educating their children. This proves key.
In Albania, not only are there dozens of
schools that have been erected since 1990
by foreign Christian organizations that try
to woo the population away from their 50
years of communist indoctrination, but a
Turkish faith-based organization inspired by
the liberal Fetullah G ü l e n has also opened a
number of well-attended d e r s h a n es in Alba-
nia (Agai 2002; Balci 2002). Armed with doc-
trinal and sectarian alternatives, local Mus-
lims in the Albanian-speaking regions of the
Balkans prove, when given a choice, effec-
tive in staving off the indoctrinating efforts
of outside interests. In Albania, as noted in
interviews with the grand mufti of Albania
and others, Arab Salafi organizations, while
targeting Albania as a potential area of in-
fluence in the early 1990s, have all but aban-
doned the country, choosing to focus their
resources on Kosova's rural population. Why
this happened is significant in that Albani-
ans in Albania clearly made a choice to not
go down the Wahhabi route. Salafi organi-
zations, eager to proselytize as other evan-
gelical groups coming from the United
States or their Greek Orthodox rivals south
of the border, learned that Albanian Mus-
lims, when armed with a choice between
their brand of intolerant and rigid spirituali-
ty and others, preferred the milder track.
This lesson could again be taught in Kosova
if communities were given similar resources.
Among Albanian-speaking Muslims, the
issues discussed here are particularly impor-
tant as their self-perceived place in the
world is now dominated by anti-Muslim
sentiments. The sense of being unwelcome
by Europe, of being persecuted and indeed
blamed for events taking place in other
parts of the globe by Americans is a com-
mon theme among self-identified Muslims
today. This sense of exclusion is being used
in some quarters to shift community loyal-
ties away from Europe and the United
States. Such a sense of increasing isolation,
as European, US, and non-denominational
organizations continue to ignore the spiri-
tual, educational, and cultural needs of local
populations, breeds the right kind of resent-
ment needed to produce a new generation
of supporters of anti-Western causes. With
more than 98 primary and secondary
schools built throughout rural Kosova, the
creation of a new generation of Albanian
Muslims is underway. As the outside world
has given free reign to Saudi-based organi-
zations to set up orphanages, mosques, and
schools, the results in the isolated regions of
Kosova are already evident. 
While many continue to resist the sectari-
an implications of these activities, others
concede that the arrival of these proselytiz-
ing organizations are creating internal con-
flicts as people are drawn by promises of
money, jobs, education, and indeed a new
identity. Unless immediate attention is paid
to providing an alternative for rural commu-
nities in Kosova, the spectacle of outside
powers manipulating internal sectarian dif-
ferences, as in Lebanon in the 1970s and
1980s, is a distinct possibility. It would be
yet another tragic demonstration of West-
ern short-sightedness that its failure to pro-
vide a few million dollars to rebuild the lives
of hundreds of thousands of human beings
would result in decades of conflict and in-
stability. The economic stinginess and the
cultural chauvinism that produces this ne-
glect may come back to haunt Europe, end-
ing any illusion that things have been made





A l b a n i a .
Activism1 0 I S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  1 1 / 0 2
South Af r ic a
S I N D R E  B A N G S T A D
Two years after the first free elections in the history
of South Africa, which brought the liberation move-
ment to political power, a new twist was added to the
seemingly ever-present violence of the gang-lands
of Cape Town. A vigilante movement dominated by
Cape Muslims, People Against Gangsterism and
Drugs (PAGAD), launched a series of assassinations
of local drug lords and vowed to free the post-
apartheid townships of the scourge of crime and
drugs. Since autumn of the year 2000, PAGAD's mili-
tant actions have ceased to pose a security threat in
Cape Town. Most of the militants of the movement
are behind bars. But even long after the movement
reached its zenith and decline, academics have failed
to reach a consensus over what the peculiar phenom-
enon of PAGAD actually represented.
Revisiting PAGAD
Machoism or Islamism?
PAGAD grew out of a network of civic move-
ments and neighbourhood watches on the
so-called Cape Flats, and was established by
a group of predominantly Muslim teachers
and social workers in 1996. Cape Flats refers
to the residential areas to which Cape
Town's coloured population was forcibly re-
moved when strict residential segregation
was imposed by the apartheid authorities in
the 1960s and 1970s. The living conditions
in the townships of the Cape Flats vary, but
the general pattern is one of overcrowding,
lack of public facilities, and increasing un-
employment. For the coloured gangs in-
volved in crime and trafficking in drugs, the
Cape Flats had proven to be fertile ground
for recruitment ever since the forced re-
movals. Among ordinary township resi-
dents, there was at the time of PAGAD's
emergence a perception to the effect that
the level of crime had spiralled out of con-
trol since the abolishment of apartheid, and
that the post-apartheid authorities were un-
able and unwilling to curtail the activities of
township gangs.
From the outset, PAGAD was a media phe-
nomenon. The movement burst into the
media headlines when a renowned gangster
from the Cape Flats, Rashaad Staggie, was
assassinated in camera by a mob of PAGAD
supporters outside his home in the suburb
of Salt River on 4 August 1996. South African
vigilantism has traditions dating back to the
late 19t h century. What was new in the case
of PAGAD was that this time it was perpe-
trated by a movement drawing heavily on
the religious imagery of Islam. PAGAD's
stance towards the local media was ambigu-
ous: on the one hand, PAGAD leaders knew
very well that township youngsters in Cape
Town were attracted by the visual images of
the seemingly omnipotent, scarf-clad PAGAD
members that appeared in the media. On the
other hand, the white-dominated media was
lambasted as 'Islamophobic' by PAGAD on
various occasions. 
The Muslims of Cape Town
The coloured Muslims of Cape Town are
the descendants of slaves and political ex-
iles brought to the 'Mother City' in the peri-
od between 1658 and 1808, and of misce-
genation between the various ethnic
groups present in South Africa through and
since the colonial era. The Indian Muslims of
Cape Town are the descendants of free Mus-
lim tradesmen and some indentured labour-
ers that both arrived in South Africa in the
late 19t h century. Whereas a mere 1.4 per
cent of South Africans are Muslim, approxi-
mately 10.4 per cent of Cape Townians are
M u s l i m .1 Historically, the cultural and reli-
gious practices of the Cape Muslims have
been heavily influenced by Sufism. The
Islam of the Cape Muslims can generally be
considered as tolerant, which is indicated by
a high frequency of intermarrying and so-
cializing with non-Muslims, especially
among the poorer sections of the communi-
ty. 
Throughout the years of apartheid, most
Cape Muslims remained politically compla-
cent. Individual Muslims, such as the Pan-
Africanist Congress-oriented imam Abdul-
lah Haron (who died in police detention in
1969) made great sacrifices in the struggle
against apartheid. The Pan-Africanist Con-
gress was a splinter group from the ANC
Youth League, established in 1959 under
the leadership of Robert Mangaliso Sobuk-
we. Young Muslim anti-apartheid activists
took part in the struggle of the streets in Call
of Islam and Qibla, as well as in the umbrella
anti-apartheid movement United Democra-
tic Front2 in the 1980s, but they were in mi-
nority in their communities. In the post-
apartheid context, however, one has seen a
selective process of remembering among
Cape Muslims in which the Muslim contri-
bution to the fight against apartheid, rather
than the complacency of most Muslims in
that era, has been highlighted. It seems rea-
sonable to regard this as the outcome of the
attempts of Cape Muslim leaders to position
the Muslim community vis-à-vis the post-
apartheid authorities.3
The internal conflicts 
The assassination of Rashaad Staggie in
1996 exposed the conflictive interests and
opinions of Cape Muslims. The state appara-
tus, represented by the senior ANC minister
Mohammed 'Dullah' Omar, had initially
sought to bring PAGAD into alignment with
the government through talks with the lead-
ers of the movement, but through the assas-
sination of Staggie, PAGAD had in effect
made this impossible. PAGAD was labelled a
vigilante movement by the government,
and the minority of Cape Muslims support-
ive of the ANC government turned their
backs towards PAGAD's actions, which they
regarded as counter-productive. The path
towards an increasing anti-state rhetoric o f
PAGAD leaders in the following years, and
the process of government labelling of
PAGAD members as 'urban terrorists' that
ensued, lay open. But PAGAD could count
on massive support from the Cape Muslim
community. In a survey published in No-
vember 1996 it was found that 62 per cent
of Muslim respondents were supportive of
PAGAD. In comparison, a mere 17 per cent
of Christian respondents were supportive of
the movement.4 The support of the Muslim
middle class and lower-middle class in
coloured residential areas appeared to be
particularly strong. In sum, PAGAD had pop-
ular but not intellectual support. Many Cape
Muslim intellectuals paid a heavy price for
distancing themselves from PAGAD's ac-
tions: in 1998, a pipe-bomb was thrown at
the house of the senior scholar in Religious
Studies, Dr Ebrahim Moosa. A prominent
imam, Sa'dullah Khan (imam at al-Quds
Masjid in Gatesville, one of the largest
mosques in Cape Town), received death
threats and opted to leave the country;
whereas the senior ANC politician, Ebrahim
Rasool, lived under constant police surveil-
lance for long periods. 
But the toll exacted on ordinary township
residents was – as usual – higher. As the as-
sassination attempts on gangsters on the
Cape Flats degenerated into regular warfare
between PAGAD and the gangs, civilians
were caught in the crossfire. In the commu-
nity of 'Mekaar' (the name of which has been
altered), where I was to undertake fieldwork
two years later, stray bullets killed a six-year-
old girl in November 1998, as was the case
with two other minors the same year. Two
suspected PAGAD members, both practising
Muslims, were later convicted for her murder
on the grounds of 'common purpose'. 
Academic representation
o f P A G A D
The academic literature on the PAGAD
phenomenon is limited. No systematic in-
vestigation of the movement has been un-
dertaken. There are however, a number of
theses, articles, and reports, the most signif-
icant of which have been produced by acad-
emics affiliated to the University of Cape
Town and the University of the Western
Cape in Bellville.5 These authors' analyses of
PAGAD diverge on one point in particular.
Tayob and Esack point to the links between
Islamist rhetoric and PAGAD's actions,
whereas Jeppie and Pillay are sceptical
about attaching importance to such links.
Pillay perceives PAGAD as an expression of
globalized, Hollywood-style representa-
tions of machoism that have been appropri-
ated and localized by both the gangs and
the vigilantes. Jeppie suggests that PAGAD
reflects a crisis of leadership among South
African Muslims, and that it serves as an av-
enue for the reinsertion of former drug ad-
dicts and petty gangsters into society.
Hence, to both Pillay and Jeppie the reli-
gious imagery invoked by PAGAD appears
to be mere strategic posturing for the Mus-
lim township public. Even though one
should not necessarily take the assertions of
PAGAD members at face value, such analy-
ses risk treating the outward expressions of
PAGAD as mere epiphenomena in relation
to the social causes of the phenomenon. For
instance, there seems to be little doubt that
Qibla, a militant organization heavily influ-
enced by Islamism, gained control over
PAGAD after the assassination of Staggie in
1996. My experience with PAGAD members
during fieldwork suggests that Islamism
may be of greater significance than what
has been assumed so far. All but one of the
alleged PAGAD members in 'Mekaar' had at
some point pursued religious careers. One
of them was a long-standing member of
Qibla, whose formative political experiences
had been the Iranian revolution of 1979 and
the anti-apartheid struggle of the 1980s.
This is certainly at some remove from the
impressions of the 'gun-ho' machoism that
was so central to the local media's represen-
tation of PAGAD. As a political and social
phenomenon, PAGAD was intimately
bound up with the hybrid social formations
from which it originated, and was therefore
multi-faceted. The question of whether
PAGAD is an expression of machoism or Is-
lamism is an awkward one, since it appears
to have expressed both.
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E u r o p e
A R MI N A  O M E R I K A
The Bosnian Young Muslims, a reformist Islamic
movement that emerged in Sarajevo in 1939 and –
officially – ceased to exist ten years later, is even
today subject to many controversies. The attempts
to characterize this movement include a whole range
of contradictory designations, ranging from hostile
approaches in which the members of the movement
are depicted as pan-Islamist terrorists whose activi-
ties aimed at the overthrow of the Yugoslavian state
and establishing of an Islamic order, to sympathetic
views in which it is presented as a basically democra-
tic movement established on Islamic humanitarian
principles that tried to resist the dictatorial commu-
nist regime of post-war Yugoslavia. 
Bosnian Young
Muslims 19 39 –1991
A Survey
The history of the Young Muslim organiza-
tion and its impact on the (self-)conceptions
of Islam in Bosnia can be examined through
different stages of development (1939–1943,
1943–1946, 1946–1949, and 1970s–1991).
These stages can be defined in terms of sev-
eral interdependent factors, of which the or-
ganizational forms of the movement and its
ideological aims can be regarded as the
most important ones. 
The Young Muslim organization emerged
in Sarajevo in 1939. The time of foundation,
the name, and even some ideological postu-
lates suggest that its foundation was related
to the more or less simultaneous emer-
gence of similar pan-Islamist movements in
the Islamic world, particularly in Egypt and
Indonesia. There are, however, no indica-
tions of a direct influence of such move-
ments on the Young Muslims, especially
bearing in mind their education and age
(basically pupils and students between 16
and 26 years of age), the lack of any travel-
ling experience, their non-acquaintance
with Oriental languages, the difficult access
to the works of contemporary Arabic writers
in the Bosnian language, and finally, their
non-alignment to the Bosnian ulama, a t
least at the early stage of their develop-
ment, which could have compensated for
the above-mentioned limitations.
The time of the movement's foundation,
the late 1930s and the early 1940s, was
marked by several factors of particular im-
portance for the Yugoslavian Muslims: a cri-
sis of national identity; the decreasing im-
portance of Muslims within the Yugoslavian
political landscape; the reinforcement of na-
tionalism in Serbia and Croatia; the emer-
gence of a secular Bosnian intellectual élite
along with the parallel decline of the tradi-
tional religious Muslim élites; and, finally,
the challenge of communist and fascistic
ideologies, both of which were opposed to
the Young Muslims' conceptions of Islam. 
Early developments
The Young Muslim movement developed
around a group of students (Husref B aš a g i c,
Emin Granov, Esad K a r a d j o z o v ić, and Tarik
M u f t ić ), who initiated a common forum for
discussions and debates on Islamic subjects.
The first Young Muslims were mainly stu-
dents from universities and high schools
aged between 16 and 26 years. Their activi-
ties during the years 1939 and 1941 were es-
tablished on the basis of private contacts
and informal meetings. During the latter,
some of the activists presented papers on
specific subjects connected to Islam, where-
upon the group had to discuss the argu-
ments of the presenters. 
Despite the lack of hierarchical or organi-
zational structures, this period was decisive
for the later development of the Young
Muslim organization: it was during this time
that their network, which was to spread
across all major Bosnian and even some
other Yugoslavian cities during the years to
follow, was initiated. Furthermore, their
main ideological and programmatic guide-
lines were formulated. Islamic decadence,
the relationship between Islam and science
as well as that between Islam and other reli-
gions and ideologies, the status of Islam and
Muslims in Europe and particularly in Yu-
goslavia, the necessity of a social renais-
sance of Muslim peoples and the decisive
role of Islamic education in it: all these top-
ics were already present in the early Young
Muslim agenda and were to run through the
members' writings and the group's activities
until the 1990s, in more or less elaborated
ways. 
The foundation as an organization took
place in Sarajevo in March 1941. However,
the outbreak of the Second World War obvi-
ated an official entry into the Yugoslavian
register of associations. In order to avoid
complete dissolution, the Young Muslims
were compelled to join the ulama associa-
tion el-Hidaje, despite their critical attitude
towards the Bosnian religious officials and
the protests of some activists like Alija
I z e t b e g o v ić and N edž i b Šaći r b e g o v ić a g a i n s t
the linkage to the much-criticized clergy. In
1943, after almost two years of organiza-
tional abeyance, the Young Muslims were
officially proclaimed the youth section of
the ulama a s s o c i a t i o n. This status had sig-
nificant impact on both their organizational
structures and ideology. Informal networks
became substituted by officially stipulated
association structures. El-Hidaje officials,
especially the association's president
Mehmed H a ndž ić and his vice-president
Kasim D o b rač a, helped to 'domesticate' the
radical, to a certain extent politically deter-
mined demands, such as those postulated
by the founding members Esad K a r a d j o-
z o v ić and Tarik M u f t ić . Now, the religious-
ethical dimension of Islam was emphasized;
this new direction fitted more in the frame
of traditional Islamic subjects rather than in
the avant-garde discourse on Islam they
had originally tried to establish. During this
period, i.e. between 1943 and 1945, the
number of members significantly increased
and the organization expanded into the
major Bosnian, and even some other Yu-
goslavian cities.
Underground and abroad
In 1945, el-Hidaje was officially dissolved,
and the Young Muslim organization went
underground. They established an illegal
network that influenced both young urban
intellectuals and much of the young rural
population. Initially tolerated by the new
regime, they went for open confrontation
with the communists as early as 1946, espe-
cially when they protested against the mili-
tant secularization policy of the new Yu-
goslavian government. In 1946, several
members were arrested and sent to prison.
The final crushing of the organization took
place during the Sarajevo trial in August
1949. Four leading members were con-
demned to death; many others were arrest-
ed and sentenced to long imprisonments. A
precise number of arrested, persecuted,
and/or executed members, though, cannot
be definitely specified. 
After their release from prison, some of
the Young Muslims emigrated to West Euro-
pean countries. Those who remained in
Bosnia and confined themselves to private
contacts with each other officially retreated
from further engagements in the Young
Muslim 'cause'. Nonetheless, it was this kind
of private contact that enabled them to
keep in touch under the vigilant eyes of the
Yugoslavian Secret Service, and to take ac-
tive part in the Islamic revival in Bosnia that
was made possible due to the liberalization
of policy with respect to religion in 1970s
Yugoslavia. However, they not only had
been participants in this awakening of reli-
gion among Yugoslavian, and especially
Bosnian Muslims; to a considerable extent,
they also gave this movement their fresh
impetus by launching newspapers and
magazines on Islamic subjects and by pub-
lishing their writings under pseudonyms, ei-
ther in the official organs of the Islamska
Vjerska Zajednica (Islamic Religious Com-
munity) or as separate, autonomous works. 
Finally, by initializing discussion and edu-
cation circles, the former Young Muslim
members succeeded in creating a new net-
work, which consisted of some former
Young Muslims and a number of Bosnian
Muslim intellectuals of the younger genera-
tion. The latter, both secular intellectuals
and young ulama from the Faculty of Islam-
ic Theology, actively took part in the discus-
sion circles. The ideas that circulated among
them followed the pattern established by
the Young Muslims, though in a modified
way. The new works, like Alija I z e t b e g o v ić' s
Islamic Declaration and Islam between the
East and West,1 to name but these two as the
best known ones, reflected the new age
structure, but also the acquaintance of their
authors with various contemporary ideolog-
ical thoughts, and the influences that result-
ed thereof.
In August 1983, in a second wave of perse-
cution, some activists of the network were
tried for 'separatism' and 'Islamic funda-
mentalism' and sent to prison with sen-
tences of up to nine years. Among those
were the former Young Muslims Alija
I z e t b e g o v ić, Omer Behmen, Salih Behmen,
Eš r ef Č a m p a r a, and Ismet K a s u m a g ić, as
well as the younger intellectuals Dž e m a l u-
d i n L a t ić, Edhem Bič akč ić, Hasan Č e n g ić, Hu-
sein Ž i v a l j, and Mustafa S p a h ić. I z e t b e g o v ić
was accused of having organized a 'group'
whose aims were to conduct 'contra-revolu-
tionary' actions in Yugoslavia and to estab-
lish an Islamic state in Yugoslavia.2 The in-
dictment, however, was more an ideologi-
cally coloured determent of regime critics
rather than an accusation based upon real
proof. 
The two lines that now constituted the
network – the 'old' Young Muslims and the
members of the younger generation – be-
came the core of the Stranka Demokratske
Akcije (SDA), a political party founded in
1991 and since regarded as the only 'true'
political representative of Muslim popula-
tion in Bosnia – a presumptuous self-de-
scription, though repeatedly confirmed dur-
ing the political elections in Bosnia. 
The ideas that had been developed at the
early stages of the Young Muslim move-
ment continued – to a certain extent modi-
fied – to exist until the last decade of the
2 0t h century, despite the official prohibition
of the movement in 1946, its being crushed
1949, and the subsequent imprisonment of
the organization's members. The ideologi-
cal continuity was guaranteed through the
'individual factor', i.e. through the network
of informal and private contacts of some ex-
Young Muslims amongst each other and
with the younger generation of Muslim in-
tellectuals in Bosnia, especially in the course
of the general liberalization of policy on reli-
gion in Yugoslavia during the 1970s. 
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The N ether l and s
S A D I K  H A R C H A O U I
There seems to be an irreconcilable gap between the
Dutch state and its Muslim inhabitants. This impres-
sion is transforming into an increasingly popular
standpoint, not only in politics and the media but
also among legal philosophers, historians, and ju-
rists. As t h e mantra that supports the apparent gap,
what tends to be singled out is the principle of the
separation of church and state. This separation is al-
legedly alien to Islam, and therefore Islam is irrecon-
cilable with the idea of a constitutional state. The
mantra appears to be a common-knowledge fact, for
which reason any substantiation and explanations
are casually dropped out, but wrongfully so. 
Church and State 
in Multicultural Society 
The state under the rule of law and the prin-
ciple of the separation of church and state
are not unambiguous concepts. The rele-
vance and scope of the principle is unclear;
moreover, a fair question can be raised as to
whether this liberal principle is even prob-
lematic at all in relation to Muslims in the
N e t h e r l a n d s .
The foundations of the state under the
rule of law are the principles of legality, sep-
aration of powers, civil rights, and judicial
control. Individual freedom is most impor-
tant. The individual determines his or her
own human vision and there is no dominant
reality. Given that the government can
never prescribe what 'real' freedom is, it
should keep its distance.
Historically, individual conscience be-
came recognized as absolute freedom to
put an end to the claims of absolutistic
theocratic monarchs. As a result, religious
freedom became a fact. By eliminating the
privileged position of the ruling church(es),
church and state were in fact separated. This
was enhanced by all the subjects' simulta-
neous claim to fundamental civil rights. In
the Netherlands, the actual separation of
church and state was completed in the
process starting in 1917, which led to the
pillar system in which pluralistic (religious)
views found a place for themselves. The
state has known no religious ideology ever
since; its worldview became neutral. But are
the prayer in this year's queen's address, the
edge inscription of the euro reading that
God is with us, and the reference to the
Almighty at the beginning of our laws mere
subtleties? The fact that the Netherlands
works within the European Union with
countries that give different content to this
important principle (England, Norway,
Greece) is often conveniently 'forgotten' in
domestic political discourse.
Separation and the Muslim
p r e s e n c e
After 11 September 2001, the presence of
about 860,000 Muslims in the Netherlands
has been increasingly perceived as a prob-
lem. People do not talk these days about
'Muslims', they talk about 'Islam' – as if it
were a national organization. The image of
church and state does not fit the mosque, as
religious variation is large and there is a di-
versity of interpretations and views.
When is the principle of the separation of
church and state relevant today? In the first
place, when the government singles out cer-
tain religions (whereas Islam as an ideologi-
cal concept is not presently singled out by
the Dutch government). Moreover, there are
no Islamic parties at a national or local level
with political power to favour 'Islam' over
other ideologies. The situation in which only
associations with a Christian orientation are
eligible for subsidies, as was occasionally the
case in municipalities controlled by Dutch
Reformed parties in the 1980s, has no Islam-
ic equivalent. On the contrary, and in conflict
with the law, the mantra of the separation of
church and state is in fact used as legitima-
tion to prevent subsidizing Islamic prayer fa-
cilities and schools.1 Second, the liberal prin-
ciple becomes relevant when 'Islam' can
exert political influence. This does not seem
to be the case either. Again, there is no uni-
fied national Islamic organization, while the
differences between and within Muslim
(sub)groups is considerable. Muslims have
organized themselves along diverse cultural,
religious, and ethnic lines, and these seldom
comprise political aspirations.
To illustrate the relevance of the principle
of the separation of church and state in rela-
tion to different ideological trends, we
should take a look at the Protestant SGP
(State Reformed Party). This party aims
specifically at a Dutch government based
entirely 'on the divine order revealed in the
Holy Scriptures'. This standpoint produces
in fact a theocratic party with official status
within Dutch polity that elevates not the
principle of popular sovereignty but a 'gov-
ernment by God'. It excludes women from
having certain voting rights because of an
alleged conflict with what a woman's 'call-
ing' is. In September 2001, the UN Commit-
tee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women called for legal measures
against this discrimination. Still, the govern-
ment persists since 1991 in its view that dis-
crimination against women should be
weighed against other rights pertaining to
the foundations of the Dutch legal system –
freedom to gather, religious freedom, and
free speech. A prohibition can only be set
when there is a 'systematic, very severe dis-
turbance of the democratic process'.
This is somewhat surprising in light of the
prohibition declaration by the highest Turk-
ish judge of the Turkish Welfare Party,
whose judgment is maintained by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. The focus of
the activities of the Welfare Party is sup-
posed to be the elimination of the separa-
tion of church and state.2
If the Dutch criterion of a 'very serious dis-
turbance of the democratic process' does
not work for the SGP, for which Islamic orga-
nization could it possibly work? The link in
public debates between wearing head-
scarves or the nonsensical remarks of some
imams (e.g. on homosexuality) and the sep-
aration of church and state lacks credibility
and is inconsequent.
None of this means that Islamic religious
diversity resulting from the arrival of immi-
grants, refugees, and converts does not pre-
sent the government with problems. The
discussion over issues like wearing head-
scarves in school, at work, or even in court is
not primarily about the separation of
church and state but about basic civil rights.
In these considerations, meanings for Mus-
lims and non-Muslims are often diametrical-
ly opposed. For instance, non-Muslims can-
not seem to accept that progressive views
can very well be combined with a strong de-
gree of religiosity, or that for some girls the
headscarf is a means to emancipation and
p a r t i c i p a t i o n .3 A forced secularization of
Muslims does, on the contrary, conflict with
the separation of church and state. After all,
giving preference to secularism equals
favouring ideological truths.
Foundations of citizenship
The real problem lies in the fact that the
Netherlands has no consequent policy re-
garding philosophies of life. All kinds of ar-
guments are thrown into the pile. The policy
or the approach is often a question of taste,
of understanding. The essence of a state
under the rule of law, particularly the pro-
tection of individual freedom, plays too
marginal a role. Behind every Muslim is an
individual: child or adult, man or woman,
traditional or progressive, ailing or healthy,
lonely, enthusiastic, expressive – you name
it. Giving space to the reality and truth of
that individual is important, and experience
has taught us that repressed identities are
more likely to develop into extremist vari-
ants. The uninvited construing of or empha-
sis on 'the' Islamic identity of Muslims in a
hostile (or friendly) environment is what
leads to a distancing from Dutch society.
This Islamic identity is confirmed as a reac-
tion to alienation and social exclusion.4 It is
this alienation that is threatening in the
long term. Many individuals – not only Mus-
lims – no longer feel at home in the Dutch
state, and feel unprotected against an indis-
criminate government. Dutch Muslims and
their children deserve the chance to make a
free choice in becoming citizens of the
Dutch democratic state, and the chance is
theirs for the taking.
The real question concerns what the foun-
dations should be of a Dutch citizenship
with an Islamic identity. The philosopher of
law Marlies Galenkamp points in this con-
text to the harm principle of the philoso-
pher J.S. Mill. The government can only in-
terfere with the freedom of the (Islamic) cit-
izen if s/he causes damage to other citizens.
On the basis of this principle, Muslims can
maintain their own religious views unless
they cause damage to others, including
those within their own community. A Mus-
lim may therefore not discriminate, because
that hurts others. A Muslim can step out of
the community if he disagrees with certain
views, such as female circumcision or forced
marriages. This comes closer to the perspec-
tive of individual freedom supported by the
foundations of the democratic state. Collec-
tive thinking is relegated in order to guaran-
tee the freedom of all citizens.
The essence of such a state is not to 'drill'
people, but to protect them against the om-
nipotence of the government. From this
principled choice for individual freedom,
Muslims must also be actively protected
against undesired interference by foreign
powers. Protective notions also call for alert-
ness when signing agreements with coun-
tries in which Islam is the state religion. One
should keep in mind that, under certain cir-
cumstances, foreign laws can also be ap-
plied to Muslim citizens in the Netherlands
on the basis of private international law.
A consequence of alienation is that, in
their isolation, Muslims try to solve their
own problems outside the law of the state.
Transparency is needed to guarantee the
freedom of Muslim citizens. For example, a
non-registered imam marriage can have
negative consequences, such as an increase
in polygamy. Muslims have to be protected
against alienation, because the state under
the rule of law is a guarantee and not a
threat. The state belongs to everyone. 
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The occurrence of death in an immigrant situation is
a little-explored albeit essential subject considering,
for example, the presence in France of a substantial
immigrant population, now largely settled, of people
working and living – but also dying – in France. To
study funerary practices in such circumstances is to
consider the entirety of social behaviours that are
caused by a migrant's death in migration. The ques-
tion of death is approached here from a dual per-
spective: that of the choice of place for the grave
(France or in the country of origin), and that of the fu-
nerary practices (what migrants actually do when a
death occurs in France). It is situated at a crossing of
two issues, that of the migration process and that of
death, its representations, and related practices. 
Dying a Senegalese 
Muslim in Migration
Currently the mortality rate among the pop-
ulation of immigrants in France from the
Senegal River region is still low due to the
relatively recent character of this migratory
w a v e ,1 its demographic structure, and the
re-emigration of certain migrants. Nonethe-
less, the question of death in France is pre-
sent in the minds of the migrants. 
The migrants feel a real fear with respect
to the idea of passing away in France, far
from their own people, in a place where the
beliefs and practices related to death are
profoundly different. Death in migration is
particularly troublesome for those who
maintain the idea of returning to their coun-
tries of origin. There is a sentiment of shame
and guilt at the idea of dying in a situation
that does not conform to the initial migrato-
ry plan or to orthodoxy. 
To be buried in a far away land is to risk
being forgotten, not being eternalized.
Death in France is thus also synonymous
with social death for the deceased, who is
not assured of the perpetuation of his mem-
ory amongst the community of the living. 
For Muslims, the will to pass away among
one's own people, in one's land of origin,
land of Islam, is coupled by the awareness of
not being able to respect Islamic prescrip-
tions in the case of being buried in France.
In effect, the creation of burial places re-
served for Muslims is contradictory to the
principles of laicity and neutrality of ceme-
teries, stipulated in the code of districts.
Two circulars (1975 and 1991) offer, howev-
er, to the mayors and cemetery administra-
tors the possibility of providing for specific
confessional spaces. Nonetheless, the legal
burial conditions do not respect the entirety
of prescriptions, such as being buried di-
rectly in the ground in a shroud. In addition,
long-term burial in France is a paid act (bur-
ial plots being leased for a fixed number of
years), submitted to constraining legisla-
tion, and is not always possible in the Mus-
lim sections. This precariousness of the
grave is a major obstacle and constitutes a
fundamental divergence from the practices
carried out in the regions of origin. 
The death of an emigrant is experienced
as a dramatic rupture by the family in the
country of origin because it symbolizes the
loss of often substantial revenue, threatens
the familial equilibrium, and necessitates a
social and economic reorganization, espe-
cially in the Senegal River region where im-
migration is aimed at reproducing the fami-
ly unit. 
Migrating to France, where the places of
death, the rites, and emotional, symbolic,
material, and financial management take on
new forms, severely brings into question
the serenity with which Muslims relate to
death. For Muslim migrants, dying in France
represents a transgression. These negative
representations have a direct impact on de-
termining the place of burial. 
Choosing a place of burial
When a migrant dies in France, there are
two principle possibilities for the place of
burial: in France, according to the current
legislation, or in the country of origin, after
the body is repatriated. Surveys carried out
have clearly revealed the preference of mi-
grants from the Senegal River region for
posthumous repatriation. Apart from excep-
tions, those who die in France are buried in
the country of origin. However, this practice
is relatively recent, the first repatriation of
this sort dating to 1984. Before then, the de-
ceased were buried in France. In some twen-
ty years, the practices and representations
have thus considerably evolved. 
These developments are the result of the
conjunction of several factors: on the one
hand, the awareness of the burial methods,
of the precariousness of burial in France,
and of the procedure of rotation of tombs in
the Muslim spaces, which is expressed
through a 'conspiracy myth' that was rapid-
ly propagated throughout the group; and
on the other hand, the establishment of a
'fund for the dead', an association of people
from the Senegal River region who finance
the costly operation (more than 4000 Euro)
of posthumous repatriation and which func-
tions as a repatriation insurance. But the de-
velopments are also due to a return to 'the
religious' in the early 1980s, coupled with
the change in inscription of migrants in
French space that followed the modification
of policies and migratory discourses. Finally,
there was the familiarization of certain mi-
grants with the functioning of procedures in
the host country. 
The migrants from the Senegal River re-
gion refer to their religious adherence and
to their return to the native land to justify
their preference for post-mortem repatria-
tion. The choice in favour of this reveals
reservations about French burial methods,
which are considered as an infringement of
the Islamic prescriptions, and thus of their
Muslim identity, but also an imagining that
associates death in migration with negative
representations and especially with a failure
of the migratory project – centred on the re-
turn to the village – and a negation of one's
origins. 
In fact, there exist different levels of justi-
fication and a plurality of causes that are ar-
ticulated in a complex fashion and explain
the divergences in position both between
the groups of migrants and among these
groups. Religious adherence, financial ca-
pacity, the ties with the country of origin,
and the individual, familial, and migratory
situation are all motives that influence the
choice of burial place in migration. Thus, a
growing number of Maghrebi immigrants
today wish to be buried in France, close to
their children, and they demand the cre-
ation of burial places in which the Islamic
principles can be respected. It is rare for na-
tives of the Senegal River region to follow
this path. But it can be expected that
changes will occur with respect to this posi-
tion in the years to come. 
Transnationalization of
t h e r i t u a l s
The migratory context and the repatria-
tion of corpses are both constraints that af-
fect the ritual practices of migrants living in
France. They hinder any identical reproduc-
tion of rituals carried out in the regions of
origin and profoundly disturb the sequen-
tial unfolding of funerals. These rituals are
played out on a particular register that con-
fronts several models, several cultures, sev-
eral 'space-times' (here and there, before
and after the transfer), and several groups.
They imply the defining of new practices,
new symbols adapted to a new situation:
life in France. 
The original practices are never totally
abandoned. The inspiration of funerary rites
of Malekite Muslims remain and the practice
of the ritual gifts (in money) continues to be
a central element in the ceremonial activity.
However, the funerals are in part recom-
posed, or reconstructed. For example, the
rite is sectioned: in France, the ritual is limit-
ed to prayer and the cleansing and prepar-
ing of the body, followed by the repatriation
of the corpse; the second part of the rite, the
burial and commemorative ceremonies,
takes place in the village or region of origin.
In this context, the person accompanying
the coffin becomes central. Spokesman for
the immigrant community, this close family
member takes the opposite journey of the
one he is accompanying, carries money col-
lected during the offering of condolences,
and oversees the proper carrying out of the
rituals. When he returns, he recounts the
ceremonies undertaken by the village com-
munity. He is the 'relay-person' between the
actors here and there, serving as a bridge
between the different space-times of the fu-
neral. 
The funerary devices in migration bring
together an imperative of continuity and af-
filiation to the revisions and reconstructions
that can be interpreted simultaneously as
alterations of the rite (less funerary sociabil-
ity due to lack of place or to the rules and
norms of the host society), resistance to the
professionalization of death (preparation of
the corpse), the re-arrangement of roles
(the most elderly are called upon, eventual-
ly outside of the family group), and even in-
novations (generalized practice of 'delega-
tions', new role of women and non-custom-
ary social and friendship networks, and the
splitting up of ritual sequences). 
Finally, it is appropriate to re-examine the
tie often established between funerary
practices and integration of immigrants in
F r a n c e .2 By analysing the practices through
the prism of integration, the approach is
centred on a dichotomized opposition be-
tween here and there, between identity and
alterity. However, it seems necessary to en-
visage the issue of the migratory process in
other terms. By posthumous repatriation
the funerary practices in migration largely
exceed this opposition. They are situated
both here and there, between here and
there, and invest the entire migratory field.
It is not a question of alternative and rup-
ture but rather of contact, continuity, and
complimentarity. Funerary practices of mi-
grants are situated in an 'in-between', which
characterizes these migrations. They wit-
ness the establishing of a system of material
and symbolic exchanges between the mi-
grants and their village and family of origin. 
The funerary practices celebrate a trans-
national culture and integrate themselves in
a culture of mobility and 'in-between-ness',
which very well expresses continuity in the
rupture. The issue of dying far away is thus
an excellent means to analysing in a dynam-
ic way the migratory process, its challenges,
and the construction of cultural and ritual
practices in migration. 
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For almost thirty years, the S h ica Imami I s m aci l i c o m-
munity in Canada has been remarkably active and di-
verse in terms of countries of origin, ethnicities, and
languages. However, at issue is the backdrop of the
Canadian policy of multiculturalism, which has incit-
ed assimilatory threats to the I s m aci l i collective iden-
tity, despite its role of establishing the community in
its pluralism. The following deals with this paradoxi-
cal positioning of the minority I s m aci l i community in
the construction of multicultural Canada. 
The S h i ca I m a m i
I s maci l i
Community in Canada
cording to the Council Member and Chair of
the Resettlement Portfolio, the agreement
stipulated that the I s m aci l i c o m m u n i t y
would take full responsibility for the new
immigrants for a full year, which includes fi-
nancial responsibility for language training,
housing, employment, education, and so-
cial and religious needs of the immigrants.
Since then, further agreements and proto-
cols have been signed by FOCUS Canada
and the I s m aci l i Council for Canada with the
governments of Québec and Canada. As a
result of these agreements, approximately
2,500 Afghanis have entered Canada. Al-
most half of them have settled in Québec,
the remainder throughout the rest of the
country: Ontario, British Columbia, and Al-
berta, notably in Calgary and Edmonton.
Paradoxical forces
The diversity of origins of S h ica Imami I s-
m aci l i s in Canada is obvious. Two paradoxi-
cal forces clearly emerge: the community's
affiliation with religion, and a (forced?)
obligation to adopt the multicultural soci-
ety of Canada. 
When considering the I s m aci l i p o p u l a t i o n
in the face of plural cultures, several ques-
tions arise. Does adapting to a plurality of
cultures mean integration into the largely
dominant British culture in Canada? Does
this integration into Canada's multicultural-
ism imply eroding one's religion? For Mus-
lims in general, especially for the Canadian
S h ica Imami I s m aci l i s, religion is what distin-
guishes them from 'the rest', the majority.
Hence, does 'adapting' to the majority and
'adopting' multiculturalism mean forsaking
their distinctive characteristic of religion? 
Multiple identifications
A juxtaposition of religion and the situa-
tional reality appears. This questions the
collectivized identities of minority commu-
nities like that of the I s m aci l i s in multicultur-
al societies. Some adaptation and perhaps
redefinition of cultures seem to be demand-
ed. Yet according to some, 'integration'
needs to be warded off because Canada is a
multicultural society with a dominant cul-
ture ruling the roost. The concept of 'cul-
ture' is then problematic: earlier theoretical
constructions of 'culture' were critiqued as
homogenized, and 'identity' as fixed and al-
legedly anchored in discrete cultures.
Today, in the face of massive social changes
on global-local bases, perhaps it is no longer
possible to continue to define oneself in dis-
crete, definite, and bounded ways. Instead,
multiple attachments encompassing plural
and fluid cultural identities are desired. How
then does the I s m aci l i community situate it-
self in this pluralistic multicultural society
and how well does the society accommo-
date it? 
It has been observed that in the English-
dominated multicultural Canada, faith and
leadership have emerged to bring the I s m a-
ci l i s together. It is the Imam Karim Shah, bet-
ter known as the Aga Khan (III) of the com-
munity, who has a firm policy on matters of
diversity within the j a m aca t. His firmans
stress strength in diversity and urge the
members to learn from the diverse practices
within the j a m aca t. Also, for Muslims, reli-
gious ideology can provide a common vi-
sion that allows its followers to look beyond
their individual cultures. In other words, it is
the religious faith, and not culture, which
becomes the primary mode of identifica-
tion. For example, the author Rani Murji,
who was born in East Africa and traces her
origins to India, voices her identification
thus: 'I used to identify myself as an "East
African Indian I s m aci l i Muslim". However,
today I identify myself simply as a "Canadian
I s m aci l i Muslim", and when pushed, as a
"Canadian East Indian I s m aci l i".' 
Within an ensemble of multiple identifica-
tions, religious identity remains constant as
it holds a central defining value, collectively
and individually, whereas the geographical,
ethno-cultural, political, and linguistic affili-
ations are subject to change and adapt to
new contexts.
Multiculturalism plays a critical role in the
establishment of the S h ica Imami Muslims.
Initially framing the possibilities for the ex-
ternal definition of the group, the Canadian
policy of multiculturalism permitted the ne-
gotiation of the frontiers between the com-
munity and the host society. Continuing to
do so internally as part of the process of in-
tegration of recent diversity, the policy al-
lows for the negotiation of the inner fabric
of the community. As we have seen, the
construction of collectivized identities and
their recognition were both complementary
and contradictory. Constructing itself with
and against the dominant host society
meant differentiating the community from
the majority, while affirming its right of affil-
iation and sense of belonging. And yet, in-
versely, it also meant weaving itself from
within, affirming its own cultural, political,
and symbolic content, without allowing it-
self to simply be an undistinguishable Other
for the majority. Thus, Canadian policy of
multiculturalism has in a way strengthened
cultural bonds.
As the community has resettled in its new
homeland, the threats posed by multicultur-
alism and its 'assimilatory' implications have
led to the re-establishment of many of the
institutions that were a dynamic part of the
community in the countries of origin. As a
result, the community has organized local
and national councils composed of volun-
teer professionals in charge of many portfo-
lios such as youth, resettlement, arbitration,
social welfare, and women's development.
In consultation with the imam, these institu-
tions address many of the issues facing re-
settlement within the community. 
However, some critics do question the na-
ture of this facet of S h ica Imami I s m aci l ip r a c-
tice in Canada. This criticism highlights the
fact that assimilation is perhaps a Canadian
reality: critics question whether it is the con-
scientization of identity recomposition that
allows for the creation of new hybrid identi-
ties in the Canadian context, with an integra-
tive passage to English as the eventual lan-
guage of prayer and of daily interactions
both within and outside the community, and
with sustained symbolic links to languages
of origin, of their restricted use, rather than
practical daily usage in all rites and rituals. 
In response to these critics, it could be ar-
gued that the Canadian Muslims, including
those of the S h ica Imami I s m aci l ic o m m u n i t y ,
are losing the language(s) of their home
countries. However, it would be a mistake to
conclude that by changing their language(s),
the communities are losing their identity. As
noted earlier, it is faith, and not language,
that is the central collective identity-marker
(characterized by its multiplicity) for these
c o m m u n i t i e s .
Multicultural Canada does appear to ask
its citizens to identify with the community
at large. There is a need to be Canadian, for
pluralism, integration, and citizenship re-
quire very careful balancing if there is to
exist harmony and solidarity in a society
where members are free and equal. But
given the significance of human rights, mul-
ticulturalism, and the role of Islamic com-
munity leadership, especially in the case of
I s m aci l i s in Canada, it is vital to emphasize
the preservation of essential defining ele-
ments of personal and collective identities
such as: language, gender, ethnicity, reli-
gion, and race; protection of the nature of
communities without unduly burdening
them; and allowing for differential identifi-
cations and permeable, movable bound-
aries, while supporting collectivities and
emphasizing collective identities.
The Canadian policy of multiculturalism,
first promulgated in 1971, means that 'al-
though there are two official languages,
there is no official culture, nor does any eth-
nic group take precedence over any other'.
In other words, the federal government
does not see multiculturalism as a threat to
national identity but rather believes that
cultural pluralism is the very essence of
Canadian identity. This protection is set
within the provisions of the Citizenship Act
(1947), which provides that all Canadians,
whether by birth or by choice, enjoy equal
status, are entitled to the same rights, pow-
ers, and privileges, and are subject to the
same obligations, duties, and liabilities.
Moreover, the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms (1982) provides that every in-
dividual should have the equal opportunity
to create the life that he/she is able and
wishes to have, consistent with the duties
and obligations of that individual as a mem-
ber of society. To what extent this policy
holds true in practice is a highly debatable
question. Yet, it is perhaps this Canadian
policy of multiculturalism that has played a
critical role in both the establishment of and
the threat to the assimilation of the I s m aci l i
community in Canada with its many trans-
national linkages.
I s m aci l i s in Canada 
Since the first influx of I s m aci l i i m m i g r a n t s
to Canada, the community has established
its own community centres, j a m acat k h a n as ,
throughout Canada, and has also main-
tained institutional contacts with other I s-
m aci l i s a n d I s m acili institutions around the
world as a transnational community. The I s-
m aci l i community in Canada itself is remark-
ably diverse.
Two broad groups, categorized according
to origin, constitute the community. In the
first group are those I s m aci l i s who first made
Canada their home in the 1970s. This group
traces its origins to either India, Pakistan, or
East Africa. Those coming from East Africa
are second- or third-generation migrants
from either India or Pakistan. Consequently,
the members of this group, often referred to
as Khojas, are conversant in various lan-
guages such as Swahili, Gujarati, Hindi,
Urdu, and Kutchi. More importantly, the
Khojas share many of the same practices
and traditions. 
The second group is comprised of I s m aci l i s
who have immigrated to Canada in more re-
cent years. Arriving mainly from Tajikhistan
and Afghanistan in Central Asia, with a small
number from Iran and Syria, this group
brings with it traditions and languages that
differ significantly from those of the Khoja
community. It was as a result of the recent
war in Afghanistan and Tajikhistan that the
community endeavoured to negotiate an
agreement with the federal government to
allow the community to sponsor a certain
number of Afghan and Tajik refugees for
entry into the country. Consequently, in
1992, the I s m aci l i community successfully
negotiated an agreement between the gov-
ernment of Canada, the I s m aci l i Council for
Canada, and the I s m aci l i Council for Québec
to sponsor I s m aci l i Afghani refugees. Ac-
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E u r o p e
G Y O R G Y  L E DE R E R
In the official Hungarian census of 2001, some 4000
of the country's legal residents, mostly immigrants,
declared themselves as Muslims – conversion of Hun-
garian-born citizens to Islam still being a rare occur-
rence. Over the last decade, nonetheless, noticeable
public and official interest in Islam has been pro-
voked inevitably by the wars in the neighbouring
former Yugoslavia and, of course, 11 September.
Islam in Hungary demonstrates a unique path of de-
velopment and specific responses to local and global
circumstances throughout its history. 
Islam in
P o s t-S o c i a l i s t
H u n g a r y
Despite the 150-year Turkish rule over Hun-
gary in the 16t hand 17t hcenturies, later Hun-
garian public opinion was not antagonistic
towards Islam.1 In sharp contrast to the Or-
thodox Christian Balkan nations, many Hun-
garians expressed sympathy towards the
Ottoman Empire at the time of the
1877–1878 Russian-Turkish war and then
with the Muslim Bosnians whom certain
Hungarian entrepreneurs wished to colo-
nize. The reason for the Hungarian parlia-
ment's enthusiastic vote for 'Act 17' in 1916
– recognizing Islam – was the war alliance
with Turkey and the integration project of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1918 the Kingdom
of Hungary lost the latter dream along with
two-thirds of its territory in which, except
for the Ottoman occupiers, the number of
Muslims had never been significant. The few
hundred Bosnian refugees and Turkish im-
migrants living in Hungary in the interwar
period were ignored by the nationalistic au-
thorities. The long-standing idea of building
a mosque in Budapest was also ignored.
'Act 33' of 1947 cancelled the discrimina-
tory distinction between 'recognized' (such
as Islam) and 'accepted' denominations (as
Catholicism and the 'Israelite' faith), which
had few practical consequences at that
time. The socialist era was not, to say the
least, conducive to religious activities. Prac-
tising Muslims, old Bosnians and Turks, hav-
ing passed away – some having left in 1956
– coupled with the fact that their children
did not follow their fathers' faith, meant that
virtually no Muslims survived. 
The Middle Eastern
c o n n e c t i o n
From the late 1970s onward, thousands of
Arab students resided in the country. They
were allowed to pray in their university
dorms if they desired. Most did not. Open-
ing a house of worship for them was not
given serious consideration, not really be-
cause of the atheistic regime but because
they were not seen as sufficiently important.
Socialist Hungary had excellent commercial
and other relations with certain 'anti-impe-
rialist' Arab countries. The project of an 'Is-
lamic centre', including a mosque, at the
T ü r b e of G ü l Baba or elsewhere in Budapest,
was cautiously raised several times from the
mid-1980s, but to no avail.
Agrarian engineer Balázs (Abdul Rahman)
M i h á l f f y became a Muslim while working in
North Africa in 1984. He attended an un-
publicized August 1987 Budapest meeting
between a delegation of the Muslim World
League, led by then Secretary-General Ab-
dullah Omar Nasseef, and the Chairman of
the Hungarian Office for Church Affairs as
well as other greedy Communist officials
longing for Saudi generosity. M i h á l f f y r e-
ceived the authorities' approval. He elabo-
rated a statutory document and formed, in
August 1988, the Hungarian Islamic Com-
munity of a few Hungarian citizens, mostly
young females. When 'Sheikh-Chairman' M i-
h á l f f y claimed to be the sole Hungarian
Muslim – as he often did in the 1980s – he
was hardly exaggerating.
Although the Community's membership
allegedly grew to several hundred in the
early 1990s (non-citizen Arabs still did not
count) it remained under the Sheikh-Chair-
man's tight control. Due to then Prime Min-
ister J ó z s e f Antall's personal interest in
Islam and relations with Muslim countries,
Mihálffy worked for a while in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. He then organized Arab-
sponsored humanitarian relief and other
shipments to Bosnian refugee camps during
the war. In April 1996, following disputes
within the Community, he was replaced as
Head by Z o l t á n (Sultan) Bolek, a young con-
vert with a college diploma in state adminis-
t r a t i o n .
At that time, the number of Arab and
other Orientals of Muslim tradition residing
in the country was probably close to five
thousand. The proselytizing activities of a
small part of them were supported and co-
ordinated from abroad, mainly the Arabian
Peninsula. The Vienna-based East European
office of the World Assembly of Muslim
Youth (WAMY) was perhaps the main re-
gional source of inspiration, printed propa-
ganda material in local languages, and
funds. WAMY's Vienna representative, who
had his network of Arab co-workers in Bu-
dapest as elsewhere in the post-socialist re-
gion, happened to be then Bosnian Presi-
dent Alija Izetbegovic's Sudanese friend,
Elfatih Ali Hassanein. He was also Director of
the famous Third World Relief Agency
(TWRA) providing the Bosnian army with
Saudi-bought weapons in 1992–1993.2 T h e
breaking of the controversial UN arms em-
bargo and the East European (re-)Islamiza-
tion project were thus, for a while, inter-re-
lated. WAMY and TWRA helped the Muslim
organizations of Hungary, the country's res-
ident Arabs, more than the Hungarian Com-
munity. These Arabs created several associ-
ations and foundations in Budapest and the
countryside (Arrahma, Alouakf, and K i b aca
were the most important ones), also to justi-
fy the various grants they expected or actu-
ally got from the Arab world.
Two communities
In 1996, the Hungarian Community of
Bolek received from the Municipality of Bu-
dapest a modest 150m2 property (a former
pharmacy) for ritual use in the 13t h d i s t r i c t .
They renovated it with foreign Muslim fi-
nancial assistance. In other Hungarian cities,
such as Szeged, Miskolc, and Debrecen,
Muslims pray in private apartments. In Pécs,
they are permitted on Fridays to pray in the
Yakovali Hassan Pasha Djami, an Ottoman
monument still in relatively good condition.
The country's biggest working 'mosque'
and proselytizing centre is in Budapest's
1 1t h district: 300m2 premises, with an inside
upper floor, known as 'Dar us-Salam'. It is
run by 'The Church3 of the Muslims of Hun-
gary', which was registered in 1999 in terms
of Act 4 of 1990 on religion, separate from
the Hungarian Islamic Community. At the
time of writing, Mohamed Abdulgalil Dubai
and Mustafa Anwar, both naturalized Hun-
garian citizens of Arab origin, as well as the
latter's Hungarian-born son-in-law Z o l t á n
(Sultan) Sulok lead 'The Church'. It was cre-
ated by resident Arabs, mainly students and
young intellectuals, partly as a continuation
of the Arrahma Foundation. Dubai edits a
Hungarian-language Islamic periodical enti-
tled G o n d o l a t (Thought) publishing many
translations from A l - E u r o p i y a, the journal of
the Federation of the Islamic Organisations
in Europe, and other articles articulating his
and his colleagues' views on Islam and the
society in which they live.
The number of the two (Sunni) communi-
ties' active members is not likely to exceed a
few hundred each, while that of the immi-
grants of Muslim descent in general may
reach several thousand if families are in-
cluded. Public interest in Islam is limited de-
spite the Balkan events of the last decade.
Most Bosnian refugees had already left the
country, while the Oriental Muslim asylum
seekers (Iraqis, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis,
etc.) living in camps expect to somehow get
to the West. Hungary, after all, is hardly the
place refugees dream of. The authorities
have provided religious services in some of
the facilities where refugees are kept. Their
changing number is not included in the
above estimate.
Islamic studies comprises the Islam-relat-
ed field in which Hungary undoubtedly ex-
celled. Since Ignac Goldziher, numerous
outstanding Hungarian Islamicists have
contributed to this scholarly discipline, not
least the late Julius (Abdul-Karim) Ger-
manus, well known for his conversion to
Islam and his numerous popular books on it.
Besides Alexander Fodor's Department of
Arabic Studies at Eötvös Lóránd U n i v e r s i t y ,
R ó b e r t Simon, Head of the Department of
Oriental Studies of the Hungarian Academy
of Sciences and Letters must be mentioned.
The Hungarian translation and interpreta-
tion of the Qur'an is one of his most famous
w o r k s .4 No other Hungarian version of the
Holy Script has reached its level of accuracy
and erudition. It was nevertheless not in-
tended for ritual or d acw a (Muslim propa-
ganda) use.
The d acw a material printed in Hungarian
is of varying quality. Increasing the local
Muslims' awareness and providing spiritual
and community services for them (as ritual
slaughter for instance) are difficult tasks in
an un-Islamic environment. The majority of
today's Hungarians are secular. Two-thirds
are said to be of the Catholic tradition; less
than one-third of the Protestant tradition. In
Budapest many are of Jewish origin. A con-
siderable number of Hungarians have
joined newly established religious commu-
nities and sects. Most view Islam as an alien
body despite, or perhaps because of, the
historical precedents. Non-assimilating for-
eigners and minorities have never been
highly regarded in this still very patriotic
country. It is in the interest of the Muslims to
emphasize their belonging to the nation,
something they usually do in a variety of
ways. 
Until recently the Muslims of Hungary had
seemed to stand closer to Christian conser-
vatism than to the Left, which won the May
2002 parliamentary elections. A few days
later Bolek was re-elected Chairman of the
Hungarian Community after he had been
ousted from that post three years earlier. He
preaches tolerance, moderation, and West-
ern commitment, which are rather topical in
the post-11 September context. His rela-
tions became strained with 'The Church of
the Muslims' since the latter is not really
pro-Western. Its review G o n d o l a t is critical
of libertarianism, sexual freedom, women's
rights in a Western sense, and Israel. It refers
to strict Middle Eastern ideals, while Bolek's
Community of Hungarian converts, includ-
ing one S h ici council member, remains far
from that uncompromising spirit. The dire
need both have for foreign Islamic funding
may be their main, if not only, common fea-
ture. Internal dissent, competition, and al-
tercation have always characterized both al-
though things seem to have improved in
Bolek's Community since his re-election.
As in other Central and East European
cities, concerns have been raised recently as
to whether Budapest's immigrant Muslim
community could serve as a hiding place or
logistical base for 'sleepers' or other agents
of radical international Islamist organiza-
tions, which might recruit from among its
members. If so, they probably take lower
risks in Hungary than they currently do in
Western Europe, where they have come
under professional intelligence scrutiny.
Hungary's few Muslims obviously feel at
home. They tend to condemn terrorism,
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In present-day Nigeria there are twelve states that
have adopted or implemented s h a r ica law. These
laws have spawned death sentences for two women
accused of adultery. The cases have received interna-
tional attention, including the boycott of the Miss
World contest in Nigeria by pageant contestants
upset by the sentences, and the November riots and
killings surrounding the pageant's controversy. The
Nigerian Federal Government has already inter-
vened to help free the first woman on appeal and to
promise to protect the second, and has denied that
the pageant was to blame for the riots. However,
thousands more northern Nigerian women are af-
fected by s h a r ica laws, which attempt to limit forms
of transportation for women and control when and
how they will marry. 
Gender, Mobility,
and S h a r i ca
Mobility is required for women to learn,
teach, or work. International audiences are
not addressing these seemingly mundane
issues and the Nigerian government is not
giving relief from such laws even though
they affect the overwhelming majority of
northern Nigerian women. 
S h a r ica law has only been in effect for
three years in Zamfara, the first Nigerian
state to adopt s h a r ica, but historically Niger-
ian laws based on the s h a r ica in the 20t h c e n-
tury have attempted to closely govern
women's mobility and marital status.* S h a r i-
ca laws promulgated since 1999 have at-
tempted to bring moral leadership to north-
ern Nigeria by limiting women's mobility.
The first governor to institute s h a r ica l a w ,
Ahmad Sani of Zamfara, has described the
laws regarding women as essential 'in his
drive to create … a decent society' (Phillips
2000b). Most of the restrictions on women's
mobility have concentrated on sex-segre-
gated transportation. States have mandated
that taxis and buses be designated specifi-
cally for men or women; women's taxis
being differentiated by pictures of veiled
women on the side. It has even been sug-
gested that though men now drive the
women's taxis, women may replace them in
the future (Phillips 2000a, 2000b). Women
have also been prohibited from hiring mo-
torcycle taxis (BBC 2000). Motorcycle taxis
are a popular form of transportation be-
cause they are often faster than waiting for
a bus and less expensive than a regular taxi.
The fact that hundreds of motorcycle taxi
drivers had been arrested for carrying
women passengers and awaited trial in
2001 under these restrictions attests to
women's need for this type of transporta-
t i o n .
These prohibitions come at a time of a
petrol and transportation crisis in Nigeria.
Since the early 1990s, the availability of
petrol in stations has been frequently inter-
rupted because of corruption and lack of re-
sources. The nation's petrol drivers divert
tanks of fuel to neighbouring countries or il-
legal roadside stations where they get in-
flated prices for their loads. Also the nation's
four refineries are in need of repairs and are
frequently inoperative. Recently the gov-
ernment has increased the official price of
fuel, which will be reflected in higher trans-
port fares (Ndiribe 2002). In the mid-1990s
higher fuel costs put some buses and taxis
out of business, which also jeapordized
women's access to transportation. Trans-
portation is especially a concern for single,
divorced, and widowed women who sup-
port themselves through working outside
the home or who go to school with aspira-
tions for earning an income.
Marital status
The current s h a r ica law movement has
also tackled and coupled the issues of
women's marital status and work. When
Zamfara State first implemented s h a r ica l a w ,
it offered prostitutes USD 250 to abandon
their profession and take up small-scale
businesses; twenty-seven women accepted
this deal (Phillips 2000b).
States' s h a r ica laws have made distinc-
tions between married and single women.
In the case of transportation, while the men
bike operators were beaten, the s h a r ica p o-
lice did not beat the married women pas-
sengers. There were reports that unmarried
women would be punished. The variance in
treatment of women may indicate that the
states have relinquished jurisdiction over
married women to husbands; husbands'
prerogatives override those of the state. It
also seems to assume that husbands are the
only ones entitled and trusted to punish
their wives appropriately, and women are
not to be trusted at all. This discrepancy in
treatment also begs the question of
whether Muslim husbands are under in-
creased social pressure to limit their wives'
movements outside the home.
Some s h a r ica policies have made states
into agents in the marriage process. Zam-
fara State was 'prepared to offer financial as-
sistance to women who want to get married
but cannot afford the cost of the wedding
ceremony' (Phillips 2000b). And other state
governments have attempted to legislate
minimum amounts for dowries, lowering
them from USD 500–1,000 to USD 10
(Dosara 2000). Women 'vehemently refused
to comply' with laws lowering dowries. No
doubt these women were attempting to
maintain mechanisms for asserting their so-
cial worth (Cooper 1995).
However, there is some popular support
for the notion that women should be mar-
ried. More than 1000 women marched in a
demonstration to urge the traditional lead-
ers in the North to enjoin men to marry
more than one wife so that divorced and
widowed women could find husbands. Oth-
erwise the women warned that the shortage
of husbands would 'force them to commit
crimes against Sharia law' (Dosara 2000). It is
unlikely that these women were predicting
the famous death sentences for Safiya Has-
seini, the 35-year old divorced woman who
was the first woman given the death sen-
tence for adultery and then acquitted on ap-
peal through pressure by the Nigerian fed-
eral government, and Amina Lawal, another
divorced woman with a pending death sen-
tence for the same charge. However, it
seems clear that women and men in Nigeria
believe that marriage protects women from
certain allegations and punishments from
the state, if not husbands' punishments.
Popular reactions to s h a r ica law have
again shown that northern Nigerians per-
ceive the current laws as critical of single
adult women and act in ways more strict
than the letter of the laws. There were ru-
mours in Zamfara that all single women
working for the government should marry
or would lose their jobs; the governor de-
nied this (Cunliffe-Jones 1999). S h a r ica p o-
lice in Kano, the lowest levels of whom are
young violent men vigilantes, have gone as
far as detaining hundreds of people of the
opposite sex who were talking to one an-
other on the street. 'The detainees have
been taken to police stations over the past
few days and questioned about whether
they are involved in adultery or prostitution'
(Phillips 2000c). Popular perception has in-
fluenced Nigerians to practise sex segrega-
tion in very strict and extralegal ways.
E d u c a t i o n
The present state governments have ex-
pressed support for the education of girls
and women. The first lady of Zamfara State,
Hajiya Karimah Sani, has encouraged women
to continue with their education, with the
goal of becoming teachers, doctors, and
nurses (Ikyur 2001). But with the laws govern-
ing transportation and the fuel crisis,
women's ability to travel and work is con-
strained; therefore becoming teachers, doc-
tors, and nurses – and getting to those jobs –
is more tenuous.
State governments have also showed a
preference for married women in their edu-
cational policies. During prize day at an
adult women's school, the deputy governor
of Zamfara noted that 'about 30 divorcee
students of the school were now married
and were comfortably pursuing their stud-
ies' (Ikyur 2001). When women's transporta-
tion woes are coupled with the retreat of
women, especially divorcees and widows,
into marriage as a refuge from some of the
more harsh punishments of the s h a r ica,
there could be reversals for girls' and
women's education. For example, scholars
of northern Nigeria have long noted that
early marriage is the reason most girls leave
school in their early to mid-teens. However,
recently many girls have finished secondary
school and put off marriage until 18 or 20
(Werthmann 1999). S h a r ica law and its pref-
erence for marriage may stifle this ongoing
transformation in northern Nigeria.
Paradoxically, then, the adoption of Islam-
ic law though ostensibly designed to 'pro-
tect' women's rights and educate women
may effectively impede women's ability to
study and teach the scriptural basis of those
rights if women cannot get to school. These
laws and Nigerian perceptions of them will
no doubt have consequences on all Muslim
Nigerian women's personal autonomy.
Gains for women may also be possible by
making new professions in a sex-segregated
economy, such as taxi driver, available to
women and by making capital for small
businesses more widely available. But the
opposite is a more realistic possibility. These
laws may just serve to decrease women's
personal autonomy by preferring marriage
and consequently subverting women's
rights as citizens to men's rights as hus-
b a n d s .
At the beginning, northern Nigerian
women and men showed support for strict
implementation of these laws, but historical-
ly strict adherence to s h a r ica has not lasted
for long. Even today the dowry example
shows that women can quash government
initiatives that trod on their sense of dignity
and worth. A colleague recently back from
Nigeria reports that urban areas like Kano
are no longer enforcing these laws. Public
transportation in Kano has reverted to ac-
cepting both men and women passengers
with some effort to seat women together.
And when asked about women-only taxis or
the enforcement of other s h a r ica laws some
Kano residents reply, 'that was during the
time of s h a r ica', implying that the time has
passed in that city (Gaudio 2002). The sensa-
tional cases of Amina and Safiya were adju-
dicated in small-town and rural areas. These
examples indicate that the continued en-
forcement of s h a r ica may be breaking down
along urban-rural lines. The nation's capital
city, Abuja, may have the final say in these
matters as the justice minister has already
declared that 'punishment under the [s h a r i-
ca] system was discriminatory and therefore
unconstitutional', partially based on sex
(Vanguard 2002). The wide scale of the Miss
World riots in northern Nigeria shows that
many Muslims there will not give in to the
Federal Government's notions on gender
and religion.
N o t e
* During Emir Sanusi's reign (1953–63) in the
Nigerian state of Kano, s h a r ica-based laws
attempted to limit women's movements outside
the home, particularly at traditional celebrations,
in order to stop the 'deterioration in moral
standards', which the mixing of the sexes in public
caused. These efforts were short lived but
stringently observed for a few years.
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M U H A M M AD  K H A L I D  M AS U D
Presently, more than one third of the world's Mus-
lims are living as minorities in non-Muslim countries,
a fact which has posed challenges not only for the
host countries but also for the Muslims themselves.
Most Muslims perceive Muslim minorities as an inte-
gral part of the larger Muslim community, u m m a.
Many insist that Muslims must be governed by Islam-
ic law, often that of the country of origin. Home coun-
tries are expected to offer human, political, and fi-
nancial resources in order for the minorities to live Is-
lamically. This perception is quite problematic: on
the one hand, it implies that while the Muslims have
been living in these countries for three generations,
their presence is seen as transitory – it cannot con-
ceive of Muslims living permanently under non-Mus-
lim rule; while on the other hand, this perception
tends to imagine Muslim minorities as colonies of the
Muslim world. Apart from the question of whether
Muslim countries are in a position to play the role de-
scribed above, other serious questions are raised for
the future of the Muslim minorities. 
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of this posi-
tion, some Muslim jurists continue to treat
Muslim minorities today as did the medieval
jurists, who regarded them as those left be-
hind after the non-Muslim occupation of
Muslim lands. They presume that eventually
these Muslims would have to re-migrate
back to Muslim countries. In the meantime,
they must protect their religious and cultur-
al identity by isolating themselves from
their host societies. An example of this per-
ception is Muslim Minorities, Fatawa Regard-
ing Muslims Living as Minorities ( L o n d o n :
Message of Islam, 1998) by the late Shaykh
Ibn Baz and Shaykh Uthaymeen, two influ-
ential Saudi muftis. The book explains that
preservation of faith and strict obedience to
the laws of Islam are the foremost duties of
all Muslims, including those living as minori-
ties. Muslim Minorities shows awareness of
the difficulties of Muslims living as minori-
ties and advises them to be patient. Howev-
er, 'if it is not possible to gain a livelihood
except by what Allah has forbidden, namely
through the mixing of men and women,
then this livelihood must be abandoned' (p.
75). It discourages Muslims from marrying
non-Muslim women (29f.), forbids them to
greet Christians at Christmas or other reli-
gious festivals (83), and allows them to go to
non-Muslim courts (for registration of di-
vorce) only if it is done according to Islamic
law (74). Muslim Minorities generally does
not allow a departure from the old laws. In
some circumstances, where some conces-
sions are suggested, they are only transitory
and subject to general provisions of Islamic
law, for example, transmission of pictures
and service in non-Muslim armies. 
Obedience to Islamic law in this sense
necessarily requires community organiza-
tion in a particular manner and the services
of legal experts for that purpose. This is
often not possible without the help of the
majority Muslim countries. The book, there-
fore, repeatedly appeals to scholars and
preachers to visit Muslim minorities, even
though, in the words of one inquirer, '[v]isit-
ing countries of disbelief is prohibited.' Ibn
Baz advises the Muslim rulers and the
wealthy 'to do what they can to save the
Muslim minorities with both money and
words. This is their duty.' The two muftis are
quite obviously restrained by the methodol-
ogy as well as the worldview of the old laws
to the extent that they still use the term
'enemy countries' (e.g. p. 39) for the abode
of Muslim minorities. Certainly Ibn Baz was
not using the term in the literal sense. It is
the compulsion of analogical reasoning to
measure the modern situation in terms of
the old categories of 'House of Islam' and
'House of War'. 
Modern Muslim jurists disregard this
methodological compulsion and treat the
situation of Muslim minorities as exception-
al cases that require special considerations.
They approach the whole range of ques-
tions relating to laws about food, dress,
marriage, divorce, co-education, and rela-
tions with non-Muslims, etc. in terms of ex-
pediency. Consequently, a whole set of new
interpretations, often divergent, appeared.
Some other jurists stressed the need for
new, especially formal sources. Various rules
of Islamic jurisprudence, e.g. common
good, objectives or spirit of law, conve-
nience, common practice, necessity, and
prevention of harm, which were invoked
sparingly, gained significance as basic prin-
ciples of Islamic legal theory. These opinions
were published in the form of fatwas and
did not constitute part of regular Islamic law
t e x t s .1 It is only recently that treatises have
begun to appear on the subject.
Jurisprudence of minorities
Despite the growing volume of the litera-
ture on Muslim minorities, many Muslims in
the West, especially in the United States,
feel that the existing legal debates have
failed to address their problems adequately.
In 1994, the North American Fiqh Council
announced a project to 'develop f i q h f o r
Muslims living in non-Muslim societies'.
Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo, Secretary of the
Council, explained that Islamic law for mi-
norities needed an approach different from
the traditional rules of expediency. He illus-
trates this approach with several examples.
For instance, instead of traditional unilateral
divorce by the husband, the new f i q h
favours termination of marriage only
through the court system.3 Taha Jabir al-Al-
wani, Chairman of the Council, was perhaps
the first to use the term fiqh al-aqalliyat
(1994) in his fatwa about Muslim participa-
tion in American secular politics. Some Mus-
lims in America hesitated to participate in
American politics because it meant alliance
with non-Muslims, division of the Muslim
community, and submission to a non-Islam-
ic system of secular politics as well as giving
up the hope of the US becoming part of d a r
a l - I s l a m. They asked the Council for a fatwa.
Alwani in his fatwa dismissed these objec-
tions and argued that the American secular
system was faith neutral, not irreligious. He
distinguished conditions in countries that
have Muslim majorities from those where
Muslims are in minority. The two contexts
are quite different and entail different oblig-
ations: 'While Muslims in Muslim countries
are obliged to uphold the Islamic law of
their state, Muslim minorities in the United
States are not required either by Islamic law
or rationality to uphold Islamic symbols of
faith in a secular state, except to the extent
permissible within that state.'4
This fatwa stirred a controversy among
Muslim scholars. For instance, the Syrian
Shaykh Saeed Ramadan al-Buti dismissed
Alwani's call for the jurisprudence of minori-
ties as a 'plot to divide Islam'. Amongst
other comments he stated: 'We were so
pleased with the growing numbers of Mus-
lims in the West, that we hoped that their
adherence to Islam and their obedience to
its codes will thaw the cold resistance of the
deviating Western civilization in the current
of the Islamic civilization. But today the call
to the Jurisprudence of Minorities warns us
of a calamity contrary to our hopes. We are
warned of thawing of the Islamic existence
in the current of the deviating Western civi-
lization and this type of jurisprudence guar-
antees this calamity.'5
Responding to this criticism, Taha Jabir Al-
wani explains that fiqh al-aqalliyat c o n s t i-
tutes an autonomous jurisprudence, based
on the principle of the relevance of the rule
of s h a r ica to the conditions and circum-
stances peculiar to a particular community
and its place of residence. It requires infor-
mation about local culture and expertise in
social sciences, e.g. sociology, economics,
political science, and international relations.
It is not part of the existing f i q h, which is a
jurisprudence developed as case law. F i q h
a l - a q a l l i y a t is not a jurisprudence of expedi-
ency that looks for concessions. Alwani ar-
gues that the categories of dar al-Islam a n d
dar al-harb are no longer relevant today.
The Muslim presence, no matter where,
should be considered permanent and dy-
namic. The term fiqh al-aqalliyat gained cur-
rency in the Muslim countries as well. Khalid
Abd al-Qadir was probably the first to col-
lect the special laws applicable to Muslims
living as minorities in his book Fi Fiqh al-
aqalliyat al-Muslimah (Tarabulus, Lubnan:
Dar al-Iman, 1998). Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who
has written extensively on the subject, also
chose this title for his works much later: F i q h
al-aqalliyat al-Muslimin, hayat al-muslimin
wast al-m u j t a m aca t a l - u k h r a (Cairo: Dar al-
Shuruq, 2001) and Fiqh of Muslim Minorities
(two volumes, 2002–3).2 This latest book is
also announced as a 'progressive f i q h', prob-
ably with reference to the current debates
on the subject and the growing anxiety of
Muslims about their minority status in Is-
lamic law. 
Another civil rights
m o v e m e n t ?
Obviously, advocates of fiqh al-aqalliyat
have yet to answer some very complex
questions. First, the term m i n o r i t y is quite
problematic. Its semantic vagueness con-
jures up the concept of a sub-nation in a na-
tion-state framework. Religious minority is
even weaker than sub-nation or national mi-
nority because it is further divided into
other aspects like language and culture.
Second, the question of minority is very
closely connected with other minority situa-
tions, e.g. non-Muslim and Muslim minori-
ties in Muslim countries. Most often they are
not perceived in the same fashion. Third,
the situation of Muslim minorities in the
Western countries also differs from the Mus-
lim minorities in non-Western countries, e.g.
India. It appears that minorities in these dif-
ferent situations have to develop different
sets of jurisprudence, to the extent that the
term m i n o r i t y, in final analysis, becomes ir-
r e l e v a n t .
The problems addressed by fiqh al-aqalliy-
a t are not the questions related to Muslim
minorities only. They concern questions for
the whole Muslim world. Some of these
questions are certainly more intense and ur-
gent for Muslims in the West, but ultimately
the whole Muslim world has to respond to
them. The West is no longer a territorial con-
cept; it is a global and cultural notion that is
very much present in the non-Western
world also. 
The jurisprudence of minorities, especial-
ly, in the United States has a further seman-
tic connotation of civil rights. It implies 'help
and special treatment for a community left
behind'. Instead of absolute equality, it calls
for differential equality and protection. This
idea has been challenged in the US courts
since 1989 and is losing sympathy with ju-
rists. In the wake of the rising Islamophobia,
discrimination and harassment of Muslims,
and media prejudice, especially after the
events of 11 September, there seems to be
no sympathy for another civil rights move-
ment. If the Muslims were forced to take this
path, fiqh al-aqalliyat would not be there to
help them because it has been so far con-
cerned only with solving problems of (and
within) Islamic law. It has still to work out
problems with the local laws. There is per-
haps a need for Muslim jurisprudence of cit-
izenship in the framework of pluralism, in
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M o r o c c o
J AM I L A  B A R G A C H
The question of adoption has been largely over-
looked in studies of the Muslim world given that
Islam officially prohibits it on potent religious alibis.
Considering such a practice from an ethnographic
perspective, and not exclusively a legalistic one,
opens up new dimensions in the study of family and
kinship in the Muslim world. Yet, such a practice is
predicated on the existence of children to be adopt-
ed as 'raw material' in the first place. And while his-
torically there have been, and still continue to be,
various intra-family exchanges of children outside
legal frames and the practice of Islamic tutelage,
k a f a l a, the Muslim world, as elsewhere, is experienc-
ing the problem of abandoned children as a by-prod-




There is a strong ethical quandary regarding
out-of-wedlock children and the practice of
secret adoption because the contemporary
codified Muslim family laws generally pro-
scribe the latter and recognize the former
within very limited legal clauses. 
Muslim family law continues to be one of
the most controversial and hotly debated is-
sues in the Muslim world today, and despite
decades of debate concerning its use and
adaptability (or lack thereof) to the changes
of the modern world, no consensus has
been arrived at so far. Such seems to be the
normal outcome when these discussions
are ideologically framed and interpret the
laws as a depository and/or a vehicle of an
'authentic' Muslim identity. The situation
seems to have even worsened in the post-
9/11 world as those holding and promoting
a conservative Muslim agenda have become
part of a legitimate contestation politics
against the largely negative image of Mus-
lims in the Western world. Family law has
been one of those elements constituting
this passionate engagement because it
goes beyond legal definitions, norms, and
procedures, and taps into the heart of Mus-
lim identity, culture, social cohesion, conti-
nuity, and values. It is, in a sense, an under-
standable move especially in the face of
what some construe to be the continuing
external onslaught of Western hegemony
and imperialism, and the internal accultura-
tion and alienation of the Muslim popula-
tion. Those Muslims living in the largely
post-colonial nation-states today who call
for the adoption of a Muslim family code are
also those who interpret such a move as
abiding by strict (or at least laying some
nominal claim to) religious rules and as safe-
guarding the authenticity of the culture in
question. While those other Muslims who
argue for a radically different family code
construct their quest as one that leads to a
more egalitarian social system, as one that is
able to accommodate the social and eco-
nomic changes (especially those of women)
in the contemporary liberal system and cap-
italist economies, and finally one that fos-
ters an emancipatory role of religion in gen-
eral but does not dismiss it, as is often be-
lieved to be the case. 
Legal code
The two entrenched readings of the role
of a legal code sketched above (whether to
structure or to accommodate Muslim social
reality), constitutes the intellectual and ab-
stract aspect of the debate in much of the
Muslim world today. And while this posi-
tioning is essential for a deep understand-
ing of the implications and interplay be-
tween Muslim legal norms and Muslim so-
cial reality, tackling a 'tangible' problem as
that of children out-of-wedlock in a Muslim
context reveals a bewildering paradox. Re-
search that explores the legal-religious
component in addition to the other dimen-
sions of the social problem of abandoned
children in a Muslim context, in the field
that is, shows the extent to which this is an
issue made of many and various intercon-
nected layers of complexity. Much has been
written about the particularly ethical orien-
tation of a number of Islamic religious/legal
rules, and one of its many examples has
been the fact that Islam protects orphans in
an unparalleled way. In all classical texts of
f i q h children born out-of-wedlock (l a q i t, sg.
l u q a t a ', pl.), although not strictly speaking
orphans, are considered to be free clients,
m a w a l i, and are entitled to all the rights and
duties of a Muslim since the notion of t a q w a
(piety, among many other meanings) is
what characterizes a Muslim and not his/her
lineage (n a s a b) or wealth (h a s a b). These f i q h
texts equally comment on the prohibition of
plain adoption in the Qur'an (what is known
as the 'Zaid incident', Sura 33:4–5) as one
aiming to foster, generally speaking, a social
order built on truth. Truth implies here the
prohibition of fictive kinship ties that may
not only alienate those legally entitled heirs
but that could also lead to future incestuous
relations deemed to be potentially destruc-
tive of communal cohesion because they
could possibly lead to a f i t n a ( d i s o r d e r ,
chaos). The Zaid incident carries another de-
cisive politico-historical meaning not often
dwelt upon by traditional religious scholars,
which is the issue of the Prophet's succes-
sion given that pre-Islamic traditions made
of an adopted son a fully legal heir. The Zaid
incident was an important historical rupture
with the existing social order and the usher-
ing of new norms that were part and parcel
of the new faith of Islam. Outside of the spe-
cific elements of this incident, which in fact
has structured the sense of family, inheri-
tance, and continuity, the question of what
to do with a fairly substantial number of
abandoned newborns and children could
not be an issue in the classical framework
simply because neither the sociological nor
the demographic conditions of the time
made it a possible likelihood to be consid-
ered as such. 
The case of Morocco
The radical economic and sociological
changes that have shaken the Muslim world
for the last two centuries have generated,
indeed, entire regiments of issues and ques-
tions to be dealt with innovatively and seri-
ously. Research on the issue shows, thus,
that a purely legalistic and discursive ap-
proach to the question of abandoned chil-
dren, k a f a l a, and secret adoption cannot
possibly be the panacea for dealing with
this problem as it might have once been his-
torically (and even this assertion remains
questionable). Certain conservative voices
argue that Islamic family code offers the so-
lution, but in tangible terms such a reading
is simply dismissing the complex reality
component and hiding behind lofty ideas
and ideals. On the other hand, considering
only the reality factor without the sedi-
ments of the Muslim legacy that shaped this
reality is being not only too utilitarian and
positivist but also inattentive to the fine nu-
ances in which a culture reproduces itself.
Morocco is the case in point here. The issue
of abandoned children continues to be stig-
matized and taboo because of a myriad of
reasons, among which should be men-
tioned the issues of 'unregulated' sexuality,
the shame associated with it, and the anxi-
ety concerning the 'chaos and loss of moral-
ity' – f i t n a – that the very being of the chil-
dren engenders. The children themselves
are believed to carry a sense of disorder and
dislocation and are made to represent pro-
fanity; such is evident through the analysis
of a number of cultural beliefs and practices.
To underline just one point here is the fact
that they are called the children of the for-
bidden, ulad l'hram. Religiously inclined
people as well as secularists generally hold
such a viewpoint to varying degrees. The
legal provisions in place for the integration
of the children either through existing care
institutions or the kafala – tutelage or the
legally accepted norm of adoption in Islam –
as is to be practised today through the Mo-
roccan family law, Mudawana, remains
equally a very limited option as it dismisses
important issues regarding a child's equilib-
rium and other family-related matters. Thus,
if and when the issue of abandoned chil-
dren is tackled in public space (notably
through media) or in specialized literature,
the discourse most often, though not exclu-
sively, falls either into an apologetic or a
moralizing tone while leaving important
questions unexamined. Of these, the most
revealing is the understanding of those ob-
jective processes at play (legal, economic,
social, and imaginary) that create and de-
fine exclusion and marginality, and an
analysis of the foundations of those very as-
sumptions that legitimize these exclusions. 
The research carried out on this issue
gives thorough details and performs an
analysis of the legal, institutional, and cul-
tural mechanisms of exclusion and victim-
ization of abandoned children as well as the
problems relating to k a f a l a and secret
adoption. It becomes evident that it would
have been ideal to translate that ethical and
all-inclusive stand of Islamic f i q h in the gen-
eral m uca m a l a t (deeds, behavior) towards
out-of-wedlock children, but contemporary
social mechanisms yield almost an antago-
nistic result. Abandoned children in Moroc-
co, as is the case in many other parts of the
world, embody shame and are often made
to pay the price of this shame by being ex-
cluded in a heavily stratified social order.
The normative paradigms upheld and dis-
seminated through the social institutions of
which the state is the w a l i (guardian) fail to
address in tangible terms the problem of
the children and those cycles of ignorance,
poverty, violence, and abuse that have
given birth to them (pun intended). While
upholding the Muslim-humanist claim that
these children are not to be ill treated be-
cause of their condition, the reality is that
they certainly are, just because – to point to
a sociological truism – religion is not the
only component in the engendering of a
collective identity and its cultural traditions.
The children are victimized because the
physical environments (shelters, orphan-
ages) in which they are lack social recogni-
tion and often basic necessities; because
the legal norms and the procedural rules in
place make their 'integration' extremely dif-
ficult if not impossible in some cases (diffi-
culty to obtain a name for instance); be-
cause the culture generally construes them
to be harbingers of evil and mistrusts them
because of their supposedly profaned blood
(evident through semantic analysis of the
language and court cases); and because
they are not tied to a legitimate kinship or
web of relations that recognizes them as
trustworthy actors of and in a given system. 
Dr Jamila Bargach is currently a fellow in the Human
Rights and Islam Program at the Emory School of
Law (Atlanta, Georgia). She is author of Orphans of
Islam: Family, Abandonment and Secret Adoption
in Morocco (Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman






p a i n t e r
M o h a m m e d
Nabili. 
Public SphereI S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  1 1 / 0 2 19
N o t e s
1 . Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities ( V e r s o :
London, 1991).
2 . See my forthcoming book, Law and Power in the
Islamic World (I.B. Tauris: London, 2003).
3 . Kitab manafi' al-aghdhiyah wa daf' madarriha ( 1s t
printed edition, Cairo, 1888; censored edition
under discussion, Beirut: Dar Ihya' al-cU l u m, 1985).
See David Waines, 'Al-Balkhi on the Nature of
Forbidden Drink', in Manuela Marin and David
Waines (eds), La Alimentacion en las Culturas
I s l a m i c a s (Agencia Espanola de Cooperacion
Internacional: Madrid, 1994), 111–26.
Dr Sami Zubaida is a reader in politics, Department
of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University
of London, UK. 
E-mail: s.zubaida@bbk.ac.uk 
Mi ddl e Ea st
S A M I  ZU B A I D A
The image of the Middle East projected in current
public discourses is one imbued with religion. Media
consumers would be forgiven for assuming that the
region consists of angry bearded men prostrating
themselves in prayer when not shaking their fists
and burning American flags, and shadowy women
with headscarves or chadors. The region is 'the Islam-
ic world', religion stamped on every aspect of its life
and function. The 'clash of civilizations' idea, much
criticized, remains a potent notion both in the West
and in Muslim circles. A mythical totalized 'Muslim
world' is opposed to an equally mythical unified
'West', with religion as the essence of the former and
the main key to its politics and society.
Religious Authority
and Public Life 
We are talking about complex and differen-
tiated societies. They comprise political and
cultural fields with diverse forces and many
contests. Many of the cities in the Middle
East have been, and often remain, the loca-
tions of cosmopolitan cultures with features
of originality. The cosmopolitan Alexandria
of past decades may be seen as the creation
of foreigners, now long gone, leaving a few
architectural traces in a ramshackle poor
city bursting with overpopulated slums. But
this image hides the native participation in
ideas and movements in that city and the
genuine mixture of peoples and cultures
that prevailed. The foreigners were not just
a rich stratum separated from the natives,
but comprised proletarian and petty bour-
geois sectors, such as Italian dock workers
and Greek shop-keepers, intimately inter-
mingled with the native Egyptian urbanites.
Cairo was the location of many secular and
cosmopolitan cultural spheres. In the 1930s
Cairo hosted the Arab music congress in
which its musical luminaries, such as Mu-
hammad Abdul-Wahab, argued about the
musical renaissance not only with fellow
Arabs but also with Bella Bartok. Edward
Evans Pritchard was delivering his seminal
lectures on primitive religion at the Egypt-
ian, now Cairo University. Are all these élite
activities that left the bulk of the population
in traditional and religious milieus? Wrong:
the flourishing film industry captivated the
fancy and imagination of the populace, not
just in Egypt but throughout the Arab
world, where the current songs were on
every lip, and where a faithful audience of
urbanites from taxi drivers to porters mem-
orized the dialogue of popular films and
gave a running commentary to new view-
ers. Now this fascination with film is further
reinforced by television screens in many
homes and cafés, broadcasting soaps,
sports, and musical entertainment along-
side the religious programmes and moral
homilies so characteristic of pious Egypt.
Where was religion prior to its political
resurgence in the 1970s? Of course it was
there, but in many forms and guises, mixed
in with other elements of culture and poli-
tics. Of course there were the bearded men
of al-Azhar, and different bearded men of
the Muslim Brotherhood. The religion of the
people, however, was much more relaxed
and syncretistic, including music, song,
dance, and even exotic substances often
frowned upon by the orthodox. Popular rit-
uals and celebration, such as those of the
Prophet's birthday and the commemoration
of the saints draw vast crowds to the pre-
sent day. Popular religiosity also mixed hap-
pily with other elements of celebratory cul-
ture. It is exemplified in the popular song
sung by Abdul-Muttalib: sakin fi hayy al-
sayyida wa-habibi sakin fil-husayn, w a - ' a l a
shan anul kull al-rida yomat aruhlu marratain
('I live in the quarter of al-Sayyida [Zaynab]
(a shrine district of central Cairo) and my
beloved lives in al-Hussayn (another shrine
district), and in order to attain maximum
merit I visit him twice a day'), which situates
his love in the sacred geography of Cairo. 
Modernity and secularization
'Secularization' is not necessarily 'secular-
ism'. It is not an ideological commitment
against religion, but a socio-cultural process
by which religion becomes differentiated
and separated from other social and cultural
spheres, which it previously dominated. In
Europe, the Renaissance, the Reformation,
then the Enlightenment, and the scientific
revolution all contributed to this process,
but it was the revolutionary dynamic of cap-
italism above all that broke up the communi-
ties and institutions that enshrined religious
domination. In the Middle East, the dynamic
of capitalist incorporation was part of West-
ern domination, and was telescoped into a
relatively short historical span. A crucial pe-
culiarity of capitalist domination is that it en-
ters into the very economy of desire of bod-
ies and psyches, offering an ever-expanding
range of gratifications. These are not only
'material' but often 'spiritual' and intellectu-
al: it engenders new and diverse forms of
knowledge and imagination, an ever-de-
manding curiosity.1 It demolishes the narrow
horizons of community, of kinship, and hier-
archical authority by providing means of
critical knowledge of the workings of social
and political organization. The new middle
classes in the urban centres of the 19t h a n d
2 0t h centuries were and remain thirsty for the
new forms of knowledge as much as for the
material commodities feeding new lifestyles. 
The consequence of these developments
of modernity was the progressive loss and
fragmentation of religious authority. Law
was separated from its religious locations in
the ulama and their institutions, and as-
signed to government ministries and courts
with personnel trained in secular law
schools. Codified state law was largely de-
rived from European models, but even the
portion on family law derived from the s h a r-
ica in most countries became state law under
secular legal institutions. Religious authori-
ties attempted to intervene in and control
the new cultural spheres of media, publish-
ing, and entertainment, but with only spo-
radic success largely confined to instances in
which items in these spheres directly chal-
lenged orthodox truths. The ulama, howev-
er, largely acquiesced in the separation of
the various spheres of politics, law, and cul-
ture from religion. When religious chal-
lenges to these spheres emerged the
sources were more likely to be the Islamic
militants than the establishment ulama.
The modern sphere, however, did not
leave Islam to the ulama, but from the time
of Abduh (d. 1905) had attempted to incor-
porate it into its modern discourses. Ahmad
Amin, Abbas Mahmud al-cA q q a d, and Taha
Hussein, among others, were Egyptian writ-
ers with European education and knowl-
edge of languages. In the 1930s they all
wrote books on Islam and its history, claim-
ing the 'real' and pure Islam of the Prophet
for modernity, against the obscurantism of
al-Azhar and its ulama. In effect, these writ-
ers and many that followed them appropri-
ated Islam for modernity and removed it
from its traditional contexts of jurisprudence
and authority. This is an essentially seculariz-
ing step. 
I s l a m i s m
Islamism also appropriated Islam for
modernity, but in a radically different direc-
tion. A central element in modern Islamism is
the attempt to impose religious authority on
culture and society. Central quests in this re-
spect are the moralization of public space, the
imposition of ritual observance, and the cen-
sorship of cultural and entertainment prod-
ucts. Whether in government or opposition
(and it straddles both) this strand of Islamism
reinforces social control and authoritarian
rule and is much favoured by the regimes in
the region. This quest coincides with a wider
cultural nationalism, seeking the restoration
of authenticity, which, as always, is construct-
ed. The history of modernity, it is argued, is
one of the imposition and invasion of West-
ern culture and institutions on a colonized
Muslim society, and it is now time to reverse
this invasion by reviving authentic culture.
The demand for the application of the sharica
is central to this quest. Given that the histori-
cal sharica and its institutions are problematic
and often irrelevant in a modern state and so-
ciety, as the Iranian Republic was to discover,2
the elements of it which are most clearly at
variance with modern sensibilities (dubbed
'Western', but in fact common to many sec-
tors of people all over the world) are high-
lighted. Thus so-called Qur'anic punishments
of amputations, executions, and stoning are
adopted by dictators and authoritarian chiefs
(Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Sudan, the Taliban,
Northern Nigeria), flaunted as Islamic. The
irony is that these acts are described by many
as 'medieval' barbarism, when in fact me-
dieval jurists and judges imposed many and
restrictive conditions on these punishments,
and the high standards of evidence demand-
ed by the sharica were hard to satisfy. It is
modern dictators who relish their application,
both as demonstration of their religious de-
votion and justice and as intimidation and
threat to political opposition.
Similarly, the veiling of women and the pro-
hibition of interest (which means disguising
it) and of alcohol become easy hallmarks of Is-
lamicity, when all the institutions of state and
society and most spheres of culture have
clearly nothing to do with religion, but are
products of technical and cultural modernity.
One episode illustrates the hollowness of this
quest for authenticity. A classic book of medi-
cine by the medieval doctor and philosopher
al-Razi3 includes a chapter on wine and its
medical qualities, finding its moderate con-
sumption to be largely beneficial. The manu-
script of this book was printed in the 19th cen-
tury, then issued in many successive editions.
It was only in a Beirut edition in 1985 that the
chapter on wine was censored, the editor ex-
plaining in a preface that such discourse was
inappropriate in a classic book of 'Islamic'
medicine. The modern Islamic editor, then,
imposed authenticity on the medieval her-
itage of the region.
Conservative Islamic attempts at imposing
authority and morality come up against sec-
tors of society now accustomed to personal
autonomy, as well as the forces of desire, lib-
erated by the processes of modernity, which
broke up the patriarchal community. To Iran-
ian youth Western pop and football stars are
much more meaningful than velayet-e faqih .
Egyptian students resort to an odd concept of
Islamic law, that of curfi or customary mar-
riage, to co-habit with lovers without their
parents' knowledge or consent, to the out-
rage of the moral censors and the press.
Egyptian authorities, religious and secular,
pursue imagined satanic cults, pornographic
displays, erotic chewing gum (supposedly
distributed by Israeli agents to corrupt Mus-
lim girls), homosexual conspiracies, and er-
rant authors – all in their tireless efforts to
eradicate deviant and inauthentic cultures,
products of Western corruption. This para-
noid vigilance fits in well with the aims of au-
thoritarian rule and a sensationalist press. But
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F r a n c e
MO U S S A  K H E D I M E L L A H
Their long beards often contrast their young faces;
they wear traditional Pakistani garb (k h a m i s s) or
more generally white tunics (d j e l l a b a or g a n d o u r a)
that flow to their ankles, a skull-cap (t a g u i l l a), and
perhaps a pair of Nikes or Reeboks. Rain or shine,
they untiringly cross mountains and valleys through-
out France and the entire world in small groups of
three or five, rarely more, to propagate the message
of Allah. For the most part they are French, mainly of
Moroccan origin or more broadly of Maghrebi or
African origin, and are called Mohamed, Rachid,
Amadou, or Moustafa, but also Eric, Thomas, Patrick,
or Didier. They are male, but are increasingly accom-
panied by young women proudly wearing head-
scarves and participating in the effort of propagat-
ing their faith. They are mostly between 18 and 35
years of age and live essentially in the French sub-
u r b s ,1 where the cumulated difficulties of unemploy-
ment, exclusion, and racism are predominant. They
are the new converts or 'reconverts' (voluntary re-
turn to the religion of their parents) to Islam, the
knights of conversion and of pietism, according to
the expression of the Moroccan sociologist Mo-
hamed Tozy.2 These new 'flag bearers' of an apostolic
and ostentatious Islam are all religious militants of
the Tabligh movement in France. 
In France, the J a m aca Tabligh exists officially
under the form of a non-profit association
called Faith and Practice (Foi et Pratique),
registered in April 1972 in the Seine-Saint-
Denis prefecture. Since 1960, the first
groups of preachers coming from Pakistan
began to travel throughout France creating
adepts amongst the first Maghrebi immi-
grants, and demanding places of worship,
which aided them in their aims, before
pushing their activism further. Since the end
of the 1980s, the Tabligh movement has
come to include mainly the second, even
the third generation of children of Maghrebi
immigrants. The Tabligh is currently very or-
ganized and has developed local, regional,
national, and extra-national ties. This fact is
especially remarkable in its ramifications
throughout such suburbs as Mantes La Jolie,
the Quatre Mille housing estates in
Courneuve, or Neuhof or Mulhouse in Al-
sace, but also in large cities such as Mar-
seille, Lyon, Lille, etc. In Lorraine, the region
that we know the best, Faith and Practice
covers a zone of influence from the city of
Forbach (Moselle), which is its epicentre,
spreading from Nancy to Bar-le-Duc, pass-
ing through Verdun and Longwy, reaching
yet other regions: Mulhouse in Alsace, Dijon
in Bourgogne. This transnational Islamic
network, the largest in the world, counts an
increasing number of adepts. 
Surviving by identity
m i g r a t i o n3
To understand the adherence to the Tab-
ligh movement, it is necessary to look at the
self-image that often prevails among youths
that live in rough neighbourhoods, since
they are joining this movement of predica-
tion in increasing numbers notably in the
French suburbs. The social and economic
misery as well as the segregation and dis-
crimination at the workplace, based on their
physical features and their housing situa-
tion, are just some examples of the violence
inflicted upon them by a consumer society
that places them at the periphery of every-
thing: consumerism, citizenship, education,
etc. This sentiment of racism is strongly felt
by these youths, who already have substan-
tial identity problems. Often in majority from
African, Turkish, or Asian immigrant families,
these youths had incredible difficulties in sit-
uating themselves symbolically in the host
country in as much as the persistent ideas of
a mythical return to their homelands lived
on. This is true most notably for youths of
Maghrebi immigration: 'I am neither from
here nor there', as a youth from the suburbs
north of Marseille told us. The result is misery
in terms of identity and an absence of stable
points of reference4 for these youths, who
thus develop substitute micro-identities.5
It is essentially in the hip hop6 culture that
they invest themselves, but also in delin-
quency, so as to access the consumerism
from which they feel excluded by either de-
viant over-consumerism, engaging in sports
(namely individual combat sports), and less
commonly by studying. These micro-identi-
ties can coexist and even be in competition.
However, the strata of these parcelled iden-
tities reveal an overall negative self-repre-
sentation. It is often by opposition to a soci-
ety of rich people ('suit-and-tie-ers'), that
their self-perception is constructed ('cap-
and-trainers'). The society that stigmatized
them by signs (often linked to their national
origins) and by signals (fashion, vernacular
language in the housing estates, regroup-
ing, way of being) also attributed labels to
them, taken up as well at times by the media:
sly-guys, squatters, zoners, wild-child(ren).
These negative labels are born from physical
criteria (facial features), geographic criteria,
or spatial criteria (coming from a violent
neighbourhood, deemed 'sensitive' – unem-
ployment, social welfare). Little by little,
these negative labels are interiorized and
even proclaimed. An inversion of the self-
presentation is thus obligatory. The youths
present themselves voluntarily in conformi-
ty with the deformed image of themselves
that society confers them: they present
themselves as dangerous individuals, or dif-
ficult to access; they wander around in
groups, speak loudly, and behave violently
among themselves, with provocative ges-
tures in public transport, or by exhibiting the
signals that incite mistrust or defiance (pitt-
bulls, shaved heads). But ambivalence in the
discourse and the practices of the youths is
striking: they hate the well-off, who are at
the source of all their problems, yet they
want to appropriate all of the emblems
(name-brand clothing, fine cars, pretty girls),
and they hate their 'ghetto', the housing es-
tates into which they were born. However, to
the question 'what would you do if you be-
came very rich?', they answer without hesita-
tion: 'I would buy the neighbourhood, the
housing estate, and I would redo everything
with sports fields and all'. 
In short, it is in the hip hop culture that a
certain number of these youths find their
points of reference in this unjust, dangerous,
and racist society. It is a response to the
emptiness that submerges them: 'Rap is the
last way to escape the emptiness; we all
know that a good part of the brothers of the
neighbourhood will never make it to univer-
sity', sighs Method Man, one of the members
of the Wu Tang Clan.7 In this identity-void of
the youths of the suburbs, the hip hop cul-
ture plays a role of 're-positivation' of reality:
trust exists between the local representa-
tives who recognize each other and hold
each other in esteem, contrary to the gener-
al suspicion in the neighbourhoods. The self-
image is made more noble and thus more
acceptable. The appeal of hip hop and no-
tably American rap music (with the west
coast – Los Angeles – seen as libertine and
the east coast – New York – as more spiritu-
al), which is, in our opinion, the most impor-
tant aspect, next to graffiti and dance,
should be researched in terms of not only
the appeal of America as the El Dorado of
freedom, but also and especially the African-
American music and identity references. In
effect, the history of African-Americans has
many similarities with the stories of the sub-
urban youths: forced immigration, racism,
political or cultural resistance, demanding of
civil rights, and African origins. The prestige
still enjoyed by the Black Panthers, Martin
Luther King, or Malcom X is the flagrant
proof of this. These confluences between
histories perhaps leads to reinvesting the re-
ligious through the figures of African-Ameri-
can culture oscillating between music and
religion: Grand Master Flash, Mc Hammer,
Public Enemy (Nation of Islam), Big Daddy
Cane, and De La Soul for rap notably on the
eastern coast; Ahmad Jamal for jazz; Mo-
hamed Ali or Mike Tyson for sports; and Mal-
com X for politics. 
In France the figures of Islam in rap also
play a role in what has been called the phe-
nomenon of re-Islamization of the suburbs.
Here we can cite the rappers who proclaim
Islam such as the group Ideal J (Rohff and
Kerry James, singers) or the singer Akhen-
aton, a convert to Islam of Italian origin from
the group IAM, Abdelmalik of the group NAP
(Nouveaux Poètes de la Rue/New Street
Poets), Disiz La Peste, Sat (of the group
Fonky Family), or the rap singer Wallen.
Music often plays the dual role of media in
the reconstruction of the self for the youths
in these territories in which misery and de-
viance predominate: a role of horizontal
media, on the one hand, between the cul-
tures of either side of the Atlantic, but also
vertical media between young rappers and
the sacred. It is naturally towards a transcen-
dence to which the youths often turn after
having had a taste of rap and its multiple im-
brications with religion. Despite its success,
the group NAP, unique in its genre, is the
only one, along with IAM, to ostensibly pro-
mote a verbalized culture of Islamic rap. Un-
fortunately space does not allow for elabora-
tion on the subject of analysis between rap
and religion in France and the USA, but we
can note that rap has often been the highly
present crypto-identity of the youth before
being dethroned by that of the militant
preacher of the Tabligh. There again the par-
allels between 'the preaching of the rapper
and the rap of the preacher', as philosopher
of the arts Christian Béthune put it, are
telling. The sources of American rap are
probably found in the same meanders as the
preachers and other gospels or forgotten
s p i r i t u a l s .8 These sources in any case were
the media supports for an uncertain identity
taken on by the youths that we followed and
little by little direct themselves towards the
religious as a fundamental authority to man-
age their wandering subjectivity. This mo-
ment of passage from the profane (deviant,
nihilist, or musical) to the sacred religious
thus marks the end of this identity migration
thanks to the religion of Islam, which be-
comes the ultimate goal, and predication ac-
cording to Tabligh, the modus operandi. 
Career in the Tabligh
The JHETs9 often have known or have
gone through the identity migration de-
scribed above before finally investing fur-
ther in predication within the Tabligh. A
number of militants interviewed were
adepts of rap music; some were even DJs or
MCs in local discotheques or groups. Aban-
doning rap and music in general (listening,
writing, or playing it) is more or less irre-
versible upon entry into the Tabligh.
Through the process of 'religious profession-
alization', the transformation is carried out
more or less cleanly. We can in effect speak
of a 'religious career' within the Faith and
Practice association. The militants of the
Tabligh are initially recognizable by their
sort of 'workers of God' uniform. It is a specif-
ic physical-vestiary aspect: beard, prayer
beads, s i w a k stick, g a n d o u r a for the men,
and headscarf for the women. It is a new way
to present oneself physically, spiritually, and
verbally, which is constructed in a society
that, according to them, never accepted and
recognized them. It is thus interesting to
note that one can follow relatively precisely
this 'militant career of preachers' by an origi-
nal physical indicator: the length of the
beard. The length of the latter allows for a
rather precise traceability of the career in
terms of engagement of the JHET in the Tab-
ligh. The greater the degree of engagement,
the more the indicator of beard length (seen
as highly recommended religiously) increas-
es, and vice versa. There are four discernible
phases of engagement in the Tabligh reli-
gious career: first, there is a disorderly and
disorganized life, often far from God in ter-
rains of exclusion, without resources and
without a future. The subjectivity is often
fragmented and lacking in points of refer-
ence. Second, there is a religious progressiv-
ity that coincides often with a cohabitation
of several identities, at times antagonistic:
that of the dealer or the delinquent with
apostolic Islam was the most remarkable –
selling drugs to subsist yet frequenting si-
multaneously, and increasingly, the mosque
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The third phase comprises an unconditional
engagement where the militant is in a peri-
od of 'religious forcing'. He speaks only of
Allah, of His qualities, of paradise and hell;
his investment in the predication of the Tab-
ligh is at its maximum. He undertakes mis-
sions that lead him at times very far from
home, even as far as New Delhi, India (where
the Tabligh founder's tomb is located), to
Pakistan (Lahore and Peshawar), and even
further away to, for example, China, the USA,
or South Africa. The worried and regular op-
position of families to reduce his missionary
engagement are to no avail. This period of
unconditional engagement in Faith and
Practice ends with what Donegani calls 'in-
transigentism' of the convert; this initial zeal
is taxed voluntarily by global society as 'fun-
damentalism', notably due to the physical-
vestiary aspect of the JHET, the beard caus-
ing confusion between them and the tele-
vised images of radical Islamists from all four
corners of the world. At this stage there is
metamorphosis: the young militant cuts
himself off from the world. Often he no
longer watches television, no longer listens
to music, selects his friends, avoids sexual
promiscuity with women, goes out little, and
prays a lot. He begins thus, like a hermit, to
fast regularly, to consecrate himself to medi-
tation, prayer, and study. He uses to his ben-
efit the time allotted him often by his status
as being on unemployment or as occasional
worker, to improve his faith and his practice.
It is a politics of ascetism and chastity, which
is demanded and applied to and against the
ostentation of consumer society. Concern-
ing the religious criteria, non-consumerism
becomes in this sense increasingly a means
and an end, a veritable Islamic leitmotiv to
accept the unacceptable of the life of exclu-
sion that they once knew. The hyper-visibili-
ty is expressed by the body or the discourse
during this crucial period of engagement. 
Finally, in the fourth phase, the Tabligh
militant often passes through a period in
which he reinvests in society having found
the capacity to go beyond the cleavages and
to inverse the stigmas of which he was the
object. It is the 'Muslim is beautiful' period.
He finds the marks and points of reference
that help him to have full awareness of him-
self and of others. He reconstructs a sense
for himself by using a citizen discourse. For
example, in the racist neighbour he now
only sees an inoffensive creature of God,
stray and ignorant, for whom one must have
compassion, patience, and kindness. Also,
social failure is seen as a simple ordeal that
one has to overcome; poverty is seen as a
good that prevents one from being tempted
by over-consumerism. At this moment of
rupture, to prove that they have finally
found the median behaviour between reli-
gious zealotry and the life devoid of sense in
the suburbs without money, dignity, and a
future, the appearance owing to the 'impas-
sioned faith' often transforms into a 'social
transparency' in which the preachers no
longer wear the traditional garb and shorten
their beards – the proof is that they have
succeeded in finding this difficult compro-
mise between their own faith and the laws of
the Republic. They voluntarily call this phase
'the middle path', a formula extracted from
the Qur'an (2:143). They thus return, after a
phase of physical-vestiary hyper-visibility, to
the most common social invisibility by tak-
ing up studies, jobs – albeit precarious –, as-
sociative activities, sports, or even citizens'
activities. Their engagement in the 'congre-
gation' of the Tabligh can then become cool,
even critical, or non-existent.
The Tabligh movement, however, remains
an associative religious movement under
high surveillance by the General Intelligence
agency and the Direction of the Territory
Surveillance notably since the Khaled Khel-
kal affair1 0 in 1995, at the time of the wave of
attacks in Paris, but especially since the at-
tack perpetrated by two young Frenchmen
in Marrakech in 1994.1 1 The General Intelli-
gence agency is especially interested in the
most zealous religious preachers, who have
gone for four months to Pakistan and India
with the supposed eventuality of having
joined training camps in Afghanistan. While
Jean-Pierre Chevènement attempted to
launch the bases of a French Islam represen-
t a t i o n ,1 2 the Tabligh remains under suspi-
cion of instigating, in the secrecy of 'cellar
mosques', potential Islamists – which re-
mains unproven. Concerning the possible
'fundamentalism' within the Tabligh, our ap-
proach to the Tabligh field in France did not
allow for finding conclusive evidence in that
sense or demonstrating any deviation of
that type, until the present in any case. 
C o n c l u s i o n
This new diasporic Islamic youth, social-
ized in France, is impassioned with spirituali-
ty in a Western universe that lacks sense. In
this way the JHET believe they offer some-
thing positive to this globalizing society. The
concern for respecting certain religious
taboos and that for ecological aspirations
(such as the quality of air, the sanitary quali-
ty of food, or kindness to animals) also exist
among the militants; in that sense it is an in-
teresting convergence of the religious and
the modern. In addition, the Tablighis re-
main faithful to the principal of being apolit-
ical, also very modern, advocated very early
on by Muhammad Ilyas, the founder. This
characteristic that separates the religious
from the political may explain the long sur-
vival of this network, which following the ex-
ample of the Internet – on which it is ex-
tremely present – has also managed to
weave its web throughout the world. Our in-
terviews also show that Islam is lived by the
youths as a globalizing cultural system, or-
ganizing the sense of their practices by an Is-
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lamization of subjectivity within the Tabligh
group. Engaging in 'this voluntary grouping
of religious intensity'1 3 allows subjectivity to
reconstruct itself around federating ideas
such as 'prophetic imitation' or the 'hunting
down of evil and exhorting good'. It is thera-
py by a rigorous religiosity within an ascetic
structure that inspires security in the face of
temptations of the self, dangers of the sub-
urbs in particular and the world in general.
This structure preserves the torn identity, al-
lowing it to completely re-socialize and to
arm itself against the social evils (exclusion,
drugs, delinquency). It seems thus to con-
firm that the passage into and engagement
in Faith and Practice in France is a moment
of transition for the socio-religious identity,
an intermediary structure of re-socialization,
which has as its role to reconstruct the self. It
is the experience of an identity migration
(hard life, delinquency, hip hop) towards a
transcendence that pulls these militant
youths out of their negative and monotone
day-to-day existence, thus bringing them to
a moral obligation. According to our analy-
ses, Tabligh allows these missionaries to cre-
ate bases and support for the solid subjecti-
vation in 'the spaces of authenticity where
unauthenticity is banned'. Locally, the for-
mer Tabligh militants, due to their symbolic
religious prestige, often become privileged
in certain municipalities since they know the
problems of violence in the area – and this
evolution has been confirmed. These young
Muslims who have reconstructed a new sub-
jectivity through the religious, are the new
emerging actors in the suburbs and in the
city by demanding a French and Muslim
identity. Yet by means of the sacred, these
youths have chosen to invest in this move-
ment of predication and seem to have thus
found their lost dignity of an identity that
had been erring somewhere between the
two shores of the Mediterranean. To con-
clude, we partially rejoin Oliver Roy,1 4 w h o
thinks that these young Muslims are not the
enemies of modernity – as Western societies
often judge them to be – but rather its prod-
ucts and, even more so, its effective produc-
ers and actors. 
This article is based on part of the author's post-
graduate (D.E.A.) thesis: M. Khedimellah, 'Des
ténèbres de la foi à la lumière, la J a m aca Tabligh en
Lorraine' (Paris: Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences
Sociales, September 1999).
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The conflict over Islam and the West began many
years ago and the ignorant viewpoints on Islam are
historical ones. Since 11 September panic has set in,
and from the rampant fear emerges the question of
how such a 'civilized' part of the world could be so
blind. Information is everywhere, from academia to
the media: becoming properly informed demands no
great effort. But ironically it does not matter how
much you have in terms of luxury or financial securi-
ty, as these do not equate to common sense. Such a
void is not the monopoly of the West; it is alive and
well in every society. What is wrong with Islam? What
is its problem with the West? Why cannot Islam just be
peaceful like all the other religions? The questions go
on and the answers are seemingly in 'recycle' mode.
We, Fun Da Mental, as a political music band,
refuse to react submissively to the current
crisis: not only is that patronizing, it is also a
very colonialist, imperialistic expectation.
Please do not see this as an obstacle but as a
stance that just might equate to honesty
and a perspective that can enlighten you on
the complex issues. Fun Da Mental has never
been about compromise.
From its inception the idea was to express
our views. The group was founded more
along the lines of Malcolm X than of Ghandi.
We wanted to challenge: politically but also
musically. There was this great artistic her-
itage that was neither acknowledged nor
encouraged. As a band we decided that the
music had to be radically different to, say,
Public Enemy and the hip hop ethos, but
should connect those interested in such
music and attract them to our form and
take. Inspired by great traditional Indian
music, we also found ourselves gob-
smacked by the integrity and experimenta-
tion from that continent. No wonder our
parents had no interest in 'Rock-n-Roll' or
the current contemporary music scene –
their ears were far more delicate and de-
manding. They had been brought up on
music that connected to the soul, their lives,
culture, religion, and environment. Sikhs,
Hindus, and Muslims all united under a po-
litical angst, which Fun Da Mental took to
the stage and frightened the hell out of
everyone… yes, even our own people. This
was not what they envisaged as it would
cause conflict. The English people suddenly
saw in us the Asian version of the Sex Pistols
and they also ran for cover. The press en-
joyed us as we made for good reading, but
they were totally opposed to our politics.
Anything radical is not acceptable in the
present, but when it is finally buried and
gone, it becomes trendy.
Through it all we remained stubborn and
focused. Those interested witnessed us en-
gaging not only musically but also in debates
and workshops, and at universities. Suddenly
we were travelling to many countries, and
the excited, alternative Asian youth was re-
lieved that here was a band that made as
much noise and chaos as Rage Against the
Machine and Motorhead. The non-Asian
youth was attracted to the anarchist rhetoric
and supported us even if they did not fully
understand. We visited Bosnia a few months
after the war, where young people had been
playing FDM amidst the fighting and we
sympathized with them as they did with us.
South Africa a month after the election of
Mandela saw FDM terrifying the Boers with
the '10 bullets per settler' statement and was
accused of being racist towards the whites.
Even white people involved in the band were
amazed at the audacity of the Boers. Despite
all this, and after five albums, we feel we have
not achieved anything in terms of political
enlightenment, but we have managed to
shed our submissiveness to allow for more
force and directness.
Indeed, we have baptized ourselves. The
current events and our opinions show that
we do not fear confrontation and are open
to debate on an equal basis. Let me say that
Fun Da Mental is not entirely a Muslim band.
Our members come from many different
backgrounds. Nation Records works with
people who, like us, have many colours, cul-
tures, and religions – or no religion.
The music industry in general has failed to
engage with artists in an honest way and
provide musicians the platform to represent
their music and politics. At Nation Records
the integrity of the music is paramount,
whereas politics is an option for the musi-
cians. They know they have a label that will
not restrict them in airing their opinions. On
the contrary, Nation Records encourages
this. Asian Dub Foundation, Transglobal Un-
derground, Natasha Atlas, Joi, Loop Guru,
and all the others have something to say
about the situation in which we live, all of
them taking different stances. This attitude
from the label has also made enemies and
has forced it to operate in a very under-
ground way. Shops have restricted our
products and radio/television stations have
been inactive.
Acts of injustice
There is a grave paranoia in the West, and
what it does not understand it wants to de-
stroy; any attempts to take a stance against
its domination will now officially be at-
tacked. History documents the domination
and it continues on. If a culture cannot be
subservient or a sellable commodity, it is a
threat to the Western lifestyle. 
In the current climate, we see a demoniz-
ing of over a billion people around the
globe – something not new to humankind.
But what is it about this religion, this 'Islam',
that causes so much conflict for the self-
elected 'civilized' world? 
Islamic thought engages with society on a
daily level and it would not be right for me
to separate the two as that would not be
agreeable to Islam. Islam gives each individ-
ual and every community the right to chal-
lenge injustice, whether it is in a Muslim
country or not. Islam is a peaceful religion
but only in the context of a peaceful and
'just' society. It embraces all, encourages to
work for 'all' for the common good. Howev-
er, if there are injustices then it gives you
the right to confront. 
Allow me to commit a sin for the purpose
of explaining my observation of the unjust
and ill-informed propaganda against Islam:
let us separate politics and religion. Politi-
cally the Muslim world is in turmoil because
of many factors aside from domestic politi-
cal issues. The international stage is domi-
nated by the West either in legal, economic,
or military terms. How can one part of the
world that is almost devoid of the most
needed natural resources be in control of a
part of the world that basically has it all?
There are many answers and all of them are
relevant. But what about the local people?
They have now had enough of the domina-
tion of the West and its unrelenting imposi-
tion of its preferred leadership upon them.
This has gone on for far too long. The West
cannot not sustain its acts of injustice with-
out some sort of reaction from the local vic-
tims. All empires must fall.
Surviving the rounds
Travelling with the band has offered a
first-hand account of local people in many
countries. We, as a band, go to absorb and
learn – not to impose. 
We who live and reside in the West but are
not 'of' it feel the injustice. We cannot sit
here benefiting from the economic security
of the West without wishing the same for
those who do not have the same opportuni-
ties. I often have wondered whether, be-
sides the financial benefits, there is any-
thing here in terms of attraction or spiritual-
ity for those who value culture, religion, and
tradition. Would Western people travel to
the Caribbean if there were money and se-
curity? Of course they would, just as they
travelled to Africa, Australia, the Americas,
and Asia. 
All my life in the UK I have witnessed Mus-
lim minorities never being embraced and
even to this day we are reminded what sta-
tus the system expects us to adhere to. Some
do, and some refuse to entertain an ounce of
it. The blindness of the injustice is unbeliev-
able and this needs to be confronted. Day in,
day out engagement in any meaningful dia-
logue is suppressed. We are allowed but sec-
onds on the media channels to suddenly say
everything we wanted to for the last 20 or 40
years. We are invited into the boxing ring for
12 rounds, both hands tied; in the 12t h r o u n d
one hand is freed, nonetheless we survive
the 12 rounds.
The debates that generally take place are
with people who have absolutely no knowl-
edge of Islam. They pick up on the weakness
and failures of Muslims as if that is what the
religion represents. A religion cannot be
judged by its followers but a follower can be
judged by his religion. Islam cannot be
questioned, only understood: this is the be-
lief of Muslims. It is divine word, no discus-
sion and no debate, only a questioning of
how to understand it and act according to it.
Islam covers not only the spiritual element
of life, it touches every aspect, from science
to nature, from capitalism to materialism,
and most of all justice based on absolute
equality. 
But how can one who has rebelled to the
maximum, and continues to do so, have no
problem with religion? The Qur'an, once
looked into, can reveal some very anarchic
views and non-conformities. The problem in
the West with religion is that it uses its own
guilt complex and failings of Christianity
(people have let the religion fall) to judge
other faiths. Does this mean we have to
have a perfect society? This is not possible,
as the Word reveals. Islam is a test, not a
dominating ideology. 'There is no compul-
sion in religion', as the Qur'an clearly states.
So where does our music stand with respect
to Islam? The best way to explain it is to
highlight our own observations of mindless,
manufactured, and manipulated contempo-
rary music – the epitome of which is MTV
culture. In a simple explanation, Islam for-
bids this (and other sorts of) exploitation. 
Aki Nawaz is the frontman of Fun Da Mental and
Nation Records. Influenced by the Punk movement,
he is credited with being one of the main founders
o f the Asian Underground and the Global Fusion
Scene. His uncompromising politics are a recurring
theme in his work, from Islam to racism and
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* The supreme jurisprudent of S h icite Islam in Iran
has allowed the use of donor egg technology.
Donor sperm technology is also allowed, although
the offspring are not allowed to inherit from the
social father.
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M A RC I A  C .  I N H O R N
Since the birth of Louise Brown, the world's first 'test-
tube baby' in 1978, the new reproductive technolo-
gies (NRTs) have spread around the globe, reaching
countries far from the technology-producing nations
of the West. Perhaps nowhere is this globalization
process more evident than in the nearly twenty na-
tions of the Muslim Middle East, where in vitro fertil-
ization (IVF) centres have opened in nations ranging
from small, oil-rich Bahrain and Qatar to larger but
less prosperous Morocco and Egypt. Egypt provides
a particularly fascinating locus for investigation of
this global transfer of NRTs because of its ironic posi-
tion as one of the poor, 'overpopulated' Arab na-
tions. 
Egypt was the first Middle Eastern Muslim
country to establish a national population re-
duction programme through family planning
in the 1960s. However, as in the vast majority
of the world's societies, infertility was not in-
cluded in this programme as either a popula-
tion problem, a more general public health
concern, or an issue of human suffering for
Egyptian citizens, especially women. None-
theless, a recent World Health Organization-
sponsored study placed the total infertility
prevalence rate among married Egyptian
couples at 12 per cent (Egyptian Fertility Care
Society 1995). Given the size of this infertile
population and the strong desire for two or
more children expressed by virtually all
Egyptian men and women, it is not surprising
that Egypt provides a ready market for the
NRTs. Indeed, Egypt has been at the forefront
of NRT development in the region, now host-
ing nearly 40 IVF centres, more than neigh-
bouring Israel (Kahn 2000).
NRTs and culture
New reproductive technologies are not
transferred into cultural voids when they
reach places like Egypt. Local considerations,
be they cultural, social, economic, or political,
shape and sometimes curtail the way these
Western-generated technologies are both of-
fered to and received by non-Western sub-
jects. In other words, the assumption on the
part of global producer-nations that repro-
ductive technologies are 'immune to culture'
and can thus be 'appropriately' transferred
and implemented anywhere and everywhere
is subject to challenge once local formula-
tions, perceptions, and consumption of these
technologies are taken into consideration. In-
stead, it is useful to ask how third world recip-
ients of global technologies resist their appli-
cation, or at least reconfigure the ways they
are to be adopted in local cultural contexts. In
other words, globalization is not enacted in a
uniform manner around the world, nor is it
simply homogenizing in its effects. The global
is always imbued with local meaning, and
local actors mould the very form that global
processes take, doing so in ways that high-
light the dialectics of gender and class, pro-
duction and consumption, and local and
global cultures (Freeman 1999).
In the case of Egypt in particular, infertile
women and men willing to consider the use
of NRTs are confronted with eight major 'are-
nas of constraint', or various structural, ideo-
logical, social-relational, and practical obsta-
cles and apprehensions. Some of these con-
straints – such as class-based barriers to IVF
access, the physical risks, and low success
rates associated with IVF – are similar to those
faced by Western consumers of these tech-
nologies. However, many of the dilemmas ex-
perienced by Egyptian IVF patients are deeply
embedded in local cultural understandings
and practices. These constraints range from
gender dynamics within marriage to local ver-
sions of Islam, which legislate upon the ap-
propriate use of these technologies and thus
restrict how test-tube babies are to be made.
Indeed, given the daunting series of obstacles
confronted by Egyptian IVF patients, it is re-
markable that Egyptian atfal l-anabib, or liter-
ally 'babies of the tubes', are being born on an
almost daily basis in some of the major IVF
centres in the country. 
Egyptian IVF landscape
In 1996, I conducted medical anthropologi-
cal fieldwork in two of the major IVF centres in
Cairo. In-depth, semi-structured interviews
were conducted with 66 middle- to upper-
class, highly educated, professional women
and their husbands, the vast majority of
whom were seeking IVF services. This Egypt-
ian IVF research followed an earlier project on
infertility undertaken with poor infertile
Egyptian women in 1988–1989 (Inhorn 1994).
In that study, in-depth, semi-structured inter-
views were conducted with 100 infertile
women and a comparison group of 90 fertile
ones, the vast majority of whom were poor,
uneducated, illiterate housewives (Inhorn
1996). These poor women were seeking treat-
ment at the University of Alexandria's public
ob/gyn teaching hospital, which had widely
publicized its opening of a supposedly 'free'
government-sponsored IVF programme.
Thus, my work on this subject incorporates
both a longitudinal perspective and a class-
based comparison of infertile women seeking
IVF treatment in the two largest cities of
Egypt. It reveals how the treatment experi-
ences of poor and élite infertile women differ
dramatically by virtue of education, economic
resources, and subsequent access to IVF, and
how a time-span of a decade has dramatically
altered the IVF treatment landscape in the
country.
In the world of Egyptian IVF, considerable
attention must be paid to issues of religion
and gender. In Egypt, the official Islamic po-
sition on NRTs – manifested through a series
of f a t w as issued from al-Azhar University
since 1980 and subsequently upheld by the
minority Coptic Christian patriarchate in the
country – has supported IVF and related
technologies as means to overcome marital
infertility. However, in Sunni (as opposed to
S h ica) Islam,* all forms of so-called 'third
party donation' – of sperm, eggs, embryos,
or wombs (as in surrogacy) – are strictly for-
bidden, for reasons having to do with the
privileging of marriage, 'pure lineage', and
the 'natural' biological ties between parents
and their offspring. Viewing the al-Azhar
f a t w a as authoritative, Egyptian IVF patients
explain that sperm, egg, or embryo donation
leads to a 'mixture of relations'. Such mixing
severs blood ties between parents and their
offspring; confuses issues of paternity, de-
scent, and inheritance; and leads to poten-
tially incestuous marriages of the children of
unknown egg or sperm donors. Thus, for
Egyptian women with infertile husbands,
the thought of using donor sperm from a
'bank' is simply reprehensible and is tanta-
mount in their minds to committing z i n a, or
adultery. Egyptian IVF patients, as well as
their IVF doctors, attempt to scrupulously
uphold these religious injunctions forbid-
ding third-party donation practices, thereby
revealing a level of conjunction between
moral discourse and medical practice that is
not found in most other regions of the world
(e.g. Kahn 2000; Nicholson and Nicholson
1994). 
However, from a gender perspective, this
religiously condoned privileging of biological
parenthood has not necessarily been advan-
tageous for Egyptian women, who are unable
to solve their childlessness through either
Western-style adoption, which is expressly
prohibited in the Islamic scriptures (Sonbol
1995), surrogacy, or donor-egg technologies.
Indeed, the saddest new twist in marital poli-
tics in Egypt has occurred as a result of the rel-
atively recent advent in Egypt of intracyto-
plasmic sperm injection (ICSI) –a variant of IVF
that allows men with very poor sperm quality
to procreate. As long as a single viable sper-
matozoon can be retrieved from a man's
body, including through painful testicular
biopsies, this spermatozoon can be injected
directly into the ovum, thereby 'forcing' fertil-
ization to take place. Thus, ICSI heralds a revo-
lution in overcoming male infertility, and its
arrival in Egypt in 1994 has led to the flooding
of IVF clinics with couples whose marriages
have been affected by long-term male infer-
tility. 
Unfortunately, many of the wives of these
Egyptian men, who have 'stood by' their infer-
tile husbands for years, even decades in some
cases, have grown too old to produce viable
ova for the ICSI procedure. Because the al-
Azhar fatwa forbids the use of ova donation
or surrogacy, couples with a 'reproductively
elderly' wife face four difficult options: (1) to
remain together permanently without chil-
dren; (2) to legally foster an orphan child,
which is rarely viewed as an acceptable op-
tion, particularly among élites who want heirs
to their fortunes; (3) to remain together in a
polygynous marriage, which is rarely viewed
as a tenable option by women themselves; or
(4) to divorce so that the husband can remar -
ry a younger, more fertile woman. Unfortu-
nately, more and more highly educated,
upper-class Egyptian men are choosing the
final option of divorce – believing that their
own reproductive destinies may lie with
younger, 'replacement' wives, who are al-
lowed to them under Islam's personal status
laws. 
Thus, the use of IVF, ICSI, and other NRTs
has myriad local implications in Egypt and in
other parts of the Muslim world. As suggested
by this study, these local cultural implications
must be studied by Middle Eastern scholars,
in order to document both the benefits and
pitfalls of the new reproductive technologies
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N A DE R  H A S H E M I
Following the tragic events of 11 September 2001,
the relationship between religion and democracy
has emerged as one of the most important and vex-
ing questions of our age, particularly as it relates to
Muslim societies. Most of the theoretical debate sur-
rounding this relationship involves a discussion of
Arab and Islamic political culture, secularism, and
the problems of separating mosque and state in Mus-
lim political theory. A critical prerequisite for democ-
ratic development is the transformation of religion.
This conclusion is implicit in the writings of one of
the early theoreticians of democracy, Alexis de Toc-
queville. What lessons can democratic activists in the
Muslim world learn from his observations of the





At first glance the relationship between reli-
gion and democracy seems inherently con-
tradictory and conflictual. Both concepts
speak to different aspects of the human
condition. Religion is a system of beliefs and
rituals related to the 'divine' and the 'sa-
cred'. In this sense it is decidedly metaphys-
ical and otherworldly in its orientation and
telos. While religion may differ in its various
manifestations, most religions share these
features. It is precisely the dogmatic claim –
for which religions are infamous – that they
alone are in possession of the absolute
Truth and the concomitant shunning of
scepticism in matters of belief that makes
religion a source of conflict. Furthermore,
religions tend to set insurmountable bound-
aries between believers and non-believers.
Entry into the community of religion de-
mands an internalizing of its sacred and ab-
solute Truth.
Democracy, on the other hand, is decided-
ly this worldly, secular, and egalitarian. Re-
gardless of religious belief, race, or creed,
democracy (especially its liberal variant) im-
plies an equality of rights and treatment be-
fore the law for all citizens without discrimi-
nation. Its telos is geared towards the non-
violent management of human affairs in
order to create the good life on this earth,
not in the hereafter. Critically, unlike reli-
gious commandments, the rules of democ-
racy can be changed, adjusted, and amend-
ed. It is precisely the inclusive and relativis-
tic nature of democracy that separates it
from religion and theologically based politi-
cal systems. 
One of the leading early writers on the re-
lationship between democracy and religion
was the 19t h-century French aristocrat, Alex-
is de Tocqueville. In Democracy in America
he wrote: 'On my arrival in the United States
the religious aspect of the country was the
first thing that struck my attention' (Toc-
queville 1999:308).* In the context of demo-
cratic theory, Tocqueville is usually remem-
bered for his warnings on the problem of
the 'tyranny of the majority' and his obser-
vation about the 'equality of conditions' in
early America. It is generally forgotten, how-
ever, that he also wrote extensively about
the connection between religion and demo-
cracy. His ruminations on this theme are not
only explored in several chapters of D e m o c-
racy and America but are peppered through-
out this work. What lessons can Muslim de-
mocrats today learn from Tocqueville on the
relationship between religion and democra-
c y ?
Tocqueville describes religion in the Unit-
ed States 'as the first of their political institu-
tions; for if it does not impart a taste for free-
dom, it facilitates the use of it' (305). 
He sees religion as a moderating force in
the United States that exists in natural har-
mony with its democratic character. 'The
Americans combine the notions of Chris-
tianity and of liberty so intimately in their
minds', he observes, 'that it is impossible to
make them conceive the one without the
other' (306).
Tocqueville, it should be recalled, was not
writing for an American audience but rather
for the educated classes in Europe where
the normative relationship between reli-
gion and politics was still unresolved, or as
he put it: 'the establishment of democracy
in Christendom is the great political prob-
lem of our times' (325). The core problem as
he saw it was that in Europe the 'spirit of re-
ligion and spirit of freedom [were almost al-
ways] marching in opposite directions. But
in America … they were intimately united
and … they reigned in common over the
same country' (308). Tocqueville concludes
his reflections on religion and democracy by
stating that while the Americans have not
completely 'resolved this problem … they
furnish useful data to those who undertake
to resolve it' (325). 
One of the confident assertions that Toc-
queville makes about the peaceful coexis-
tence of religion and democracy in the Unit-
ed States is its decidedly secular character.
All with whom he spoke on this matter – in-
cluding the clergy – were in unanimous
agreement 'that they all attributed the
peaceful dominion of religion in their coun-
try mainly to the separation of church and
state' (308). Tocqueville invokes the ab-
sence of this separation in the case of Islam
to explain its democratic deficit.
Mohammed professed to derive from
Heaven, and has inserted in the Qur'an not
only religious doctrines but also political
maxims, civil and criminal laws, and theories
of science. The Gospel, on the contrary,
speaks only of the general relations of men
to God and to each other, beyond which it
inculcates and imposes no point of faith.
This alone, besides a thousand other rea-
sons, would suffice to prove that the former
of these religions will never long predomi-
nate in a cultivated and democratic age,
while the latter is destined to retain its sway
at these as at all other periods (II, 23).
Tocqueville was simply repeating the
standard view of what is now a sacred and
unexamined equation: 'no secularism
equals no democracy'. While there is no
denying that secularism has been an inher-
ent part of the development of democracy
in the West, when applied to Muslim soci-
eties it encounters several theoretical and
historical problems. Leaving aside the emo-
tionally charged and exaggerated debate
about Islam and secularism, what are the
lessons here for the struggle for democracy
in the Muslim world?
First encounters
The first observation is that Tocqueville is
not talking about religion generally but re-
ally about a particular type of religion – in
this case various strands of Protestant Chris-
tianity, three hundred years after Martin
Luther, which had been transplanted into
the New World because of religious perse-
cution in Europe. The many Protestant
Churches that Tocqueville encountered in
his travels were largely anti-élitist, commu-
nity-run organizations. Many of these insti-
tutions had undergone a significant democ-
ratic transformation during the early years
of the American republic. According to
Nathan Hatch's seminal work The Democra-
tization of American Christianity, a n t i - c l e r i-
calism, religious pluralism, egalitarianism,
and the supremacy of the individual were
core characteristics of American religion by
the 1830s. 
Secondly, democratic ideas and debates
that flowed from the American Revolution
and constitutional debates indelibly affect-
ed the practice of both religion and democ-
racy in America. In other words, the en-
veloping context was democracy friendly
and democracy enhancing. In most Muslim
societies, by contrast, a different situation
exists. The historic Muslim encounter with
modern democracy has been a bitter experi-
ence. The late Eqbal Ahmad, a prominent
democracy activist and dissident Muslim in-
tellectual captures the point:
Our first encounter with democracy was
oppressive. Democracy came to us as
oppressors, as colonizers, as violators. As
violators, they spoke in the language of
the Enlightenment and engaged in the
activities of barbarians…. Secondly, after
decolonization our experience was again
with the democratic power centers,
United States, France, [and] Britain. Our
experience even in [the] second stage of
our post-colonial history, was one of
these big Western powers calling
themselves the 'Free World' and …
actively promoting neo-fascism and neo-
fascist governments in one Muslim
country and Third World country after
another. Historically the United States
has spoken of democracy and has
supported Samozas, Trujillos, Mobutu
Sese Seko, Suharto of Indonesia, the Shah
of Iran, Zia ul Haq of Pakistan….
Therefore, our first experience with
democracy was one of outright
oppression and our second experience
with democracy was one which [the
West] promoted fascism, global fascism
in some cases. (Ahmad 1996) 
Not only has the historic Muslim experi-
ence with democracy been different, but
also a strong argument can be made that
existing mosques and religious schools in
the Muslim world – unlike their early Ameri-
can counterparts – actually foster values
that are antithetical to democracy and liber-
alism. A content analysis of the j u mca k h u t a b
(Friday sermons) in the major mosques of
Cairo, Mecca, Beirut, Damascus, Tehran, and
Karachi (not to mention most North Ameri-
can mosques and Islamic schools) would be
profoundly revealing in this regard. Themes
of popular sovereignty, political account-
ability, and (gender) equality are rarely if
ever expounded.
Finally, the doyen of American democratic
theorists Robert Dahl, in responding to the
question of how a democratic culture can
be created in a non-democratic society, ob-
served that 'few would seriously contest
[that] an important factor in the prospects
for a stable democracy in a country is the
strength of the diffuse support for democra-
tic ideas, values, and practices embedded in
the country's culture and transmitted, in
large part, from one generation to the next'
(Dahl 1999:2). In the Muslim world today,
who is promoting, propagating, and trans-
mitting democratic values, ideas, and prac-
tices? The ulama (clergy)? the education sys-
tem? the media? the intellectual class? the
family? (I am deliberately leaving out the
state for obvious reasons.) The point is a
self-evident one. To quote Ghassan Salamé,
you cannot have 'democracy without de-
mocrats'. Tocqueville realized this over 170
years ago as he surveyed the political cul-
ture of early American society. Unlike Eu-
rope in the 19t h century and large parts of
the Muslim world today, in the United
States, by contrast, the 'spirit of religion and
spirit of freedom … were intimately united
and … they reigned in common over the
same country' (Tocqueville 1999:308). In his
writings on religion and democracy, Toc-
queville provides considerable food for
thought for Muslim democrats to read and
reflect upon as they grapple with the prob-
lems of political development that afflict
their own societies. 
N o t e
* I am indebted to Hillel Fradkin's essay 'Does
Democracy Need Religion?', Journal of Democracy
11 (January 2000): 87–94, for stimulating my
thinking on this topic, as well as the writings of
Saad Edeen Ibrahim on Islam and democracy.
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A S M A  A F S A R U D D I N
Among the political theorists of classical Islam in-
voked by scholars today, particularly in the context
of discussions on 'democracy within Islam' and/or
'civil society in Islam', the name of cA m r b. Bahr al-
Jahiz (d. 255/869) is, to the best of my knowledge,
never mentioned. Yet, his political treatises or epis-
tles have much to tell us moderns about the concep-
tualization of the ideal Muslim polity and its leader-
ship by the turn of the 3r d century of the Islamic era.
One of his epistles in particular, 'Risalat al- cU t h-
m a n i y y a' (The Epistle of the cU t h m a n i y y a), deserves
closer study due to its possible implications for legit-
imizing modernist discourse on the extrapolation of
democratic principles from the Islamic tradition. 
'Civil'  and
'Democratic'  Polity
A 9 t h-Century Treatise
Al-Jahiz (literally 'the bug-eyed', referring to
his protruding eyes) is regarded until today
as the best litterateur ever produced within
the Arabo-Islamic civilization. It seems al-
most certain that he composed the 'Risalat
a l -cU t h m a n i y y a' during the reign of the Ab-
basid caliph al-Ma'mun (d. 218/833) and
that it was among a series of treatises pre-
sented to the caliph on political governance
by the courtier al-Yazidi (d. 202/817–18).
This dating would make the epistle one of
the earliest Islamic political tracts we have
from the medieval period composed before
the classical work on political theory by al-
Mawardi (d. 450/1058). The cU t h m a n i y y a i s
consequently the repository of much earlier
layers of political and religious thinking. 
According to the cU t h m a n i y y a, legitimate
leadership of the Muslim polity is primarily
predicated on the individual's precedence
in piety, on his election by popular consent
and accountability to the populace. As far as
the individual leader is concerned, he must
be acknowledged as the most morally excel-
lent of his time, possessing and demonstrat-
ing in abundance traits such as generosity,
superior knowledge of worldly and religious
matters, courage, and truthfulness. Accord-
ing to al-Jahiz, invocation of these criteria
establishes that Abu Bakr was the best-qual-
ified candidate to assume the caliphate
after the death of the Prophet. His argu-
ments are briefly delineated below.
Precedence in piety
The Qur'anic principle of granting prece-
dence to believers solely on the basis of
piety (for example, Qur'an 49:13) is central
to al-Jahiz's discourse on just and legitimate
leadership. In the cU t h m a n i y y a, he inveighs
against the classic S h ici position that legiti-
mates leadership based on blood-kinship to
the Prophet, a position that lends itself to
the assumption of the genealogical superi-
ority of certain individuals over others,
which militates against this basic Qur'anic
principle. He points out that God had as-
sured Abraham: 
'I will make of you a leader (imam) over
the people.' Abraham asked, whether of
a desire to know or as a request, 'And of
my progeny?' He said, 'My promise does
not extend to those who do wrong.'
(Qur'an, 2:124)
Thus, al-Jahiz affirms, Abraham learned
that 'the covenant of his leadership and
vicegerency' did not extend to the wrong-
doer, even though he may be from the best
stock of God's creation. In this is proof that
leadership (a l - r i y a s a) is concerned with reli-
giosity (d i n) and does not extend beyond re-
ligiosity (al-Jahiz 1955:210).
Al-Jahiz then proceeds to demonstrate
how the Qur'an's uncompromising stance
on individual moral accountability is reflect-
ed in the operational principles of the d i w a n
or the register of pensions established by
the second caliph cU m a r. Al-Jahiz painstak-
ingly establishes that the Qur'anically de-
rived principles of s a b i q a ('precedence' in
Islam) and f a d l/f a d i l a ('virtue' or 'moral ex-
cellence') guided the d i w a n's organization,
and that kinship, ethnicity, or tribal affilia-
tion had little to do with its overall function
(al-Jahiz 1955:211ff.). 
Election and public
accountability of the leader
If the relevance of kinship is thereby thor-
oughly discounted, then it is the piety of the
caliphal candidate, as evidenced by his
demonstrated moral righteousness and a
track record of early and distinguished ser-
vice to Islam, that makes him acceptable to
the public as their leader.
Al-Jahiz relates that Abu Bakr stressed
piety in his inaugural address before the
Muhajirun (emigrants from Mecca) and the
Ansar (their helpers in Medina) and dis-
counted the pre-Islamic notion of h a s a b
('[collective] merit inherited from one's fore-
fathers') as having any bearing on legiti-
mate leadership. He is quoted as coun-
selling the people gathered before him:
You must be Godfearing, for piety is the
most intelligent practice and immorality
is the most foolish. Indeed I am a
follower, not an innovator; if I perform
well, then help me, and if I should deviate,
correct me. O gathering of the Ansar, if
the caliphate is deserved on account of
hasab and attained on account of kinship
(bi-'l-qaraba), then Quraysh is more noble
than you on account of hasab and more
closely related than you [to the Prophet].
However, since it is deserved on account
of moral excellence (bi-'l-fadl) in religion,
then those who are foremost in
precedence (al-sabiqun al-awwalun)
from among the Muhajirun are placed
ahead of you in the entire Qur'an as being
more worthy of it compared to you. (al-
Jahiz 1955:202) 
In this speech, Abu Bakr foregrounds per-
sonal moral excellence of the leader as es-
tablishing his claim to leadership and clear-
ly indicates his accountability to the people
who are vested with the right to correct him
should he lapse into error. The assembly of
people, according to al-Jahiz, was swayed
by the cogency of Abu Bakr's arguments
and proceeded to give their allegiance to
him in recognition of his superior qualifica-
tions for the caliphate. 
Individual moral traits of
t h e l e a d e r
On the subject of personal traits, as men-
tioned before, al-Jahiz particularly highlights
generosity, exceptional knowledge, courage,
and truthfulness. With regard to generosity,
he adduces as proof-texts specific h a d i t h t h a t
testify to Abu Bakr's reputation for generosi-
ty. He quotes, for instance, the following h a-
d i t h in which the Prophet says '[t]he most
gracious of people toward me with regard to
his wealth and his companionship is Abu
Bakr' (Muslim 1995:7:108).
He further points out that only Abu Bakr,
in recognition of his truthful nature, was
regularly called al-Siddiq (the Veracious) in
the h a d i t h and historical and biographical
literature. Examples of his courage in ad-
verse circumstances, for example, during
the three nights he spent in a cave with
Muhammad on their way to Medina while
being pursued by hostile Meccans, are simi-
larly stressed by al-Jahiz. Superior knowl-
edge of genealogical relationships and of
the religious law that allowed Abu Bakr to
speedily end the r i d d a wars and restore po-
litical unity are extolled in the cU t h m a n i y y a
as pointing to his greater qualifications for
the office of the caliph (al-Jahiz 1955:122ff.). 
Implications for modern
discourses 
It is clear from this exposition that al-
Jahiz's political thought has potentially
great relevance for Muslim modernist and
reformist thinkers who wish to tap into the
classical period for broad directives on
sound political governance. Al-Jahiz's expo-
sition is firmly grounded in Qur'anic princi-
ples and relevant h a d i t h, understood by him
(and like-minded others) to point to a piety-
based Muslim polity that selects its leader
on the basis of his superior individual attrib-
utes and record of service to the community
rather than out of considerations of kinship
and worldly status. In addition to the Qur'an
and h a d i t h, al-Jahiz's arguments also appeal
to the praxis of the Companions of the
Prophet as recorded in historical and bio-
graphical works. He therefore mines the
gamut of religious, historical, and biograph-
ical sources available to present a cogent
and holistic account of the political con-
sciousness of the earliest Muslims. 
It is no wonder that some contemporary
Muslims often repeat the same sterile dis-
course on 'Islamic government' and its sup-
posedly authoritarian nature because they
restrict themselves to a few, standard
sources from after the 9t h century, like a l -
Ahkam al-Sultaniyya of al-Mawardi and a l -
Siyasa al-s h a rci y y a of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328).
Ibn Taymiyya, for example on the topic of
governance, is of the opinion that Muslims
must discharge their duties to the ruler (a l -
s u l t a n) to the fullest, 'even though he may
be a tyrant' (Ibn Taymiyya 1951:28). Al-
Mawardi refers to the Qur'anic verse 'O ye
who believe! Obey God, and obey the Apos-
tle, and those charged with authority (ulu 'l-
a m r) among you' (Surat al-Nisa' 4:59) and
explicates it as mandating virtually unques-
tioning obedience on the part of Muslims to
their appointed leaders (al-a'imma al-mu-
t a ' a m m a r u n) (al-Mawardi 1996:13). In the
cU t h m a n i y y a, al-Jahiz indicates, however,
the range of possible interpretations of this
verse: some Qur'an exegetes have under-
stood the phrase ulu 'l-amr to have a re-
stricted application and to apply only to
specific agents (cu m m a l) of the Prophet, or
to specific commanders of his armies such
as Abu Musa al-A shca r i. Others have under-
stood it to refer to political rulers (s a l a t i n;
u m a r a '). Yet others have interpreted this
phrase to refer more broadly to the Com-
panions of the Prophet as a group, and/or to
Muslims in general (al-Jahiz 1955:115ff.).
The last interpretation would invest the en-
tire Muslim community (or, at the very least,
its righteous members) with moral and po-
litical authority. 
This discussion was intended to show that
recourse to the panoply of early literature at
our disposal – historical records, exegetical
works, and treatises such as al-Jahiz's al-
cU t h m a n i y y a in addition to the Qur'an and
h a d i t h – opens up the parameters of the dis-
course on legitimate leadership and organi-
zation of the Muslim polity. This admits of a
much more creative engagement with the
early history of Islam and also, one should
add, allows for a more realistic retrieval of
the political consciousness of early Muslims.
This consciousness appears remarkably hos-
pitable to certain concepts associated with
the modern civil and democratic polity: con-
sultative government, public accountability
of political leaders, and citizenship of the in-
dividual. The Islamic medieval discourse on
the politics of piety, reconstructed from
these diverse sources, may indeed be recast
today in the idiom of civil society and made
relevant once again. 
Al -cU t h m a n i y y a
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I n d i a
DO M I N I Q U E - S I L A K H AN
Histories tell us how, threatened by state power and
by various pressure groups, resisting communities
have chosen to go underground, surviving clandes-
tinely as a whole or partly concealing their activities.
This phenomenon testifies to the permanence of dy-
namic, antinomian trends in societies. A particular
type is expressed by the tales of religious dissimula-
tion – practised by Jews, Christians, and Muslims – re-
ferred to in the Islamic idiom as t a q i y y a. 
The Tale of
t h e Hidden Pir 
South Asian history shows that, in the past,
the huge diversity of beliefs and practices
ensured not only a certain amount of toler-
ance but a great deal of interactions, ex-
changes, and even the existence of overlap-
ping identities. This is still the case in con-
temporary India, although shared space and
times in religious life tend to diminish,
mainly owing to the increasing Hindu-Mus-
lim divide that started to emerge about one
century ago. 
The precautionary concealment of Islamic
traditions in predominantly Hindu commu-
nities has become more urgent in the face
of growing Hindu right-wing fundamental-
ism. From the Arya Samaj to the Sanatan
Dharm movement, the RSS and the VHP
Hindu leaders posing as reformists and 're-
vivalists' made all possible efforts to con-
vince various Hindu – generally low-caste,
tribal or 'liminal' groups – to discontinue
Muslim traditions and customs, which they
regarded as 'impure' or non-Hindu. The re-
sponse to these pressures is far from having
always been positive: apart from those who
fully accepted these dictates or started
open resistance, a number of communities
opted for concealment. Interestingly, dis-
simulation, ceasing to be a unique feature
of some S h ica communities, became a more
general practice that extended to much
wider spheres of society. An interesting il-
lustration of this phenomenon is the tell-
tale story of the Diggy Kalyanji temple locat-
ed to the south of Jaipur, Rajasthan. 
Invisible pirs
The pilgrims or tourists who visited the
shrine 15 or 20 years ago still remember that
it was a simple underground chamber
where the devotees – Hindus and Muslims –
came to bow in front of the grave of a mys-
terious Sufi saint, that had been erected side
by side with an icon of a Hindu folk deity.
Local priests, posing as Hindus, were doing
the usual service of the m a z a r (grave). After
a Hindu trust took over the management of
the structure it was decided to lock this un-
derground and to build a brand-new temple
above, in front of an old, dilapidated tower
where one can still admire classical sculp-
tures representing various Hindu deities.
Brahmins were entrusted with the regular
worship. It did not take long before new
generations of ignorant pilgrims started to
regard this place as a 'pure' Hindu, Brah-
manical temple, not even being aware of
the existence of a 'hidden treasure'. Howev-
er, as soon as the tomb had been aban-
doned various disasters took place in the
small town of Diggy. This was immediately
interpreted by the local pandits as the
'wrath of the pir'. To prevent further prob-
lems, they took the following decision: the
Brahmin priests would secretly visit the un-
derground twice a day and perform, as earli-
er, the ritual washing of the grave and the
usual offerings. Besides, on the top, at the
temple level, a rectangular enclosure was
erected around the symbol of Shiva, to pre-
vent the devotees from unwittingly 'tread-
ing on the pir' of whose existence they were
not aware, but whose b a r a k a t had been
fully recognized by the 'pure' Hindu priests.
If all my elder informants knew about the
existence of the sacred grave, it is a young
Muslim living in the nearby city of Malpura
who told us the story: recently he had seen,
with his own eyes, the m a z a r located in the
secret underground chamber; entrusted
with the renovation of the dilapidated walls
the painter had been taken to the place by
one of the Brahmin priest's sons who was – a
noteworthy detail – his best friend.
A case that may appear similar to a certain
extent is that of Panna (Madhya Pradesh).
The ordinary visitor and devotee can no
longer see the m a z a r of Mahamati Prannath
(traditionally referred to as Nishalank Budh
Avatar and Imam Mahdi), the 17t h- c e n t u r y
Guru of the Pranami faith (Khan 2002); the
underground tomb is now entirely hidden
by a structure consisting of a platform on
the top of which the Qulzam Sharif, the
Pranami Holy book, is installed. There is also
a world of difference between the openly
disclosed ideas and the 'clandestine' doc-
trine of the Pranamis. For instance, while the
modern literature portrays the sect as a ba-
sically Hindu tradition, the Qulzam Sharif i s
described by the founders themselves as
the 'Sahebi' or 'Imam Qur'an', and their reli-
gion is constantly referred to as 'Islam' and
'Din-e Islam Haqiqi' – one of the traces of its
Ismaili origin.
In this respect, the underground Sufi saint
of Diggy, like the invisible Mahdi of Panna,
could also be compared to one of the hid-
den (living) pirs of the present i m a m s h a h is
of Gujarat – an offshoot of the Nizari sect
(Khan and Moir 2000). Along with some of
his followers, the Sayyid who claims to be
the direct descendant of Imam Shah practis-
es t a q i y y a to protect his community from
the Hindu fundamentalist wave: in doing so
he reproduced the typical behaviour of the
earlier South Asian Nizaris during Sunni rule. 
There are other, even more original ways
to conceal a pir, not necessarily connected
with a conscious or unconscious S h ici
t a q i y y a. As spies have always known, there
is no better hiding place than one's own
body. Is that why, even in modern India, so
many Hindus are allegedly possessed by a
pir? Far from being simple cases of 'primi-
tive' spirit possession, these stories often
have interesting consequences: while be-
coming the s a v a r i of a Muslim saint or mar-
tyr, the Hindu devotee temporarily adopts a
new religious identity, revealing at times a
surprising knowledge of Islamic, Qur'anic
terminology of which he claims to be other-
wise utterly ignorant.
These phenomena should not be miscon-
strued hastily as mere superstitions or idola-
try. Apart from being genuine traces of an
older, half-forgotten Sunni Sufi or Ismaili
heritage, these practices are, in popular mi-
lieus, powerful and natural means of ensur-
ing mutual tolerance and maintaining com-
munal harmony, unless…
True, if we look at the case of that upper-
caste trader who has joined the ranks of
Hindu right-wing organizations: far from his
residence he behaves like an uncompromis-
ing, fierce ideologist of 'Hindutva', but when
he returns home he never forgets to make
offerings to the 'invisible pir' symbolized by
an oil lamp (c h i r a g) installed inside a recess
of his room. This pir is not a simple house-
hold spirit but a real Sufi saint whose spiritu-
al teaching had once been accepted by the
trader's ancestors without formally convert-
ing to Islam.
The colour of t a q i y y a
The underground motive – strongly remi-
niscent of the symbol of the Christian cata-
combs often wrongly imagined as places of
concealment – has its parallel in other
'clever strategies' used by communities who
wish to pose as 'full-fledged' Hindus to dis-
simulate Islamic features. As religious iden-
tities in South Asia came to be more sharply
defined, essentially in terms of two antago-
nistic blocs, colours were used among the
symbols that served to demarcate the two
'communities': saffron for Hinduism, green
for Islam. For instance, many local shrines
that, seen from outside, once looked exactly
the same – rough, square white-washed
structures – started to display saffron and
green flags, while the walls of Muslim d a r-
g a hs were often painted green. However,
the re-Hinduized, 'liminal' – I would rather
say crypto-Islamic – shrines had to face an-
other problem: if the leaders of the sects
wished to pose as genuine Hindus, at the
same time they were reluctant to discard al-
together what had been for centuries their
sacred heritage. This is why they resorted to
one of the 'clever strategies' to which I have
been alluding: the ornate draperies (c h a d a r)
covering the holy graves of their founders
and spiritual masters, which were usually
green, were not removed but hidden by
other c h a d a rs of saffron hue placed on the
t o p .
If colours symbolize and signify, so do
words. Nothing is simpler than avoiding the
accusation that a supposedly Hindu place of
worship looks like a Muslim shrine: in many
cases changing its name is enough. D a r g a h
will become s a m a d h i, the pir a guru, the
m u r i ds b e c o m e s h i s h y as, the term m u k a m
can be explained as a corrupted form of
m u k t i d h a m (place of salvation), and the ety-
mology of Pirana, the main centre of the
i m a m s h a h is, is rendered as Prerna (Divine
i n s p i r a t i o n ) .
But to what conclusion does all this lead?
There is no denying that resistance increas-
es along with reaction. Besides, dissimula-
tion has its limits – as is also well known in
history. If it is a fact that Islamic markers in-
creasingly go underground in contempo-
rary communities who wish to be accepted
as full-fledged Hindus, it is equally true that
tradition is stronger than caution. This is re-
vealed by simply peeping into a locked un-
derground or 'lifting the veil': the Islamic
colour – dear to the hearts of those sincere
devotees – still shows through the appar-
ently self-asserting but in reality infinitely
light veneer of 'Hinduness'.
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is a most recent phenomenon – might be
proportionally devalorized in the future.
However, starting from the second gener-
ation, we witness a sort of 'normalization' of
the relationships and of the social separa-
tion of functions between converts and im-
migrants. It is not without reason that sec-
ond-generation intellectuals compete with
converts, but it is especially noteworthy that
they also cooperate and mutually support
each other in the battles over cultural hege-
mony fought against the first-generation
leaders, or those coming from the Muslim
c o u n t r i e s .
The converts, in their 'dual position', ap-
pear to be able not only to serve a function
in the relationship between Islam and the
public space, but also in the transition be-
tween the Islam of the fathers and that of
the sons, in unison with the second genera-
tion. In a way, the converts foreshadow a
tendency of the second-generation Muslims
towards an Islam that is no longer an inher-
ited tradition, brought from the native
country, but a conscious choice. 
To sum up, the converts are in the ideal
position to perform a function in the pas-
sage from Islam in Europe to Islam o f E u-
rope, and then in the creation of a E u r o p e a n
Islam. They are, after all, nothing more than
Europeans of Islamic adherence, who can-
not be qualified as immigrants or as bearers
of a foreign culture. Consequently, they are
also producers of an Islamic culture with a
European inclination. They are in fact at the
same time the product and the mediators of
the meeting between Islam and Europe. A
Europe that is also, without knowing it, the
European part of the Islamic umma. To con-
clude, they globally perform a function that
promises to have important consequences
for the very self-definition of the European
Islam, and perhaps also of the Islam 'of ori-
g i n ' .
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L e b a n o n
L A R A  D E E B
The SAA is one of the many Islamic jamciyyat,
or welfare organizations, located in al-
dahiyya. The organization is active through-
out the year, providing basic foodstuffs,
clothing and shoes, essential household
items, and health and educational assistance
for approximately two hundred client fami-
lies. The jamciyya also conducts education
programmes on topics ranging from 'correct'
religious knowledge to how to store food
properly or treat a child's fever. 
All of this is done almost entirely with
women's volunteer labour. Without the time
and energy of women volunteers, neither
the Ramadan centre nor any of the other ac-
tivities and projects of this and the other
j a mci y y a t in the area would be possible. 
Volunteering and piety
Women's motivations for volunteering
vary, but no matter how and why a woman
initially joins a jamciyya, it soon becomes an
integral part of her life and identity, especially
her identity as a pious member of the com-
munity. Volunteers understand faith as a lad-
der they must continually struggle to climb.
One of the fundamental rungs on this ladder
is mucamalat, mutual reciprocal social rela-
tions. As the vehicle through which personal
piety is most clearly brought into the public
realm, community service is an important
component of these social relations; a com-
ponent that encapsulates both the personal
morality and the public expression that to-
gether constitute piety in this community.
Taking this to an extreme, some volunteers
have internalized these social expectations
into an unorthodox conviction that commu-
nity service is a religious 'duty' on par with
prayer.
As one volunteer put it, '[f]or us it's not that
it's a good thing for us to do this work – no, for
us it's become an obligation, like prayer and
fasting.' Demonstrating a sense of social re-
sponsibility is a critical aspect of being a
moral person for many volunteers, and it is
important to fulfil that responsibility before
oneself and God. 
In addition, in order to be seen as a 'good'
Muslim woman in al-dahiyya, barring ex-
empting circumstances, one is expected to
participate in at least some of the activities of
at least one jamciyya. Community service has
become a new social norm. This expectation
is conveyed by volunteers to their relatives,
friends, and neighbours in conversations
about jamciyya activities as well as outright at-
tempts at recruitment. Once a jamciyya net-
work identifies a potential participant who is
judged to be of good moral character – or oc-
casionally when an interested woman herself
initiates contact with a jamciyya – she will re-
ceive a steady stream of telephone calls and
invitations to attend fundraisers and other
events. Gradually, she will be drawn into
working with the jamciyya more regularly. 
As a social norm for women, community
service provides an externally visible marker
of a woman's morality. While not volunteer-
ing does not necessarily damage a woman's
status or reputation provided she has good
reasons for not participating and is not as-
sumed to spend her time frivolously, partici-
pating in the activities of a jamciyya adds sig-
nificantly to public perceptions of her moral
character. In this way community service has
been incorporated into a normative moral
system for women in al-dahiyya. 
However, volunteers' prolific public par-
ticipation is not without its critics. Despite
its links to piety, a woman's volunteer activ-
ities are only met with approval if her
household responsibilities are also fulfilled.
Volunteers believe that with proper 'organi-
zation', women should be able to manage
the double shift of household and commu-
nity work, and many take pride in their abil-
ity to do so. This too is linked to piety, as the
energy and ability to complete one's work in
both arenas tirelessly and efficiently are
viewed as gifts from God, and often taken as
further indication of a woman's religiosity. 
Why women?
As a public indicator of piety in al-dahiyya,
community service is gender-specific, hold-
ing particular salience for women. To a certain
extent, this obtains from the structure and
method of the work itself. From among the
myriad tasks and responsibilities fulfilled by
volunteers, the most constant activity is regu-
lar visits to client families. During these visits,
volunteers distribute material assistance,
monitor changes in a family's economic, so-
cial, and health situation, draw on their per-
sonal networks to facilitate access to health-
care or employment, and provide advice and
education. In essence, they function as li-
aisons between these families and the mater-
ial and cultural resources managed and dis-
tributed by the jamciyyat. In a community
where a woman's – and her family's – reputa-
tion would be severely compromised if she
were to receive unaccompanied male visitors
in her home, household visits are impossible
for a male volunteer. Women volunteers, on
the other hand, are able to enter homes read-
ily. This is especially crucial as many of the
households assisted by the jamciyyat are fe-
male-headed.
Furthermore, women are believed to be in-
herently suitable for community work due to
an understanding of essentialized sex differ-
ences that posits women as more nurturing
than men. Both women and men in the com-
munity indicate that women's natural empa-
thetic and emotional capacities equip them
to handle the emotional stress of dealing with
poverty, to contribute to the proper upbring-
ing of orphans and the education of the poor
more generally, and to be committed to com-
munity welfare. 
Interestingly these essentialized sex differ-
ences are not necessarily interpreted as limit-
ing women to domestically oriented roles in
society. Many in al-dahiyya believe women
have the potential to make excellent doctors,
engineers, and politicians. The sole exception
to this is the battlefield. Women are believed
to be innately unsuited to military service,
and taking up arms is considered inappropri-
ate except in situations of self-defence. In the
context of Israeli occupation of southern
Lebanon (and after, as the border is still con-
sidered an active front), community work rep-
resents an appropriate way for women to par-
ticipate in the Islamic Resistance without en-
tering the battlefield. In this sense, the impor-
tance of community service is not gender-
specific, but the form that service takes is re-
lated to perceived gendered proclivities. 
Finally, it is necessary to factor in a gender
ideology that values men's work and time
over women's, a valuation linked to the per-
sistent notion that men are the primary
providers. Women's employment is assumed
to provide a secondary income to a house-
hold, and women's household duties are as-
sumed to allow for more flexibility in time
than men's work. Compounding this is the
notion that paid employment in a jamciyya
does not carry the same weight with regard
to piety as volunteering does, because it does
not represent the same level of self-sacrifice.
Volunteering, for many women, is seen as a
form of martyrdom, paid in sweat instead of
blood. 
Women in the public
So what does women's volunteerism in this
community and its relationship to piety mean
for gendered understandings of the
public/private divide? As Suad Joseph has
noted, researchers and theorists tend to view
voluntary associations as a constituent aspect
of civil society and to locate them in the pub -
lic sphere. Coupled with assumptions about a
gendered public/private divide, particularly
in studies of the Middle East/North Africa,
jamciyyat and other such organizations are
thereby associated with men.* By their mere
visibility in occupying public spaces and en-
gaging in public work, women volunteers in
al-dahiyya challenge these assumptions and
conclusions. Yet the gendered divide be-
tween the public and private has been cri-
tiqued as overly dichotomous, particularly in
the context of the Middle East. Women's com-
munity service in al-dahiyya reflects the
porosity and the blurring of the division itself. 
On the one hand, women in al-dahiyya are
challenging traditional gendered boundaries
through their active participation in the pub-
lic sphere. This is the view of many SAA volun-
teers. For example, while expounding on the
importance of the SAA as a women-only jam-
ciyya one afternoon, Hajji Amal observed that
'[m]en think that women can't have a jamciyya
that works, because they think that when
women gather we just gossip or fight.' She
went on to assert her hopes that, through the
work of the SAA they would be able to
change men's views of women in the commu-
nity by providing an example of a well-run
and well-organized women's organization. At
the same time, women's volunteerism draws
on traditional gender roles and definitions. 
Women's community service is also public
with regard to the public marker of morality it
carries. The understandings of piety that in-
clude community service as a constituent
component are understandings produced in
part by women in the community. Volunteers'
argument that women have the same capaci-
ty for rationality as men is often extended to
state that therefore, community service
should be the rational choice for good Mus-
lim women in the community and the logical
extension of one's moral responsibility. While
this argument draws upon notions of gender
equity, it also contributes to the construction
of a social norm that carries moral implica-
tions for women with regard to status and
reputation. In this way, women are participat-
ing in the construction of community service
as a social norm, and the proliferation of a
broader normative moral system that may be
as constraining as it is liberating. 
During Ramadan afternoons in al-dahiyya al-junu-
biyya, the southern suburbs of Beirut, while most
people are rushing through traffic to arrive home be-
fore i f t a r, a bustle of activity fills a warehouse on a
prominent street corner. A crowd of over one hun-
dred people waits impatiently on one side of the
building. On the other side, separated by a colourful-
ly wallpapered partition, fifteen well-dressed women
volunteers rush around filling plastic containers with
food and packing them into bags along with bread,
soda, vegetables, and sweets. At a table along the
partition's edge, two volunteers hand these bags to
those in the waiting crowd. Another table is occupied
by several wealthy donors, sitting with two more vol-
unteers, who entertain them while keeping track of
the many children rushing around trying to help.
This is the scene one hour before sunset during Ra-
madan at the food distribution centre of the Social
Advancement Association (SAA).
W o m e n ' s
Community Service
in Beirut
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G a m b i a
MA R L O E S  J A N S O N
Gambian griottes, or female bards, are in a serious
predicament. Islamic ethics prescribe that women
should behave in a modest way, while conversely the
griottes' very profession implies that they stand out
by their behaviour and the way they dress. How do
these women reconcile their identity as female per-
formers with Islamic values? The Gambia is an inter-
esting setting in which to explore this question be-
cause of its long history with Islam. There was even
talk that President Jammeh wanted to impose the
s h a r ica in this small West African country.
On the Boundaries of 
Muslim Gender
I d e o l o g y
For centuries the griottes' male counter-
parts, the griots, have attracted the atten-
tion of scholars. If griottes are mentioned in
literature, however, they mostly appear only
in footnotes, or are mentioned in passing.
Indeed, in actual fact they are very conspic-
uous in the Gambia. They can be recognized
by their flamboyant style of dressing, and
with their sharp voices they are audible
from a great distance. This being the case,
the following aims to provide insight into
the griottes' practices. The main activity of
griottes is performing d a a n i r o o, a Mandin-
ka* word that is difficult to translate. When
griottes set out for d a a n i r o o, they sing or re-
cite their patrons' praises. Praises, which are
composed of a mixture of fixed formulae
and genealogies, are powerful since they af-
fect and persuade the patron by referring to
the great deeds of his or her ancestors. In re-
turn for their praises, the griottes are re-
warded with money or goods. So, d a a n i r o o
can be interpreted both as praising and as
gift exchange. 
D a a n i r o o not only refers to the gift ex-
change between griottes and their patrons,
but also to the gift exchange between be-
lievers and God. People beseech God by of-
fering alms to a mediator, in the hope that
God will reward them with divine blessings.
In the relationship between griottes and pa-
trons, d a a n i r o o has the connotation of
'praising' and this is a way for the patron to
accrue prestige. In the relationship between
Muslims and God, daaniroo has the conno-
tation of 'praying' with the aim of entreating
a blessing. An equivalence exists between
its performance in the sense of praising and
its performance in the sense of praying. In
both cases it concerns an invocation that is
responded to by a reward: a gift from the
patron or grace from God. There are also dif-
ferences, in particular because of the am-
bivalent relationship between music and
belief in Islamic tradition (cf. Charry 2000).
There is an inherent tension between the
exaltation of man and the adoration of God.
Qur'anic scholars, who have an influential
position in the area where my field research
was conducted, therefore considered the Is-
lamic identity of griottes dubious. They be-
lieved that these women could not sing and
still be good Muslims. In their opinion
singing distracts the worshippers' attention
from God and leads to the loss of one's self-
control. 
A distinction can be drawn between two
occasions on which griottes practise d a a n i-
r o o. On the first type of occasion they are in-
vited by their patrons to perform. This in-
cludes naming ceremonies, marriages, and
initiations. On the second type of occasion
griottes themselves take the initiative to
perform, including at the market. In the area
around Basse Santa Su, the provincial capi-
tal of eastern Gambia, griottes are difficult
to ignore. The market is a convenient place
because griottes are free to go there when-
ever they want, whereas ceremonies are not
organized on a daily basis. At the market
they easily meet people and earn a little, as
people usually have money in their pockets
when they go to Basse Santa Su. D a a n i r o o a t
the market is probably a recent phenome-
non. Several middle-aged griottes con-
strued it as the outcome of the historical
process in which colonialism induced
changes that eroded the old system of pa-
tronage. In order to survive, they had to per-
form at the market. The development of
d a a n i r o o at the market may also be related
to rising economic pressure on women. The
griottes with whom I worked complained
that they have many 'family problems'
nowadays, and indeed, they have become
to a great extent responsible for feeding
their households. Taking into account that
most of them do not farm and that regular
employment is restricted to men, these
women have to generate money to pay for
food. The market is the natural place to
practise d a a n i r o o because food crops are
sold there.
The performance at the market is consid-
ered not an 'authentic' form of d a a n i r o o,
and several patrons condemn it, preferring
the d a n i r o o performed at their ceremonies
and upon their invitation. The local Islamic
scholars disapprove of d a a n i r o o at the mar-
ket for other reasons. In their perception
earning a living by means of music is im-
moral. They argue that griottes should not
'expose' themselves as public women. Is-
lamic law commends unremitting labour,
but in the judgement of the Muslim clerics,
d a a n i r o o practised at the market cannot be
regarded as work. The leader of The Gambia
Muslim Women's Association compared it
to exploitation: 
'Griottes beg from us even though they
are sometimes richer than we are. Neverthe-
less, we have to give them our last cent,
which we had saved to support our families.
What griottes do is very bad and therefore
they will have marks in their faces by which
they can be recognized on Judgement Day.
The Prophet has said that we should scatter
sand in their faces.'
Moreover, the griottes' increasing contri-
butions to household maintenance collides
with the Muslim ideal of the man as the
principal provider. 
The negative assessment of the griottes'
public performances as conflicting with Is-
lamic morals may have been increased
under the influence of 'bumpsing' (follow-
ing tourists). As a result of the enormous
growth of the tourist industry on the Gam-
bian coast, numerous boys turned 'bumps-
ing' into a profession. These 'bumpsters' re-
gard tourists as patrons who can provide
money, luxury goods, and mobility. Some
equate the obtrusive way 'bumpsters' ask
for gifts with the activities of griottes. They
note that 'bumpsing' as well as d a a n i r o o a s
it is practised today is h a r a m. The griottes
themselves see no contradiction between
being a Muslim and being a bard. They try to
behave as correct Muslims by living accord-
ing to the pillars of Islam and react to the
scepticism of the Qur'anic scholars by ac-
centuating the Islamic dimension of their
profession. 
Islamizing griottes
A striking development is that the griottes
often frame their d a a n i r o o as a form of pray-
ing. The way they request their patrons for
gifts may, to a certain extent, be equated
with the way mendicants beg for alms. Gri-
ottes, for example, punctuate the praises
sung or recited for their patrons at the mar-
ket with blessings. These blessings tend to
be fairly formulaic utterances, of the sort
'May God bless you with long life'. Further-
more, they lace their praises with Qur'anic
verses and religious phrases. When setting
out for the market, griottes often wear a
special kind of headdress that is usually
worn by people who have made the h a j j. It
seems that by wearing this headdress they
want to emphasize their devotion. They also
explain their choice of dress in an Islamic
context stressing that they dress splendidly
to demonstrate that they have 'a clean
heart' (i.e. that their appearance corre-
sponds to their moral values). Griottes also
interpret their way of practising d a a n i r o o i n
a moral context. Before they set out for the
market, they form groups because as pious
Muslims, they believe, they are not allowed
to perform individually. A woman venturing
on to the street alone is regarded as 'prey to
Satan'. By practising on her own, a griotte
runs the risk of being depicted as a 'wanton
woman'. When she mingles with her col-
leagues, social control is being exercised. It
seems that griottes single out specific ele-
ments of their traditional cultural back-
ground and integrate and reinterpret them
in the light of Muslim norms, in order to
meet the expectations of the local reformist
scholars. The roles of griottes may have ex-
panded to incorporate various aspects of an
Islamic culture, as the Gambian president,
Yayha Jammeh, lately began to demand
greater adherence to the rules of the reli-
g i o n .
In their movements women are restricted
by the boundaries of the dominant Muslim
gender ideology, but griottes have to cross
these boundaries to be able to exercise their
profession. In their position as bards, they
have acquired a certain freedom that other
women in Gambian society are not allowed
to exercise. On the one hand, this explains
their strong position, but on the other hand,
it makes them vulnerable to criticism. To
disentangle themselves from this ambigu-
ous position in which they operate, griottes
have developed strategies to embed their
performances in a reformist Islamic dis-
course. By employing such strategies, they
are attempting to earn a living without sub-
verting their position as respectable Muslim
women. 
N o t e
* The Mandinka comprise the majority of the
Gambian population.
R e f e r e n c e s
– Charry, E. 2000. Music and Islam in Sub-Saharan
Africa. In N. Levtzion and R.L. (eds), The History of
Islam in Africa. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.
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the Hand that Always Gives. Griottes and Their
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C L E O C A N T O N E
A subject that has largely been overlooked until re-
cently and whose implications for the various fields
of Islamic studies are wide-ranging, is female
mosque attendance and the corresponding spatial
organization that it entails. In Senegal the rise and
influence of the Mouvement Islamique has granted
women a place in the mosque formerly denied them
by the t u r u q, the Sufi brotherhoods. Degrees of spa-
tial marginalization, on the one hand, and appropria-
tion, on the other, vary. Much of the current litera-
ture on Senegal maintains that the impact of Is-
lamism is still relatively small. Although religious ob-
servance in Senegal is relatively strong and predom-
inantly Sufi in its orientation, the recent infiltration
of 'Wahhabi' ideas has given women greater access
to public places of worship.
Women Claiming
Space in Mosques
Within the t u r u q the mosque plays no role in
the religious life of women. Rather, women's
religious activity has revolved around alter-
native structures, such as pilgrimages to
saints' tombs. Indeed, the notion of Sufism
representing 'popular' Islam often carries
the implication that women opt for this in
favour of the more puritanical form of Islam
because it gives them greater room to ma-
noeuvre in the religious activities of their
choice. In the case of Senegal, however,
only a few women hold positions of author-
ity within the t u r u q, and, surprisingly, these
isolated cases have lead some scholars to
comment that 'maraboutic and brother-
hood Islam will be thus the religion of
women par excellence'.1 In reality, with the
possible exception of the Layenne t a r i q a,
women's position is clearly inferior to that of
men and in no place is this more apparent
than in the mosque.
Most Senegalese mosques, in fact, whether
Tijani, Mouride, or Qadr, to mention the most
important t u r u q, exclude the participation of
young women altogether and relegate those
women who are no longer considered to be
capable of tempting men to small buildings
that are disconnected from the mosque
proper. The situation noted by Paul Marty
during the French colonization of Senegal at
the turn of the last century has virtually re-
mained unchanged:
'We see, however, a few old women in cer-
tain mosques at the Friday prayer. Else-
where, when there is a sufficiently substan-
tial and tenacious core of devotees, a small
boarded or thatched cabin is constructed
for them in a corner of the courtyard; and
from there, alone among themselves, they
can follow the mosque service.'2
With the exception of the two great
mosques of Dakar and Touba, the majority
of mosques fit this description. Explanations
given point to the fact that according to Ma-
liki tradition, women are not obliged to at-
tend Friday prayer and young women
should not attend at all. Mouride informants
in Thiès, including a prominent marabout,
stressed that women should not frequent
the mosque because they distract men3 a n d
because their only reason for coming to the
mosque is to 'think about men'. This atti-
tude helps to explain why there are special
male guards in the Great Mosque of Touba,
the 'Mecca' of the Mouride t a r i q a, to sepa-
rate women past the menopause from all
other women, including those with small
children. The former are allowed into the
mosque precinct in a wing designed to ac-
commodate them, whereas the latter must
make do with the marble pavement or the
gravel outside.
Generally, Mouride women are taught
how to pray but rarely are taught Arabic so
that they can understand what they are
reciting. Their Muslim education does not
exceed rote learning of a few s u r as from the
Qur'an; hence there is little scope for them
to further their religious knowledge. By con-
trast, reformist Islam encourages religious
education and this often takes place in the
mosque, in particular among Ibadous, who
derive their name from the Qur'anic term
Ibadu ar-Rahman, or slaves of the Merciful,
organized in the Jamaatou Ibadou Rahmane
group. Henceforth the term Ibadou is wide-
ly used to designate those who veil, wear a
beard, and pray with their arms crossed. As
one Ibadou informant put it, 'people are
hungry for the truth' and the mosque be-
comes the ideal locus to convey this mes-
sage. In order to fulfil this mission, the
mosque must open its doors to women as
well as men.
Les filles voilées
Reformist Islam is not new to Senegal, yet
it has only been in the last fifteen years that
such strands have had an explicit and very
tangible influence on women. The most ob-
vious markers of this shift in religious orien-
tation are undoubtedly the h i j a b and fre-
quenting the mosque, both of which are in
breach of local interpretations of what a
Muslim woman should or should not do. In-
stead of following one particular school of
thought, the Ibadous claim to follow all four
Sunni schools of law. Female Sunni infor-
mants, known as l e s filles voilées, would
quote a number of h a d i t hs to support
women's presence in the mosque and would
admit that often the mosque was the place
where they learned such h a d i t hs. Most of the
respondents to my questionnaires were
young students with some proficiency in
French. Most had started to wear the h i j a b
and frequent the mosque in their early twen-
ties, in the mid-1990s. 
Some of the first women to veil did so
under the influence of the Jamaatou Ibadou
Rahmane. The style of the veil has distinct
Middle Eastern origins, pinned or sewn
under the chin, often trimmed with lace and
rarely going below the bosom. Colours are
varied and match with brightly coloured
clothes and extendible petty-coats, used to
cover feet during prayer. By contrast, the
newly emerging reformist movement is in-
troducing much more sober colours and
styles, including the dark, opaque chador-
like garment and the use of socks. The most
eloquent proof of the growing number of
Sunni-Ibadous is reflected in the University
of Dakar. In the university's mosque, during
peek times, especially Friday prayers, few of
the dark h i j a bs remain. Their wearers fre-
quent a reformist mosque, more in keeping
with their attire, where the segregation of
the sexes is marked by a main road.
The outskirts of the capital are witnessing
a mushrooming of new Ibadou mosques.
And the more mosques open their doors to
women, the more women come there to
pray. Many of my respondents said they
came to learn about their religion or to hear
the sermon of the imam in their own lan-
guage rather than in Arabic, as is the prac-
tice in the majority of mosques affiliated to
a t a r i q a.
Women's space 
The metaphor of opening the doors to
women has a literal manifestation as well. In
many of the so-called Ibadou mosques, on
Fridays, when there is an overflow of wor-
shippers, the back door is left open so that
women praying outside can still participate
visually in the ceremony. Sometimes this
technique is also used to accommodate
women during their monthly periods when
they cannot enter the mosque. This simple
measure ensures that they can continue
with their religious classes on t a f s i r or h a d i t h
while not being able to take up their usual
space for the five daily prayers directly be-
hind the men.
Another way of accommodating women
below the age of menopause is to allow
small children into the mosque. In one
mosque, on Tuesday afternoons women
from all parts of Dakar and from different so-
cial backgrounds meet to be taught Arabic,
h a d i t h, and the Qur'an as well as general
knowledge. They bring their children and sit
outside as described above when they are
ritually unclean. This little prayer room for
women situated in the courtyard of the
men's mosque has been renamed Mosquée
Aisha. The connotations of the name are
twofold: one refers to the historical figure of
Aisha, reputed to have been a lady of learn-
ing, and the other makes a clear reference to
the Sunni/Ibadou orientation of the estab-
l i s h m e n t .
One of the most significant examples of
the transformation of mosque space into a
women's area is in Cité Soprim, also in the
outskirts of Dakar. Here the former women's
prayer room adjacent to the mosque proper
has been knocked down and redesigned by a
female architect, also an Ibadou. The new
women's space includes a wide window to
allow the women to participate visually in
the Friday prayer. Senegalese mosques usu-
ally comprise no more than one floor. Cité
Soprim is an exception and so is the new
mosque on the south side of the island of
Saint Louis, Mosquée Ihsan. In both these
cases architectural inspiration came from the
Middle East: in the former the intention was
to accommodate the women on the upper
storey but this idea was later abandoned for
logistical reasons. Firmly entrenched in the
Tijani tradition, Mosquée Ihsan controversial-
ly accommodates women in the gallery
above the men.
Today, not only are more women fre-
quenting the mosque, their very presence in
the mosque embodies the notion of appro-
priation. Spatially, appropriation is reflected
in the varying degrees to which women
have gained either physical or visual access
to what was previously out of bounds for
them in the men's part of the mosque. In
terms of generation, younger women have
often gone to considerable lengths to don
the h i j a b and frequent the mosque regular-
ly, in breach of local custom, which discour-
ages and even threatens them. Islamic dress
code acts as a means to access public prayer
places and signifies a greater acquaintance
with their religious rights and duties. Simi-
larly, degrees of covering point to varying
doctrinal orientations and serve as identity
m a r k e r s .
N o t e s
1 . Originally in French: 'l'islam maraboutique et
confrérique serait alors par excellence la religion
des femmes'. C. Coulon cited in C. Laborde, L a
confrérie Layenne et les Lébou du Sénégal: Islam et
culture traditionnelle en Afrique (Institut d'Études
Politiques de Bordeaux, 1995), 86.
2 . Originally in French: 'On voit toutefois quelques
vieilles femmes dans certaines mosquées, à la
prière du vendredi. Ailleurs, quand il y a un noyau
de dévotes assez important et tenace, on leur
construit une petite case de planches ou de
chaume, dans un coin de la cour; et de là, seules
entre elles, elles peuvent suivre l'office de la
mosquée.' P. Marty, Etudes de l'Islam au Sénégal
(Paris: Editions Larose, 1917), 38.
3 . See also research by Olga F. Linares, which reveals
the same attitude towards women: Power, Prayer
and Production: The Jola of Casamance, Senegal
(1992), 173.
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Islamic feminism/s as forms of consciousness, think-
ing, and practice are ascendant, yet in many places
they still all too often go unnoticed. In Bosnia rising
generations of Muslim women and men emerging
from an atheistic past and the horrors of war are find-
ing their own way back to Islam. In the process, and
with a heightened awareness of justice and sensitivi-
ty to gender, they are coming to Islamic feminism as




The present moment in Bosnia is one of both
promise and peril. The country emerged
from half a century of communism only to
experience a war that viciously shredded it.
There are two major influxes from outside:
political Islamic currents and cadres of
peaceniks, each working closely with insid-
ers. Neither is particularly congenial to gen-
der. The former want to take over gender
and impose their conservative agenda. The
latter ignore gender altogether. With the
protracted public erasure of religion Mus-
lims had confined themselves mainly to dis-
crete home rituals. The 1970s saw a certain
liberalizing when there was some public
space accorded to religion but this occurred
in a context of state control. The Muslim
community and the administrative religious
leadership, the Rijaset, show marks of the
constraints of the past. Now new genera-
tions of Muslims are re/turning to Islam. But
to what Islam? Herein lies the story of an
emergent Islamic feminism in Bosnia.
The local feminist scene
When I was invited by Rusmir Mahmutce-
hajic, Head of the International Forum
Bosnia, to participate in the Roundtable on
Women and Sacrality in Sarajevo in October
(2002), organized by its Centre for the Study
of Gender Issues, where I gave a paper on
'Islamic Feminism/s in and beyond East and
West', I found it an excellent chance to ex-
plore the local Islamic feminist scene. Most
simply defined, Islamic feminism is a dis-
course and practice grounded in the Qur'an
and its core ideas of social justice and gen-
der equality. It is a growing global discourse
informing and informed by local elabora-
tions and practices. How does Bosnia fit into
the picture or how does Bosnia fill out the
picture? Personal trajectories offer salient
i n s i g h t s .
Samir Beglerovic is a graduate student at
the Faculty of Islamic Studies (Fakultet Is-
lamskih Nauka), an independent institution
of higher study founded in 1977 offering
undergraduate education as well as M.A.s
and Ph.D.s. He explains quite simply that he
is an Islamic feminist because he wants 'to
express the Islamic view'. The ease and con-
viction with which he says this may take
aback those who consider the combination
of Islam and feminism an oxymoron. But to
him it makes perfect sense. Growing up
knowing little about Islam, Samir, born in
1973, was an atheist. The experience of war
helped catapult him to Islam. Coming to
knowledge of Islam through the door of the
Qur'an, he finds in Islam's Holy Book a
strong statement of justice and equality
that cannot be parsed: justice and equality
cannot logically be allocated to some and
not to others. He was meanwhile encour-
aged in his progressive thinking at the Fac-
ulty of Islamic Studies by Adnan Silajdzic, a
professor of ca q a ' i d, and Reshid Hafizovitch
who teaches Sufism, who were both atten-
tive to gender, as well as Esmet Busatlic, a
professor of Islamic Culture and Civilization
through whom resonates the tradition of Is-
lamic humanism. To widen their debates on
Islamic feminism and other key issues Samir
and a group of fellow students from the Fac-
ulty of Islamic Studies, along with others
from medicine, engineering, and econom-
ics, set up a website called Znaci, or Signs
(www.znaci.com). 
Amra Pandzo-Djuric is of the same gener-
ation as Samir. She too comes from an athe-
ist past and although also from a Muslim
family she calls herself a convert to Islam. 'A
convert? Yes', she affirmed, 'I was an atheist
and I converted to Islam.' She was quick to
say also that she is an Islamic feminist. Amra,
who acts as the administrator of the Interna-
tional Forum Bosnia's Centre for the Study
of Gender Issues, is also doing an M.A. in so-
cial work at the Faculty of Political Science
at Sarajevo University. Earlier she had
worked as a journalist for the wide-circula-
tion magazine D a n i and for Bosnia-Herze-
govina state television. During the war she
turned her attention to directing a youth
programme set up by a French NGO and
when the fighting ceased she helped found
and run the NGO Information Support Cen-
tre. Like most women everywhere Amra
came to feminism through her experience
as woman: the everyday experience of in-
equities, injustices, and patronizing behav-
iours. She found her own solution and path
away from patriarchal injustices in the
course of her return – her conversion – to
the Islam of the Qur'an. However, she feels a
need to know much more: 'I am an Islamic
feminist in the sense that I want to discover
more fully what it means to be a woman in
Islam and really fight for it. This means prac-
tising Islam in an enlightened way.'
Others I met from a slightly older genera-
tion were unfamiliar with Islamic feminism,
but were open. Nirman Moranjik-Bamburac,
Head of the International Forum Bosnia's
Centre for Gender Issues, is a professor at
the Department of Comparative Literature
in the Faculty of Philosophy at the Universi-
ty of Sarajevo and at the Academy of Dra-
matic Arts. She teaches feminist literary crit-
icism, and is a feminist herself but admits
that until now she has not dealt with reli-
gious aspects of feminism. She was quick to
add, however, that it interested her: 'It is
necessary to learn about Islamic feminism
because we have a lot of women who are
believers and who are sensitive to gender
discourse.' She concedes that although fem-
inist books first came to Bosnia more than
two decades ago (the earliest from France
and the United States), feminism to this day
remains controversial in the academy as
well as the broader society. 
I met Nermina Baljevic at the NGO Zene
Zenama, or Woman to Woman (or I should
say I re-met her for we had first come to-
gether at an international Islamist confer-
ence gathering women from around the
world in Khartoum in 1991). She conceded
that she does not like the word feminism,
reflecting a common perception that femi-
nism is alien to her culture and associated
with negative ideas and practices. But, she
went on to confess that she does not really
know what feminism means. The record of
Nirmina's life itself reads like a feminist CV
par excellence. Hostilities had barely cooled
down when this single mother (whose hus-
band was killed during the war) became a
member of parliament serving for four
years, being its only veiled parliamentarian.
In 2002 she quit politics to turn her atten-
tion to reconstructing civil society through
independent activism, working with the
NGO Woman to Woman she had helped to
organize after the Dayton Accords. Woman
to Woman monitors laws and legislative de-
bates concerning the well-being and stabili-
ty of society as a whole while keeping an
alert eye on gender. The NGO also organizes
women's studies courses that examine vari-
ous forms of feminisms but have yet to deal
with Islamic feminism. Nirmina added al-
most parenthetically that she was the first
woman in Bosnia to be trained as a theolo-
gian. She had been part of the initial enter-
ing class at the Faculty of Theology and took
her degree in 1981. Her professor, the late
Ahmet Smajlovic, helped arrange for her to
continue her graduate studies at al-Azhar
University in Cairo, but untoward circum-
stances put an end to this. Focusing on the
present and future she said with conviction:
'I am always for movement – for upward
movement. I would like to know more about
Islamic feminism.'
Specificities: The Bosnian
w e a v e
Several things are striking about Islamic
feminism in Bosnia: the particular combina-
tion of an atheistic upbringing and war that
propels a return to a gender-egalitarian
Islam, especially evident among the younger
generations; interest by both women and
men; courage to stand up and be counted
as Islamic feminists; and an openness to Is-
lamic feminism by those who had not con-
sidered it before. Also notable among Bosn-
ian Muslims is the absence of a religiously
based antagonism to the West, which is
hardly possible because they a r e W e s t e r n .
Shaped within an old Western Islamic soci-
ety, yet one with Eastern historical influ-
ences, and the only Western Muslim com-
munity that does not constitute a minority,
Bosnian Islamic feminism will have impor-
tant things to say to Muslims in the new
Muslim communities in Western Europe and
the Americas, as well as to Muslims in the
older Eastern societies still uncomfortable
with 'the West'.
Meanwhile outside political Islamic cur-
rents are inhibiting to those Bosnian Mus-
lims seeking their own path. Both Samir and
Amra spoke of the attempts of various Is-
lamist currents (the Wahabbis, other Salafis,
S h ici s, etc.) to exert influence and win local
adherents. Samir tells how others are quick
to name him and claim him. He simply
wants to find his own way in Islam. Amra
points to the negative gender dimension of
such influences and pressures: 'With all
these currents women are really suffering
and being misused.' 
What about Islamic feminism, pluralism,
and peace? A multiplicity of religions and
ethnicities has always been an integral part
of the Bosnian weave. New to Bosnia is what
is labelled inter-faith or intercultural dia-
logue – what before was simply called talk-
ing to your neighbour or debating with your
colleague. Intersections of religions and
ethnicities have always been found in
Bosnia even at the heart of families them-
selves. In our movements around Sarajevo,
Amra and I came face-to-face with some of
those proclaiming their dedication to inter-
cultural dialogue and peace. On two differ-
ent occasions we were firmly told that with
the s e r i o u s problems Bosnians now face
there is no time to talk about women, gen-
der, or feminism. For such people, no hard
ethnic issues, no hard religious issues, and
certainly no hard gender issues – indeed no
gender issues at all. I came to understood
her disaffection with the shallowness of
much of the 'dialogue' and what can be
called 'soft-togetherness'. Quick with the
bon mot A m r a said: 'I think it is essential to
discuss, but to discuss essential things.' Our
talk steered to the Qur'an. 'Oh, humankind!
We created you from a single (pair), m a l e
a n d f e m a l e , and nations and t r i b e s that you
may know one another (not that you may
despise one another)' (49:13, emphasis
added). Why remove gender from inter-reli-
gious and intercultural dialogue? A good
Bosnian Islamic feminist question. 
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I n d i a
C L A U D I A  P R E C K E L
Hardly is any historical Indian Muslim figure of the
1 9t h century as controversial as Sayyid Siddiq Hasan
Khan al-Qannauji al-Bukhari (1832–1890). The reason
for all the contrasting assessments of his personality
was his astonishing career: he rose from an impover-
ished scholar to the son-in-law of the Prime Minister
at the court of Bhopal.1 In 1871, the widowed ruler of
this principality, Shah Jahan Begum (r. 1868–1901)
chose him as her second husband. After his marriage,
Siddiq Hasan Khan established the reformist move-
ment Ahl-e Hadith (people of the prophetic tradi-
tions), which soon became a dominant Muslim group
in Bhopal. But as soon as Siddiq Hasan's career had
started, it came to a sudden end.
Wahhabi or
National Hero?
Siddiq Hasan Khan 
In 1885, Siddiq Hasan was deprived of all his
posts and titles by the British, thus forcing
him into privacy. For a period of more than
one year, he had to retire in his own palace,
Nur Mahall, completely isolated from his
wife and his supporters. Due to this sudden
end of his career, in the Indian nationalist
views prevalent since 1918 Siddiq Hasan is
described as one of the first heroes of the
anti-colonial struggle.
This nationalist paradigm is overshad-
owed by another perspective about the his-
torical figure of Siddiq Hasan: several Mus-
lim sources describe him as a puritan and a
Wahhabi, closely linked to the reformist
movement of Muhammad cA b d a l - W a h h a b
(d. 1762) in today's Saudi Arabia. Besides
these contrasting views, the sources lack an
assessment of the 'real' Siddiq Hasan. As a
consequence, it is necessary to apply chang-
ing research methods in order 'to avoid
common pitfalls of historiography, like pro-
jecting modern nationalist paradigms …
back into the past'.2 Consequently, the so-
cial network analysis, originally developed
by the Manchester school of anthropolo-
gists in the 1950s, seems to be a suitable re-
search method. Taken the premise that
every individual (ego) is embedded into a
network of personal relationships, it is inter-
esting to observe which parts of his/her
ego-network a person activates in order to
achieve his/her aims. Hence, it may be inter-
esting to show which personal relations
were really important in Siddiq Hasan's ca-
reer – and which connections became cru-
cial only to the eyes of posterity. The follow-
ing gives an analysis of Siddiq Hasan's per-
sonal networks, trying to avoid the cate-
gories of 'Wahhabi' or 'nationalist hero',
which have determined the characteriza-
tion of Siddiq Hasan for more than 100
years. 
Born into a Sayyid family, strongly con-
nected to the Tariqa-ye Muhammadiya re-
form movement of Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi (d.
1832), Siddiq Hasan made the first steps of
his personal career as the secretary of the
Prime Minister at the court of the Islamic
principality of Bhopal. Since 1818 this Cen-
tral Indian princely state was ruled by strong
female rulers, the Begums. Sikander Begum
(r. 1844–1868) followed her mother Qudsiya
Begum (r. 1818–1837) to the throne (m a s-
n a d) and secured the succession of her
daughter, Shah Jahan Begum (r. 1868–1901).
Sikander Begum, on the one hand, needed
support from the British to protect Bhopal's
territory from the invasions of the Marathas
and Pindaris. On the other hand, she wanted
to have her reign legitimated by a group of
Islamic scholars. Thus, she invited several
ulama of reformist background to Bhopal.
Among them was Sayyid Jamal ud-Din Dih-
lawi (d. 1881) who had been, like Siddiq
Hasan's father, an active member of the
Tariqa-ye Muhammadiya. 
The 'Yemen connection'
When young Siddiq Hasan approached
Bhopal, Jamal ud-Din took him under his
wing. Due to the fact that from now on he
lived in financially secure conditions, he
could continue his personal studies, which
he had had to interrupt before. In Bhopal he
came to know two Yemenite brothers who
had been living in Bhopal for several years,
namely the brothers Zain al-cA b i d i n ( d .
1880) and Husain b. Muhsin al-Hudaidi (d.
1910). Sikander Begum had met the Yemi-
nite family in Hudaida during her pilgrim-
age to Mecca in 1863. She invited Zain al-
cA b i d i n to Bhopal, because she was looking
for a new qadi al-qudat (chief judge) for her
state. 
Although Zain al-cA b i d i n did not know
Persian or Urdu, nor did he belong to the
Hanafi school of law prevailing among the
Indian Muslims (he was a S h a f ici), he soon
became acquainted with the situation in
Bhopal. After a short time, he knew all rele-
vant manuals of Hanafi law in India and
wrote his legal decrees (f a t a w a) according
to that school. Later, he invited his younger
brother Husain to join him in Bhopal. Husain
decided to undertake the long journey to
Bhopal, where the Begum cordially wel-
comed him. She employed him as a teacher
of the local dar ul-hadith (house of the
teaching of the prophetic traditions). It was
around 1856, that Husain taught h a d i t h t o
Siddiq Hasan. This close teacher-pupil rela-
tion made a deep impression on Siddiq
Hasan and caused a significant change in his
intellectual orientation. The reason for this
change can be seen in his studies of various
famous books by the reputed Yemenite
scholar and q a d i Muhammad b. cA l i a s h -
Shaukani (d. 1834), who gained fame mainly
for his legal theories of rejecting the t a q l i d,
i.e. the strict adherence to one school of law.
Shaukani insisted on the i j t i h a d, i.e. to find
the proof (d a l i l, pl. a d i l l a) of a legal opinion
in the Qur'an and s u n n a. Shaukani applied
the method of i j t i h a d in his own f a t a w a, col-
lected in his voluminous Nail al-autar.
Shaukani's works, all of them containing
heavy criticism on t a q l i d, spread all over
India starting from the late 1850s. The
Yemenite brothers in Bhopal as well as Sid-
diq Hasan were responsible for this 'Shau-
kani boom'. Siddiq Hasan, formerly influ-
enced by the teachings of Shah Waliullah (d.
1762) and Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi, shifted to
the Yemenite tradition of Shaukani and Hu-
sain b. Muhsin. Husain wrote several i j a z a t
(teaching permissions) to him, which al-
lowed him to teach several works of this
Yemenite tradition (e.g. by the Ahdal family,
the Mizjajis, and mainly Shaukani). 
At this time, around 1857, Siddiq Hasan
was a young scholar with limited influence.
He even lost his job as a secretary to the
Prime Minister and had to leave Bhopal.
Later on, in 1859, he was allowed to return
to Bhopal and was appointed Head of the
Bhopal State Archives by Sikander Begum.
His career gained further impetus when he
married the widowed daughter of the Prime
Minister Jamal ud-Din Khan. From that time
onwards, Siddiq Hasan was one of the most
influential scholars in Bhopal. His career
reached its climax when the widowed ruler
Shah Jahan Begum made him her Nawwab-
consort in 1871. Siddiq Hasan started exten-
sive propagation of the theories of Shau-
kani, Ibn Taimiya, and to a lesser extent the
opinions of Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi. This mix-
ture of Indian and Yemenite religious re-
formist teachings became fundamental to
the Ahl-e Hadith movement, of which Sid-
diq Hasan was one of the most active mem-
bers. He wrote almost 300 works in Arabic,
Persian, and Urdu dealing with the elimina-
tion of unlawful innovations (b i dca), the up-
coming approach of the Day of Judgement
(yaum al-qiyama) and the need for reform of
the Indian society according to the model of
the early Islamic community in Medina. It
was mainly the insistence on i j t i h a d t h a t
caused conflicts among all Indian Muslim
groups of that time, e.g. the Deobandis and
the movement of Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi
(d. 1921), who were all strict followers of the
Hanafiya. 
Siddiq Hasan's enemies in Bhopal's as well
as in other Muslim circles chose the easy
way to get rid of him: they denounced him
as a 'Wahhabi', which was synonymous with
'anti-British', 'fanatic', and 'puritan'. At first,
the British did not believe these rumours,
mainly because the Begums proved to be
loyal supporters of the British in several crit-
ical situations. Later, the British began to ex-
amine Siddiq Hasan's books critically and
discovered some writings in which the theo-
ry of jihad was explained at length. When
the British further detected that 17 'Wah-
habi' scholars from Najd had come to study
in Bhopal, they began to think of an interna-
tional network of anti-British agitators,
reaching from Bhopal to Egypt, Istanbul,
and the Mahdist Sudan. The British Resident
Lepel Griffin immediately reacted and de-
posed Siddiq Hasan. Other prominent lead-
ers of the Ahl-e Hadith like Husain b. Muhsin
and Muhammad Bashir Sahsawani (d. 1908)
further propagated the objectives of the
movement. This points to the fact that some
people at the court of Bhopal only wanted
to eradicate Siddiq Hasan's dominant influ-
ence on the Begum. Nationalist circles, how-
ever, had labelled their hero as 'a victim of
the British imperialism'. At first, the British
were proud to have caught 'one of the lead-
ing figures of the Indian Wahhabis'. Later
they had to admit that they had overreacted
to intrigues and rumours circulating at the
court. 
Every group mentioned above neglected
completely that Siddiq Hasan in his works
had always denied Muhammad b. cA b d a l -
Wahhab's influence on the Indian re-
formists. Rather, he had accused the Najdi of
religious fanaticism and bloodshed among
fellow Muslims. Siddiq Hasan himself was
far away from being an anti-British agitator:
he did not support the Mahdist revolt in
Sudan and did not even justify Islamic jihad
against the British in India. He opted for a
close cooperation of Muslim rulers and the
British authorities within the framework of
Islamic s h a r ica. 
All in all, Siddiq Hasan was a reformer who
gained most of his religious knowledge
from his Yemenite teachers. His link to
Yemenite scholarship even overshadowed
his connection to Indian reformist circles
into which he was born. The combination of
the analysis of Siddiq Hasan's oeuvre and
that of his social network is the objective of
the further research concerning this subject.
Siddiq Hasan
K h a n
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East  Af ri c a
X A VI E R  L U FF I N
The European attitude towards the Muslims in East
and Central Africa can be seen in two different, al-
most antithetic phases. The first one covers the ex-
ploration and the conquest periods, when Muslim
traders helped Europeans to reach the most remote
areas and Muslim soldiers were enlisted as indige-
nous soldiers. The second phase covers the settling
period, when Muslims were almost rejected from so-
ciety. Both were closely related to the Europeans'
perception of the African and Arab cultures.
Colonialism and
Muslim Mobility
Since the very beginning of their arrival in
Central Africa, the Europeans were in contact
with 'Arabs' (in European sources, 'Arab' often
refers to Muslims as a whole, including Asians,
Swahilis, and 'half-cast' Arab-Africans). E v e r y
explorer's diary mentions the presence of
these ivory- and slave-traders, even in re-
mote areas like Manyema (Eastern Congo).
The presence of Arab (and Persian) traders on
the East African Coast goes back to the 10t h
century, and their contacts with the African
population gave birth to the well-known
Swahili culture. In 1840, the Omani Sultan
even decided to transfer his capital from
Mascate to Zanzibar. They were in contact
with the Nyamwezi and Yao African traders,
who seem to have penetrated the inland
since the 18t h century. Using these people as
guides, Arab traders followed the same path
in the first half of the 19t h century and went
deeper and deeper into the Dark Continent
in order to find ivory and slaves. This created
a Muslim society composed of different com-
munities. Some of them were of Omani de-
scent, having settled on Zanzibar and the
East African coast since generations, but it in-
cluded also Persians, Indians, and Baluchis as
well as Swahilis and other 'mixed' Arab-
Africans. Finally, the so-called Wangwana, lit-
erally 'freemen', constituted local Muslim
African tribes. 
Arab blood, African blood
When the first Europeans decided to ex-
plore the forests of Central Africa, the area
was already well known to Muslim traders.
That is why most of the European expedi-
tions departed from Zanzibar and Bag-
amoyo, where they could find carriers and
soldiers but above all guides that knew the
roads, the habits, the material needs, and
the languages of the local population. On
the road, they could also benefit from the
information given by the ivory- and slave-
traders. That is why 'Arabs' and Muslims
were quite well considered by the European
explorers; yet that was not the only reason.
The European mentality of the last century
firmly considered that the world's popula-
tion was divided in different cultural levels:
Westerners were of course the most civi-
lized nations and the Africans were nothing
but savages. The Arabs stood obviously in
between: Arabo-Islamic contribution to civi-
lization was recognized, even if the relations
between Europe and Muslims have not al-
ways been easy. This conception influenced
the way they were considering the Arabs in
Africa. 
It is interesting to notice that the Arabs
described by the explorers are almost sys-
tematically compared to the Africans: the
latter are depicted as nude or half nude,
lazy, stupid, cowardly, and ugly. Arabs, on
the other hand, are well dressed, proud,
noble, but also cruel and cunning. Descrip-
tions of mulattos are even more interesting:
they inherited their good characteristics –
whether physical or intellectual – from their
Arab ascent and the negative ones – often
limited to their physical features – come
from their African blood. 
The information gathered by the Euro-
pean explorers about Africa reached Eu-
rope, and some European governments –
Belgium, Germany, and Great Britain – de-
cided to colonize these new territories. At
the beginning, Europeans continued to see
Muslims as potential allies in a totally new
world. 
Military, politics, and religion
Germany – which ruled Tanganyika (Tan-
zania), Burundi, and Rwanda until 1918 –
seems to have been the more open-minded
towards the Muslim communities. They
adopted Kiswahili – which was then closely
associated with Muslim culture – as an offi-
cial language in their territories, which at-
tracted a lot of Muslims to work in the ad-
ministration as well as the local army and
police. The fact that the Germans founded a
city like Bujumbura also attracted many
Muslim merchants. At the beginning of the
2 0t h century, Johanssen, a missionary, con-
sidered that it was the German colonial ad-
ministration itself that opened Rwanda to
Islam. And when Germany had to leave the
administration of both Rwanda and Burundi
to Belgium, the majority of the inhabitants
of Bujumbura, Burundi's capital, were Mus-
lims. Most of them were not Burundians, but
Swahilis, Arabs, Indians, and Congolese. 
In the last decades of the 19t h century, the
British chose Muslim 'tribes' to help them
conquer or rule East Africa: Zanzibari, Su-
danese, Somali, Swahili, and later even Indi-
an troops. Yet, after the Sudanese mutiny of
1897, British officers decided to diversify
their recruitment and enlisted more and
more local soldiers, like Baganda and later
Acholi. Of course, most of these soldiers,
sometimes accompanied by their wives, set-
tled down where they were brought by their
British officers. For instance, Captain Lugard
enlisted 'Nubi' soldiers from Southern Sudan
and brought them to Uganda. Actually,
these warriors belonged to various Muslim
populations originating from Southern
Sudan. Later, they continued to serve the
British Crown and went to Kenya, Tanzania,
and even Somalia. Nowadays, their descen-
dants still live in these countries. Some of
them continued to serve the British Crown
during the two World Wars and even helped
the British colonial troops to fight the Mau
Mau rebellion. In the same way, today most
of the inhabitants of Isiolo, Kenya, are the
grandsons of Somali soldiers enrolled in
Kismayo and Aden during the First World
War. 
But if those Muslim tribes were well con-
sidered by the colonial rulers for their mili-
tary purposes, they had to stay away from
any political aspirations. The main reason
for this segregation was the religious factor
itself: the British wanted to favour Protes-
tant Africans, through education as well as
selection for local power. In Uganda for in-
stance, Muslims – and Catholics – were soon
marginalized and they were denied access
to some political posts and even chieftain-
cies. On the Swahili coast, the British tried to
emphasize the Arab origin of the Muslims in
order to make Islam look like an alien ele-
ment, despite its presence in East Africa
since many centuries. For instance, colonial
law did not consider the Arabs, Abyssinians,
Baluchis, Somalis, Comorians, and Mala-
gasies of Kenya as 'natives', even though
they had been there for generations.
In the beginning, the Belgians also recruit-
ed many Muslims to the army. Between
1874 and 1900, many mercenaries were en-
rolled to help King Leopold II's officers 'con-
quer' the Congo Free State (Etat Indépen-
dant du Congo). At first, they mainly came
from Zanzibar. Later, Somalis, Ethiopians,
Hausas, West Africans, and even Sudanese
were enlisted. In 1894, some of these Su-
danese left Congo and were recruited by
the British in Uganda. 
Due to the political influence of the
Swahili merchants in Eastern Congo, the
colonial administration even gave them
some administrative posts. In 1887, Stanley
appointed Tippo-Tip, a famous Zanzibari
slave-trader, as governor of Stanley Falls
(now Kisangani). But the Arab and Swahili
merchants quickly understood that the Bel-
gians did not aim to share anything and that
they had to fight if they wanted to keep
their power in Eastern Congo. Between
1892 and 1895, several battles opposed Eu-
ropeans and 'Arabs'. A couple of years later,
colonial troops fought against the Sudanese
Mahdists in the northern province. The Eu-
ropeans finally won those conflicts and put
a term to any Muslim political influence.
This was the start of a radical change in the
nature of the relations between both com-
munities, the former allies becoming ene-
m i e s .
But the major element explaining the
change of attitude towards Muslims is the
role played by the Church, whether Catholic
or Protestant. The missionaries had been ac-
tive since the exploration phase, yet their
impact grew considerably during the set-
tling period due to their monopoly on the
education system. Missionaries were afraid
of Islam, seen as a serious rival in the area,
and they had to fight its spread by all
means. In the 1880s, the Church organized a
campaign in Europe against the slave trade
in Africa. This also had a strong impact on
the way Muslims were seen, although it
often – not always – was a political tool
more than a real humanistic feeling in the
colonial administration. After that, Belgian
authorities were very suspicious towards
the Muslims and this until the Indepen-
dence of Congo. A report about Manyema's
Muslims issued in 1959 – one year before
the Independence – underlines the way
Muslims were systematically harassed by
authorities: building of new mosques and
introduction of religious books as well as Is-
lamic education in general were forbidden.
Arrival of alien Muslims – seen as potential
predicators – was made difficult. Neverthe-
less, Muslim merchants coming from West
Africa or from British East Africa were nu-
merous in the region.
In the first decades of the 20t h century, the
widespread idea that Muslim Africans were
more educated, more civilized, and were
better fighters helped Muslims to move eas-
ily inside the European colonies. Yet, the
very same reasons for their inclusion later
excluded them from society. But the colo-
nial administration still needed many hands
to exploit 'their' territories. They thus began
to favour some of the local peoples, with
whom they also began to become better ac-
quainted. For instance, the Belgian adminis-
tration moved numerous Baluba from Kasai
to Katanga province and Rwandans to Kivu
in order to exploit those rich areas. In the
same way, they enlisted the Bangala in the
army because they considered them as the
best warriors. 
So, the relationship between Muslim com-
munities and colonial powers was an am-
biguous one. Muslims were seen as materi-
ally and culturally more developed than the
other Africans, and thus as more valuable in-
terlocutors. But this meant, too, that they
could eventually have a kind of influence on
the local populations, whether in religion or
in politics. The colonial powers quickly un-
derstood that the most efficient way to di-
minish this potential influence was to make
Islam and Muslims into an alien culture, not
only different but even opposed to African
v a l u e s .
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Uni ted Sta tes
J O E L  B E I N I N
The 11 September attacks on the United States creat-
ed an opportunity for the denizens of neo-conserva-
tive and Israel-oriented think-tanks to exploit the le-
gitimate fears of the American people and launch a
campaign aimed at imposing a new orthodoxy on
what may be thought and said about the Middle East,
especially on university campuses. So far, this cam-
paign has had only a limited impact. But students
and scholars with dissident opinions, especially
those of Middle Eastern origins, are feeling some
pressure to lower their profiles and conform.
N e o - C o n s e r v a t i v e s
Threaten Academic
Freedom 
Shortly after 11 September Martin Kramer,
former director of the Dayan Center for Mid-
dle East Studies at Tel Aviv University, pub-
lished a lengthy screed condemning the en-
tire field of Middle East studies in North
America: Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of
Middle East Studies in America. Kramer al-
leges that the 'mandarins' of the Middle East
Studies Association of North America
(MESA) have imposed an intellectual and
political orthodoxy inspired by Edward
Said's O r i e n t a l i s m. Among the disabilities of
American Middle East studies, according to
Kramer, was the failure to predict the 11
September attacks and to warn the Ameri-
can public about the dangers of radical
Islam. Kramer was acclaimed in the pre-
dictable political circles. But few scholars
have taken his arguments seriously.
In response to questions raised on univer-
sity campuses about the need to launch a
war against Afghanistan following the 11
September attacks, the American Council of
Trustees and Alumni (ACTA) issued a report
entitled 'Defending Civilization: How Our
Universities Are Failing America and What
Can Be Done about It'.1 ACTA's founder and
Chairperson Emerita, Lynne Cheney, is the
wife of Vice-President Dick Cheney; and the
former Democratic vice-presidential candi-
date, Senator Joseph Lieberman, is a mem-
ber of its National Council. A lengthy quote
by Ms Cheney appears on the cover of the
report, suggesting that she supports its con-
tents and giving the document the appear-
ance of a quasi-official statement of govern-
ment policy.
ACTA's report asserts that 'our universities
are failing America' because of inadequate
teaching of Western culture and American
history. The original appendix to the report
lists 117 university faculty members, staff,
and students who ACTA alleges are negli-
gent in 'defending civilization' (the names
were excised after ACTA was criticized for
compiling a black list). ACTA's catalogue of
unacceptable speech includes my comment
that, '[i]f Usama Bin Laden is confirmed to
be behind the attacks, the United States
should bring him before an international tri-
bunal on charges of crimes against humani-
ty'. Among the other items cited are '[i]gno-
rance breeds hate' and 'there needs to be an
understanding of why this kind of suicidal
violence could be undertaken against our
c o u n t r y ' .
Policing dissent
The attack on American universities in the
name of 'defending civilization' was a ruse
for ACTA's real agenda: suppressing any
form of dissent from the Bush administra-
tion's policy in response to the 11 Septem-
ber attacks. Thus, ACTA regarded as inher-
ently suspect the call to understand better
why some people in other lands hate the
United States enough to kill themselves to
harm Americans.
In March 2002, former Secretary of Educa-
tion and 'Drug Czar' William Bennett
launched Americans for Victory over Terror-
ism (AVOT). AVOT aims to 'take to task those
who blame America first and who do not
understand – or who are unwilling to de-
fend – our fundamental principles'. On 10
March Bennett published an open letter as
an advertisement in the New York Times d e-
scribing the external and internal threats to
the United States. According to AVOT, the
external threat comprises 'radical Islamists
and others'. The internal threat consists of
'those who are attempting to use this op-
portunity to promulgate their agenda of
"blame America first"'. AVOT's list of internal
enemies includes former President Jimmy
Carter because he criticized George Bush's
'axis of evil' concept as 'overly simplistic'
and 'counter-productive', as well as con-
gressional representatives Dennis Kucinich
(Democrat, Cleveland) and Maxine Waters
(Democrat, Los Angeles).
Another effort to police dissent specifical-
ly targets those who teach Middle East stud-
ies on university campuses. The Middle East
Forum, a think-tank run by Daniel Pipes and
supportive of the Israeli right wing, estab-
lished a website pretentiously called Cam-
pus Watch. Campus Watch claims to 'moni-
tor and gather information on professors
who fan the flames of disinformation, incite-
ment, and ignorance'. Campus Watch al-
leges that Middle East scholars 'seem gener-
ally to dislike their own country and think
even less of American allies abroad. They
portray US policy in an unfriendly light and
disparage allies.' Campus Watch asserts that
'Middle East studies in the United States has
become the preserve of Middle Eastern
Arabs, who have brought their views with
them. Membership in the Middle East Stud-
ies Association (MESA), the main scholarly
association, is now 50 per cent of Middle
Eastern origin.'
These assertions are maliciously false. Ex-
pressing dissent from prevailing foreign
policy is no indication of whether one does
or does not like the United States. The ma-
jority of the members of MESA are not of
Middle Eastern origin. Moreover, casting as-
persions on scholars because of their na-
tional origin violates the most basic democ-
ratic traditions of the United States and is a
form of racism.
The sloppy thinking of Harvard University
President Lawrence Summers is another
bad omen for the future of free debate on
Middle East-related issues at US universities.
At the start of the current academic year he
addressed a student prayer meeting and ar-
gued that harsh criticisms of Israel were
'anti-Semitic in their effect if not their in-
t e n t ' .2 Among other things, Summers was
referring to a petition signed by 600 Har-
vard and MIT faculty, staff, and students to
divest university funds from companies that
do business in Israel as a protest against Is-
rael's continuing occupation of the West
Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem.
Similar efforts have been launched at some
forty campuses. Whatever one thinks of this
political demand, it is not anti-Semitic.
By contrast, the administration and facul-
ty of the University of North Carolina resist-
ed efforts to dictate their curriculum. The
university was sued in court by the Family
Policy Network, a Christian right group, be-
cause it assigned Michael Sells's translation
and interpretation of the early verses of the
Qur'an, Approaching the Qur'an: The Early
R e v e l a t i o n s, as summer reading for all in-
coming first-year students. Family Policy
Network's president, Joe Goover, argued
that '[b]y forcing students to read a single
text about Islam that leaves out any men-
tion of other passages of the Koran in which
Muslim terrorists find justification for killing
non-Muslims, the university establishes a
particular mind-set for its students about
the nature of Islam. This constitutes reli-
gious indoctrination [which is] forbidden by
the Supreme Court.'3
Daniel Pipes jumped on the bandwagon
and assailed the university for obscuring the
violent character of Islam. Thus, the Univer-
sity of North Carolina became one of the
first institutions featured on Campus Watch.
However, the university won the legal case,
and the reading and discussion programme
went forward.
Delegitimizing critical
r e f l e c t i o n
It is not coincidental that these efforts to
police the boundaries of acceptable opinion
about Islam, the Middle East, and US policy
in the Middle East emerged following the 11
September attacks and as the Bush adminis-
tration was launching a drive to war against
Iraq. There is a clear political agenda behind
these efforts. AVOT is funded primarily by
Lawrence Kadish, chairman of the Republi-
can Jewish Coalition, which has long tried to
bring Jews into the Republican Party. Martin
Kramer is a visiting fellow at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) – the
most influential of the Israel-oriented think-
tanks in Washington – which published his
book. In addition to directing the Middle
East Forum, Daniel Pipes is a WINEP adjunct
scholar. Campus Watch appears to be in-
spired by Kramer's book. Although Kramer is
not directly involved in Campus Watch, he
has issued a statement supporting its aims.
Richard Perle, Chairman of the Defense Poli-
cy Board, is a member of WINEP's Board of
Advisors, as was Deputy Secretary of De-
fense Paul Wolfowitz, before he joined the
Bush administration. Perle and Wolfowitz
are the intellectual leaders of the 'chicken
hawks' who have provided the rationale for
the Bush administration's drive to war with
I r a q .
The activities of ACTA, AVOT, Campus
Watch, and their fellow travellers recall the
era of Senator Joseph McCarthy, when Hol-
lywood actors and writers, trade union lead-
ers, politicians, and university faculty mem-
bers were branded as un-American commu-
nist sympathizers. McCarthy and his follow-
ers succeeded in narrowing the range of
American political debate and cultural ex-
pression, and in depriving many innocent
people of their careers and livelihoods. The
assault on Middle East and Islamic studies
has comparable objectives: to delegitimize
critical reflection on US Middle East policy
and nuanced understandings of contempo-
rary Islamic social and political movements,
and to harness the study of Islam and the
Middle East to the most narrowly construed
interests of the national security apparatus.
Tenured faculty members do not general-
ly risk losing their jobs. However, in Decem-
ber 2001, Sami al-Arian, an associate profes-
sor of computer science at the University of
South Florida, was threatened with termina-
tion after being of accused of being a terror-
ist sympathizer on a notorious right-wing
television programme. Professor al-Arian is
of Palestinian origin and has been an Islam-
ic activist for the Palestine cause outside of
the classroom. His case is still under adjudi-
cation. So far, there are no similar cases in-
volving professors of Islamic or Middle East
Studies. But graduate students and un-
tenured faculty are likely to feel intimidated,
especially if university administrations do
not firmly resist the pressures from the neo-
conservative right. Such resistance will be
difficult because the campaign to delegit-
imize dissent and narrow the range of ac-
ceptable thought comes from circles close
to the Bush administration. If university ad-
ministrators capitulate, the lack of under-
standing of Islam and the Middle East in the
United States will become even more en-
trenched than is already the case. 
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E u r o p e
R E N É  R OM E R
Is European advertising a mirror of the demograph-
ics of the European societies? The answer seems to
be no. But is it? The limited number of cases where
advertisers do promote their products and services
to Asian, Arab, African, or Latin American Europeans
most probably reflects the importance that Euro-
pean nations attach to integrating these various eth-
nic communities in their societies.
A d v e r t i s i n g
and Changing
D e m o g r a p h i c s
Ethnic marketing
On a small scale, targeted marketing and
communication towards specific ethnic
communities was introduced in Europe in
the early 1990s. Ethnic marketing consul-
tants advised advertisers to develop target-
ed ethnic campaigns because the different
communities were said to be too different
from the regular consumer. Marketers were
advised, for example, 'not to use the white
colour in advertising for the Moroccan com-
munity, because white is the colour of
mourning'. Amongst the other suggestions
were that 'Caribbeans consider yellow to be
a colour of happiness'; 'young blacks think
blue is a dull colour'; and 'in print advertis-
ing for the Turkish community one should
use a lot of pictures and few words'. Ethnic
marketing agencies often promoted their
businesses by emphasizing the differences
between communities.
In recent years, we notice a change in the
way we tend to look at the markets. Mar-
keters start to realize that a growing num-
ber of Asian, Arab, African, or Latin Ameri-
can Europeans are p r i m a r i l y E u r o p e a n s .
They might be Europeans with a double ori-
entation – an orientation towards the coun-
try of residence and an orientation towards
the culture of the country of birth or their
(grand)parents' birth – but they a r e E u r o-
peans. Many are born and raised in Europe.
They go to school in Europe, fall in love, get
married, and raise children, all inside E u r o p e
– not as Asians or Africans, but as E u r o p e a n
citizens. 
As European citizens, people watch Arab
and Asian television networks such as Al-
Jazeera, Zee TV, or B4U, but these same Eu-
ropeans enjoy BBC, Sky, ZDF, Antenne 2, or
TVE. An Asian-British citizen may watch the
Asian-British networks Prime TV and Remi-
niscent TV, but on the same evening pick up
BBC's news headlines. As Europeans, con-
sumers read the Daily Jang, N i m r o o z, S i n g
Tao Daily, or a l - A h r a m, while these same Eu-
ropeans read The Independent, Bild Zeitung,
Le Figaro, or any other European newspaper.
It is not uncommon for a Turkish-Dutch citi-
zen to start the day by reading both the
Dutch M e t r o newspaper and the Turkish
daily H ü r r i y e t. Indeed, diversity has become
the core of European societies.
Local values 
As we have seen here, the European con-
sumer becomes more diverse by the day.
But the majority of those in the European
advertising sector tend to look at the con-
sumer as white, or at least as Caucasian.
Even the ever-increasing local ethnic media
landscape in many European countries is
not considered by most advertisers as
worth spending part their media budgets
on. 
If advertisers do end up focusing on the
biggest segments, as we have seen before,
can they not give a more balanced repre-
sentation of Europe's changing demograph-
ics in their general advertising? Yes they
can, and a small but growing number of ad-
vertisers already do manage to cope with
the multicultural dilemmas with which they
are faced.
In many countries, advertisers use local
values to promote their products and ser-
vices. But do these traditional local values
still do their job in a culturally diverse soci-
ety? Do such values appeal to those with
'foreign' ethnic roots? In most cases, the an-
swer is no. In the Netherlands in the early
1990s, the peanut butter brand Calvé used
the motto 'Who has not grown up with
Calvé?' For millions of Dutch citizens with a
non-Dutch ethnic background, it was easy
to say 'I did not grow up with Calvé!' A few
years later, the motto was changed into
'How tall do you want to grow?' Without
abandoning its brand value 'energy to
grow', it suddenly extended its target audi-
ence to include ethnic communities that
had not grown up with Calvé peanut butter.
A European dream?
Sometimes, however, local values can
work: the 'American dream', for example.
Before 9/11, the American dream was in-
deed a dream for many – but not all – ethnic
cultural communities in and even outside
the United States. Is there such an equiva-
lent in Europe for the American dream: a Eu-
ropean dream, or a British, French, or Dutch
dream, which is universal for all ethnic cul-
tural communities living in Europe? The
question, unfortunately, cannot be an-
swered positively. This does not, however,
obstruct advertisers in finding universal val-
ues. Diesel jeans' motto 'for successful liv-
ing' has been effective in many countries
and for many cultures. The 'family values' of
the global brand Western Union Money
Transfer is another fine example. 
As we have just seen with Calvé peanut
butter, our good examples are not limited
to global brands only. In recent years we
have seen some excellent advertising cam-
paigns for local brands, going one step fur-
ther than Calvé. The Dutch mobile phone
brand Ben is one. Ben promotes values of
'individuality' and 'straightforwardness'. In
advertising, these values are always linked
to individuals, whether they are white or
black, Muslim or Christian, young or old. Or-
dinary people are the heroes of communica-
tion. Amongst the many interesting exam-
ples, two television commercials certainly
stand out.
The one commercial shows a young Mus-
lim girl in front of the mirror before leaving
the house. She is binding her hair together
and puts on her scarf, while her father is
proudly glancing at her. After covering her-
self, she picks up her mobile to go. But be-
fore she leaves, she slips her mobile into a
phone pouch, protecting both herself and
her precious phone. In another commercial,
we see an office department. All employees
are quietly working on their computers.
Suddenly one employee receives an sms
message. After reading the message, the
man starts dancing around the department
waving a Turkish flag. Apparently, the Turk-
ish national football team has just won its
latest match. When putting the flag away
and taking his seat again, he kisses his mo-
bile and starts working. 
Another brand-awareness commercial
that stands out is that of the Dutch cheese
brand Uniekaas. Their motto 'unique cheese
for unique people' successfully matches the
traditional Dutch values represented in but-
ter and cheese with all Dutch citizens of a
foreign mother tongue. In the commercial
we find an Arab-Dutch family having break-
fast while the mother tells the child what
mothers in the Netherlands traditionally do:
'first you have a savoury sandwich, then you
have a sweet sandwich'. Of course, the
mother speaks in Arabic. The motto remains
the same: 'unique cheese for unique peo-
ple'. 
In other European countries we find inter-
esting examples as well. In the United King-
dom, targeted services in a number of Asian
languages were promoted by radio com-
mercials and print advertising in five differ-
ent Asian languages. The British Army made
use of famous Asian personalities such as
Naseem Hamed to create the image of a dy-
namic, modern, and young organization for
which to work. Other famous Asian and
Afro-Caribbean British were cast to promote
products and services as well, such as Meera
Syal, Ian Wright, and Frank Bruno. In France
a chatting Asian-French woman was cast to
promote the Tchatche service of France
Telecom. The SNCF (the French Railways)
made use of testimonials of commuters
with a wide variety of ethnic backgrounds.
The children's fashion brand Natalys cast a
young black child for its advertising, while
Universal Music contracted Jamel Deb-
bouze and Omar et Fred as spokespersons.
These are some examples of commercials
where the advertising sector is apparently
far ahead of politicians when it comes to the
acceptance of cultural diversity as the new
standard in the European societies. Unfortu-
nately, these are still exceptions. Just like
Europe, the advertising sector as a whole
does not yet mirror the changing European
demographics as an integral part of their
business. These examples are proof, howev-
er, that the advertising world can play a
major role in presenting a European society
that has changed forever. Even though
there have been setbacks since 9/11, the
growing diversity in European societies can-
not be put to a halt. Most large advertising
agencies are located in Europe's major cities
such as London, Paris, and Amsterdam.
These are all cities in which the population
is growing more diverse by the day and
since the 'colour' of the workforce in Eu-
rope's leading advertising agencies is likely
to change sooner rather than later, advertis-
ing will in the future most definitely adapt
to these new European realities.
René Romer is strategy director with TBWA\Direct
Company, a leading advertising agency in
Amsterdam. Romer is specialized in diversity
marketing and is author of the book Thuis in
N e d e r l a n d (At Home in the Netherlands), a practical
handbook on diversity marketing.
E-mail: rene.romer@tbwa.nl 
The European landscape is changing rapid-
ly. Europe has become an immigration con-
tinent – a continent in which the Judaeo-
Christian and humanist traditions are en-
riched with new Islamic and Hindu dimen-
sions. Many European citizens have not yet
adapted to these rapidly changing demo-
graphics. 
The increasing cultural diversity of Euro-
pean consumers also impacts businesses.
Candy producers like Haribo and Van Melle
are substituting their meat-produced gela-
tine with alternative substances making it
suitable for the halal and kosher markets.
Several financial companies now market tar-
geted insurance and investment products
such as funeral insurances to cover the
transport of the deceased abroad – for
those of the relevant faith, the ritual wash-
ing of the body before transport is included.
Some health insurers cover the costs for
male circumcision, while a few banks offer
Islamic investment products. However, in
most instances such fundamental adapta-
tions will not be required. What is needed,
however, is adapting the ways in which we
advertise for these products. 
Why have fundamental adaptations in ad-
vertising not taken place? Why is cultural di-
versity in advertising considered on an inci-
dental rather than a structural basis? A pos-
sible explanation could be that advertisers
have for too long been looking at what sep-
arates ethnic communities instead of what
binds them. The consequence is that mar-
keters end up with too many niche markets.
Since advertising budgets do not allow for
addressing every niche market efficiently,
marketers focus on the most substantial
segments: in other words, 'the average con-
sumer'. And the average consumer in Eu-
rope is predominantly white. 
A still from an
a d v e r t i s i n g
campaign by the
Dutch Railways.
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1 . See Oceans Connect, 89 (1999), a special issue of
The Geographical Review. For the Indian Ocean
area see A. Wink, 'From the Mediterranean to the
Indian Ocean: Medieval History in Geographic
Perspective', Comparative Studies in Society and
History 44 (2002): 416–45.
2 . See M. Juntunen, Between Morocco and Spain. Men,
Migrant Smuggling and a Dispersed Moroccan
C o m m u n i t y (Helsinki: Institute for Asian and
African Studies, 2002).
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The Medi ter r ane an
H E N K  DR I E S S E N A Seaward View 
on a Transitional
R e g i o n
Anthropologists and to a lesser extent geog-
raphers and historians have largely avoided
the Mediterranean Sea as if they suffered
from hydrophobia. Almost all statements on
Mediterranean unity, in which the sea is seen
as the connection between peoples, cul-
tures, and societies, and Mediterranean di-
versity, in which the sea is conceived as a
barrier, are based on research conducted in
the interior rather than in the coastlands.
This is all the more striking because Mediter-
ranean seaports, with their ethnic trading
minorities, have for more than two thousand
years been hubs in networks with connec-
tions to other regions. Not only the anthro-
pological but also the geographical perspec-
tive has been marked by terracentrism.
Though this inland orientation is hardly sur-
prising, it is nevertheless biased.1
The study of the circum-Mediterranean
area, with an emphasis on c i r c u m, should not
neglect the sea, because it has made possi-
ble a relatively easy transport of people,
goods, and ideas. The primacy of the sea and
of a maritime focus is thus a matter of logical
priority determined by the sea's central posi-
tion in a network of connections, even in the
present age of fast communication by air,
satellite, and cable. Of all seas and oceans,
the Mediterranean has the longest docu-
mented history of human interaction. Re-
cent genetic, archaeological, linguistic, and
anthropological research has demonstrated
that pre-neolithic exchange occurred be-
tween the northern and southern shores.
The recent finding of a series of early-palae-
olithic flint tools on Sardinia indicates that
more than 300,000 years ago Homo Erectus
was able to travel short distances over sea.
The sea as social space
One of the topics deserving more attention
concerns the relationships of Mediterranean
peoples, past and present, with the sea. This
theme involves perceptions, classifications,
and exploitations of the sea. During its long
documented history the Inner Sea was often
attributed an ambiguous and sometimes al-
together negative role in Mediterranean cos-
mologies. Until the 18t h century, when a sig-
nificant change of attitude towards the sea
took place, particularly on the northern
shores, it mostly inspired fear and abhor-
rence. Several Ancient Greek and Roman
thinkers saw it as a corrupting sea, the easy
communications being felt as a threat to the
integrity of social order. However, at the
same time the Inner Sea was mare nostrum,
an integral part of the imperial territory and
identity. In the Old Testament the sea is de-
picted as a plumbless and dark depth hosting
the wreckage of the Flood, an empire of
chaos, monsters, and demons. In the eyes of
the Church Fathers, especially Augustine, the
sea was both a source of life and a realm of
death. In spite of its storms and torments, it
made possible Paul's missionary travels and
thus the spread of the Christian faith. The
problematic relationship of Islam with the
sea, which is reflected in written as well as
oral traditions, is linked with the limited de-
velopment of a maritime culture on the
southern and eastern shores of the Inner Sea.
The incompatibility of sea life with Islam goes
a long way to explain why Muslims missed
the boat at the time of maritime expansion
towards the New World, when there was still
a relative power balance between Cross and
Crescent in the Mediterranean area. To be
sure, there are many exceptions to these
generalizations and they deserve systematic
and accurate research. The role of the sea in
the rituals of coastal towns and villages
around the Mediterranean is yet another fas-
cinating topic that should be further ex-
plored, apart from the instrumental relation-
ships coast-dwellers maintain with the sea.
Modern transients: 
tourists and migrants
A seaward perspective inevitably entails
sustained interest in tourists and migrants
as modern transients. Each year between
June and September approximately 110
million tourists spend their holiday along
the Mediterranean shores, making up one-
third of the global tourist flow. In the light of
this massive arrival of foreign, and more re-
cently domestic tourists, the Inner Sea has
taken on an entirely new meaning as an
economic and social resource. Moreover,
mass tourism has transformed and homoge-
nized formerly diverse coastal landscapes
with regard to buildings, economic and
leisure activities, manners, and the percep-
tion and organization of time. It has also
drastically affected centre-periphery rela-
tionships, the fragile coastal environment,
and the quality of life in most Mediter-
ranean countries. Although much research
has already been done, the ongoing diversi-
fication of touristic demand and supply – for
instance the emergence of Islamic beach
tourism in Mediterranean Turkey or of re-
tirement migration to Italy and Spain – is an
important theme for further inquiry. 
The massive counter-movement of Medi-
terranean migrants to the North is an equal-
ly sweeping phenomenon that needs en-
during attention. During the past ten years
the largely clandestine trans-Mediterranean
migration has become a major socio-politi-
cal issue within the European Union and will
undoubtedly remain so for the coming
decades. A seaward perspective pays spe-
cial attention to the passages and connec-
tions across the Mediterranean with regard
to transnational community formation, the
exchange of consumer goods and informa-
tion, and the distribution of symbolic, social,
and religious capital. For instance, there is a
growing conviction in the towns of north-
ern Morocco that Islam is now coming from
the European side of the Mediterranean
with devout returning migrants who are
often considered to be more 'true Muslims'
than local ones. The ordeals of being a mi-
nority in a non-Islamic environment are said
to strengthen Muslim devotion. Moreover,
migrant communities across the Mediter-
ranean have more freedom in creating asso-
ciations than in Morocco.2 This shifting of
the Islamic frontier is a challenging topic for
scholars of contemporary Islam. 
Revival of Mediterranean
c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m ?
A seaward perspective not only pays privi-
leged attention to the sea and the people
who use and cross it, but indeed also to the
seaport, a settlement form that has received
only scant treatment in the humanities and
social sciences. The recent renaissance of
Mediterranean seaports – Marseille,
Barcelona, Genua, Alexandria, but also small-
er ones, such as Algeciras and Koper – con-
stitutes a fascinating field for interdiscipli-
nary area research. The following questions
may be raised: Are the maritime towns and
cities foci of cultural convergence? What role
did they play in the different stages of the
globalization process? Less sweeping ques-
tions include notions of maritime urbanity,
the impact of the port on town life, changing
attitudes of coast-dwellers towards the sea,
the revitalization of maritime identity, and
its relationship with ethnicity, nationality,
and transnationality.
Especially the link between Mediter-
ranean seaports and cosmopolitanism is a
promising research topic. If there is an eco-
logical dimension to cosmopolitanism then
the seaport is certainly one of its main nich-
es, until recently probably the most impor-
tant one. Awareness and knowledge of and
openness towards the wider world have al-
ways been ingredients of maritime culture.
What is of particular interest is h o w and i n
w h i c h contexts Mediterranean people, past
and present, evoke cosmopolitanism; the
meanings they attach to it; and how they as-
similate understandings of cosmopoli-
tanism into their behaviour. Greek refugees
from former Smyrna and their descendants
in Piraeus, old families in Tangier, Triest, and
Alexandria, frequently evoke a past defined
as cosmopolitan. In doing so they stress, in
varying combinations, features such as eth-
nic-religious plurality, multi-lingualism, cul-
tural refinement, openness, enterprise, tol-
erance, and intercultural exchange.
Thus, a basic question is whether the re-
vival of seaports in parts of the circum-
Mediterranean area goes hand in hand with
a renewed emphasis on cosmopolitanism
under changing political, economic, and
technological conditions (think, for in-
stance, of the impact of tourism, migration,
and the mass media). In order to answer this
broad question an interdisciplinary ap-
proach is needed in which a political-eco-
nomic perspective is joined with a cultural
and historical one and a broad gamut of re-
search techniques and sources are com-
bined. This implies a need not only for
multi-local but also (and rather) for trans-
local anthropological, geographical, and
historical research – in other words, re-
search o n and i n the connections and pas-
sages between different localities and iden-
tities around the Mediterranean Sea. And, fi-
nally, it means a willingness to reconsider
old regional categories and divisions such
as 'Europe', 'North Africa', and 'the Middle
East'. 
This article is a summary of Henk Driessen's
inaugural lecture held at the University of Nijmegen
on 28 June 2002. For references, see Henk Driessen,
Mediterrane passages. Een zeewaartse visie op
een overgangsgebied (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij
Wereldbibliotheek, 2002).
In the last few years there has been an upsurge of
scholarly interest in the circum-Mediterranean area
as part of a wider academic movement to rethink and
revitalize area studies. As a transitional zone the
Mediterranean area has always had a somewhat un-
certain, marginal, and ambivalent position in the
field of established area specializations, which until
recently were defined by rather rigid and arbitrary
geo-political boundaries. 'The Middle East', a prod-
uct of the strategic thinking of 19t h-century 'Europe'
(itself a problematic category), is a case in point.
Scholars, in particular anthropologists, working in
the Middle East and North Africa have often studied
this region as detached from the wider Mediter-
ranean world. One good reason to correct this my-
opic perspective is to be found in the basic fact that
the Mediterranean region has been the breeding
ground of globalization and cosmopolitanism in
which the sea played a major role.
i m a g e
not available
o n l i n e
Beach scene
at the port of
A l e x a n d r i a .
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B P B
N A TH AL  M .  D E S S I N G
The Bundeszentrale f ü r Politische Bildung (BPB), Pro-
jektgruppe Migration, organized an international
conference on 'Muslime und Islam in Europa: Die Inte-
gration einer r e l i g i ö s e n Minderheit' at the Ost-West-
Kolleg, B r ü h l, Germany, from 10 to 13 July 2002. The
conference compared the processes of integration of
Muslims in Western Europe and discussed the Islamic
Charter drawn up by the Central Council of Muslims in
Germany. 
The Islamic Charter
as a Tool for Integration
The conference brought together some 150
academics, teachers, politicians, activists,
and journalists, including Mohammed Abdul
Aziz (Forum Against Islamophobia & R a c i s m ,
London), Soheib Bencheikh (Comité Région-
al des Affaires Islamiques, France), Coskun
Ç ö r ü z (Member of Parliament, the Nether-
lands), Nadeem Elyas (Central Council of
Muslims in Germany), Fatma-Zohra Mes-
saoudi (Centre socio-culturel de la rue de
Tanger, Paris), and Mohibur Rahman (Mus-
lim Council of Britain).
The Islamic Charter is a document consist-
ing of 21 articles developed by the Central
Council of Muslims in Germany (Zentralrat
der Muslime in Deutschland e.V., ZMD) and
adopted in its general meeting of 3 Febru-
ary 2002. With this document the ZMD aims
to promote dialogue among Muslims and
not to exclude divergent opinions, says
ZMD chair Nadeem Elyas.
The Islamic Charter may be regarded as a
further example in a series of documents
drawn up by governmental or representa-
tional bodies in various European countries
that seek to describe or to codify the posi-
tion of Muslims in Western societies. Anoth-
er example, though different in status and
origin, is the report 'l'Islam dans la Répu-
blique', drawn up in 2000 by the High Coun-
cil on Integration, an advisory body to the
French prime minister. The report treats the
history of the separation of church and state
in France, describes Muslims and Islam in
France, and ends with recommendations.
Such documents are vulnerable to criticisms
concerning their representativeness and au-
thority. This became clear in the discussions
on the Islamic Charter at the B r ü h l c o n f e r-
e n c e .
Mohibur Rahman of the Muslim Council of
Britain, for example, mentioned three con-
cerns. According to him, emotional attach-
ment to a country cannot be encouraged
through a written document. Furthermore,
he sees no reason for British Muslims to ex-
plain or justify nationality or religion, since
they already feel that they belong. A Charter
is in his view a defensive exercise and there-
fore undesirable. Lastly, he suggests that
the Charter's aims could be better achieved
by investing the time and effort in more
practical ways.
Similarly, Nico Landman of Utrecht Uni-
versity regards increasing participation of
Muslims in political processes and public
debates as more important than the devel-
opment of an Islamic Charter, which claims
to speak on behalf of 'the Muslims'. He
thereby alludes to the plurality of opinions
among Muslims in the Netherlands.
Soheib Bencheikh, mufti of Marseille, was
not sure if France needed an Islamic Charter.
Taking an individualistic view of Islam, he
believes that no one has the right to deter-
mine the theology of the future. He empha-
sized the importance of transparency, of
avoiding provocation, of Muslim role mod-
els to display the beauty of Islam, and of
imam-training institutions independent of
the countries of origin and of the French
government. He also argued that the idea
behind the headscarf is the protection of
the woman. Nowadays, this protection may
also take the form of education and other
skills. On this basis he advises women to
dress tastefully and to be modest in their at-
tire if they must choose between wearing
the headscarf and a job.
These statements aroused much contro-
versy, particularly among the British partici-
pants. Mohammed Abdul Aziz, for example,
felt that the ethnic minority discourse in
France and Germany concentrates on first-
generation issues such as the headscarf,
while the United Kingdom has long passed
this phase. Muslims in Britain, says Abdul
Aziz, speak about respect and diversity, and
not about minorities as a problem. Barbara
John of Humboldt University argued that
the fear of difference and wish for homo-
geneity is deep-rooted in German society,
whereas Britain tolerates diversity to a
greater extent. 
Thomas K r ü g e r, BPB president, said that
controversy, the guiding principle of politi-
cal education, must be used to further dis-
cussions on the integration of Muslims. The
lively discussions during the two days of the
conference suggest that this aim, at least,
was fully met. He announced that the BPB,
in cooperation with the Goethe Institute
and Deutsche Welle, is developing an Islam
portal with information on the Muslim
world and Islam and Muslims in Germany. 
Dr Nathal M. Dessing conducts research on Islam in
Europe and is ISIM educational coordinator.
E-mail: n.m.dessing@isim.nl
S E D E T
C A C O  V E R H E E S
On 28 and 29 October 2002, the conference 'Political
Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: Narratives, Itineraries
and Networks' was organized by the research institute
SEDET (Sociétés en développement dans l'espace et
dans le temps) of the Université Paris 7 Denis Diderot.
The objectives of the conference were to identify,
analyse, and define the actors of political Islam in the
different countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, where Islam
has often been referred to as an Islam of brotherhoods
(c o n f r é r i e s). In earlier research the Islam of the broth-
erhoods is often depicted as peaceful and non-politi-
cal, whereas the reformist groups are said to be politi-
cal in scope and often use violence. But how do these
trends actually relate?
Political Islam in Sub-S a h a r a n
A f r i c a
Reformist groups do not always have a clear
political agenda. They are first and foremost
interested in purifying Islam from the tradi-
tional influences of the Sufi brotherhoods,
like praying with a chapelet ( c h a p l e t ) ,
m a r a b o u t a g e, and the worship of saints.
Some reformist groups, however, attract
many brotherhood-affiliated members.
Therefore, it seems that we should ap-
proach them as groups that react to and in-
teract with each other and with the govern-
ment. At the conference this was done from
different angles. Bakary Sambe proposed to
revisit the terrain of Islam in Senegal as it
can no longer be understood in terms of this
(simplified) dualism. The changes that took
place in the last twenty years, the growing
dynamics of the c o n f r é r i e s that have not es-
caped modernization, the politicizing of the
marabouts, and the external influence ask
for a new approach, which – according to
Sambe – should be interdisciplinary. 
Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, who
presented his research on political Islam in
Nigeria between 1803 and 2003, suggested
an economic reading of political Islam. Ac-
cording to him most political Islamist groups
have primarily economic interests. Further-
more, he thinks Islam nowadays is not more
political than it was 200 years ago, and there-
fore the political dimension should not be
over-emphasized. Souley Hassane discussed
the marketing of Islam. To illustrate this, he
mentioned the marabouts guérrisseurs, reli-
gious agents who are paid for their services,
and the dowry. In addition to the economic,
marketing, and electoral dimensions, R ü d i-
g e r Seesemann proposed a new dimension:
'the quotidian dimension'. He sees the di-
chotomy of 'reformists' and 'brotherhoods' as
another way of saying 'modern' and 'tradi-
tional', respectively, which is not a reflection
of what is happening in the field. He also cri-
tiqued the division between little and great
traditions. In order to understand how peo-
ple perceive Islam and everything related to
it, researchers should look at the debates
that take place on a local level (in the little
tradition), because it reveals more about the
debates at the top level (in the great tradi-
tion). In other words, researchers should con-
textualize Islam on the level of everyday life.
The (partial) implementation of s h a r ica i n
various West African countries was the sub-
ject of a number of papers. In Nigeria some
states have now put into practice criminal
law of the s h a r ica, and this has led to a storm
of protest from Western states. Mukhtar
Umar Bunza of the Usmanu Dan Fodiyo Uni-
versity of Nigeria focused on the influence
of Iranian politics and ideology on political
Islamic movements in Nigeria. While most
Muslims in Nigeria would vote for imple-
mentation of the s h a r ica, the most extremist
movement in Nigeria, Yan S h ica h, is against
it, because they believe true s h a r ica can only
be realized after a successful jihad, after
which the whole state will be an Islamic
state. Thus, this group does not acknowl-
edge the s h a r ica under a non-Islamic demo-
cratic government. Perouse de Montclos
also argued that the s h a r ica can only be im-
plemented in a Muslim state, affirming that
s h a r ica legislation in Nigeria causes prob-
lems mostly related to two articles of the
constitution: freedom of religion and free-
dom of movement. A Muslim who converts
to Christianity in the north of Nigeria is sen-
tenced to death. This conflicts with the arti-
cle on freedom of religion. In the south of
Nigeria there is the option to convert, but
according to the freedom of movement a
Christian should be allowed to settle in one
of the Muslim states. 
Several scholars focused on female Mus-
lims. Fatou Sow, a Senegalese scholar and
member of SEDET, warned of the resur-
gence of Islamist groups in Senegal. She is a
feminist Muslim, and having fought all her
life to free herself from a subordinate posi-
tion, she considers these reformist groups
as a threat to the achievements of the femi-
nist movement in Senegal. More women in
West Africa are wearing the h i j a b n o w a d a y s ,
which she sees as depriving women of their
liberty. For her, the reformist movements
use a discours d'enfermement, and are only
interested in controlling women's sexuality
and fertility. In contrast, Cleo Cantone
(SOAS, London), herself a converted Muslim
– wearing a veil – spoke about the veil as an
opportunity for women in Senegal to prac-
tise Islam in the public sphere, instead of al-
ways being confined to their homes. While
in the mosques of the brotherhoods women
are discouraged from entering the mosque,
the newly built Sunni mosques all have a
space for the women to pray as well as a
room where they can receive Qur'anic
lessons. Cantone therefore considered veil-
ing a positive development, interpreting it
as empowerment (see p. 29).
Article headings of the Islamic Charter 
– Islam is the religion of peace
– We believe in a compassionate God
– The Qur'an is the verbal revelation of God
– We believe in the prophets of the one God
– Humankind will be held accountable on Judgement Day
– Male and female Muslims have the same task in life
– The five pillars of Islam
– Islam is at once faith, morality, social order, and way of life
– Islam does not aim at abolishing wealth
– Islamic law obliges Muslims in the diaspora 
[in principle to observe local law]
– Muslims accept the constitutionally guaranteed separation
o f powers, and the juridical and democratic order
– We do not aim at establishing a clerical theocracy
– There is no conflict between Islamic teaching and the core
human rights
– [European culture is] formed by the [classical Greco-Roman and]
Judeo-Christian-Islamic heritage, and the Enlightenment
– It is necessary to develop a specific Muslim identity in Europe
– Germany constitutes the centre of our interests and activity
– Reduction of prejudices through transparency, openness, 
and dialogue
– We are beholden to the whole of society
– Integration while maintaining Islamic identity
– An honourable way of life in the midst of society
– [We are] party-politically neutral 
The organizers of the conference hope the papers will
be ready to be published at the end of 2003.
Caco Verhees is a Ph.D. candidate at the ISIM.
E-mail: c.verhees@isim.nl 
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Khaled Ramadan is a visual artist and architect,
a n d is currently a Ph.D. candidate in art history at
Copenhagen University, Denmark. He is also curator
for the Nordic Institute for Contemporary Art since
2 0 0 1 .
E-mail: khaledramadan@get2net.dk 
D e b a t e
K H AL E D R A M AD A N
As a cartoon figure, Dirk always dominates the last
page of NU, The Nordic Art Review. One of Olav West-
phalen's best Dirk strips is the one that follows the
9/11 – in his word – 'occasion' (NU vol. 111, no. 6/01).
The first drawing starts by showing Dirk as an angry
artist. The second shows him together with an art
critic in a gallery where Dirk is telling the critic that
we cannot go back to business as usual. In the third,
Dirk underlines that artists have to rise to this histor-
ical occasion. In the forth drawing Dirk emphasizes
that artists' work should be part of a mighty struggle
for a truly democratic and peaceful world. The critic
then comes to his senses and asks: 'How do you re-
flect all that in this new piece of yours?' While look-
ing at a sculpture entitled Perseverance Dirk answers:
'Well it is a mould of the permanent dent I put into my
couch while watching the CNN for two months.' The




To chase the change and look for it in delib-
erate rational ways with known outcomes is
not the way to practise art. Change should
come as a natural reflection and not as a ra-
tional behaviour dictated by the mass
media only. Artists who choose to switch
and adjust their art production according to
what they have heard on CNN, which keeps
telling us that it is the time of change and
that the world will never be the same,
should try to take a neutral look into their
behaviour. They have to ask themselves
where they stand in relation to 'other' news,
which we do not see on CNN. Since when
did the world become static and unchange-
able? It has always been exposed to and re-
flected fluxes and constant change in all
fields and in all directions. The world never
looks at itself at any moment of time. So 'it
will never be the same' is just an empty
s t a t e m e n t .
Detector of change
In FlashArt, December 2001, Giancarlo
Politti wrote that art has always been the
sensitive detector of change and is a deli-
cate seismograph of our time. If art is about
detecting first and curing afterwards, why
then did art activists not detect the other
side of the coin? Can art activists afford the
humanistic luxury of reacting seriously only
to what is taking place within the American
boundaries? If we look into what most visu-
al artists did after 9/11, the majority went
into writing, shocked and without knowing
how to approach it. For those who chose to
do it straight after the 'occasion', their
achievement, as Dirk's, came from one
source only, namely CNN. This unbalanced
behaviour is what artists are supposed to
abandon. So far columnists, writers, and au-
thors have been pretty effective straight
after 9/11. Voices from the USA, Germany,
and the Arab peninsula were all busy con-
demning the 'occasion' but at the very same
time answering those who say 'these things
should not happen here, not in the US' with
a 'well, these things should not happen any-
where'. Art should be concerned with all
human communities and not only one of
them. As Politti said, art should be humani-
ty's most sensitive alarm, detecting changes
within human communities at large, always
using the same barometer of value judge-
m e n t .
Who is challenging what?
The role of art is not only to detect and
react but also to challenge the unspeakable
and the 'political correctness'. At any time,
from art one must expect confrontation
rather than confirmation. Therefore, art
should be political and analytical if it wishes
to keep its position as detector.
The latest challenge to the art world after
9/11 came in suit. Terrence Donahue of the
FBI and Steven Smith of the Secret Service
arrived at the Art Car Museum, an avant-
garde gallery in Houston. Secret Wars w a s
the title of the exhibition, which contained
anti-war statements made before 9/11.
Donna Huanca, who works in the gallery,
stated that '[t]hey said we were displaying
anti-American activities.' Huanca asked if
they were familiar with the artists and em-
phasized the role of art at such a critical time.
The agents were more interested in where
the artists were from. They were pointing
out negative things, like a new painting by
Lynn Randolph of the Houston skyline on
fire, and a devil dancing around with George
Bush Sr. in the belly. The Art Car Museum's
director, James Harithas, described the visit
from the G-men as unbelievable. 'People
should be worried that their freedoms are
being taken away right and left.' Robert
Dogium, the FBI spokesman, said the visit
was just a routine follow-up on a call 'from
someone who said that there is artwork of a
threatening nature to the President'.
Another incidence which makes us think
deeply before producing art after the world
has decided to change itself is this:
On 26 October it knocked on the door of
the art activist A. J. Brown: 'Hello, we're
from the Raleigh branch of the Secret
Service. We're here to check if you have
anti-American material in your
a p a r t m e n t . '
'Are you sure?'
'Yes, we got a report that you've got
a poster of anti-American nature.'
'Have you got a warrant?'
No. But they wanted to come in and look
around. They explained to Brown:
' W e already know what it is. It's a poster
of Bush hanging himself.' Well, then it's
a poster with a target on Bush's head.
T h e poster they were interested in was
one that depicted Bush holding a rope,
with the phrase: 'We Hang on Your Every
Word. George Bush. Wanted: 152 Dead.'
The agents kept looking at the walls that
contained posters from the Bush counter-
inaugural, a 'Free Mumia' poster, and
a Pink Floyd poster with the phrase:
'Mother, should I trust the government?'
Then they asked: 'Do you have any pro-
Taliban stuff, any posters?'
Penetrating the Real Thing
The theorist Slavoj Zizek described the fall
of the WTC comparing it to the Hollywood
catastrophe as 'the element of truth'. Zizek
writes that in Karl-Heinz Stockhausen's
provocative statement that the planes hit-
ting the WTC towers were the ultimate work
of art, one can see the collapse of the WTC
towers as the culminating conclusion of the
2 0t h-century art's 'passion for the real'. The
terrorists themselves did it not primarily to
provoke real material damage but for the
spectacular effect of it: the authentic 20t h-
century passion to penetrate the Real Thing.
The Real Thing is what the world (including
the art world but excluding the Hollywood
planet) has been witnessing so far. The Real
Thing has always been out of the Hollywood
planet. But when the Hollywood planet was
hit by reality, suddenly the world of our fan-
tasy became a Universal Reality.
Slavoj Zizek plays with reality, authentici-
ty, and the fake sphere in order to welcome
the new and free world in joining the Real
World. He says that '[t]he ultimate American
paranoiac fantasy is that of an individual liv-
ing in a small idyllic Californian city, a con-
sumerist paradise, who suddenly starts to
suspect that the world he lives in is a fake, a
spectacle staged to convince him that he
lives in a real world, while all people around
him are effectively actors and extras in a gi-
gantic show. These shots were always ac-
companied with the advance warning that
'some of the images you will see are ex-
tremely graphic and may hurt children' – a
warning which we never heard in the re-
ports on the WTC collapse. 
We were told that nothing will be the
same in the era of post-9/11. In reality
things look different. September 11 means
that nothing has really changed. The world's
conflict patterns did not change a bit.
Change as such did not emerge in art, poli-
tics, military, or – well, I cannot say that
nothing happened to the economy. That
alone will have its impact on all sectors in-
cluding art. The collapse of the stock market
in NY in the 1930s did indeed take with it
the local and the overseas art life. Such eco-
nomic changes are never without conse-
quences. Yes, in that sense one can confi-
dently say that world matters are getting
w o r s e .
Art activists in the shadow of the 'event'
have to make a stand. Either you are with art
or you accept everything your government
says, whether it is true or false. Are the
artists going to do something about it or are
they going to wait for the CNN to do so?
Dear ART, Welcome to Slavoj Zizek's Desert
of The Real.
No UN (life size),
by Khaled





A w a r d
P R I N C E  C L A U S  F U N D
The Principal 2002 Prince Claus Award was
awarded to Mohammed Chafik (b. 17 Sep-
tember 1926) on 11 December for both his
academic oeuvre and his tenacious struggle
for the emancipation of the Berber people.
Chafik's academic endeavours culminated
in his bilingual dictionary of Amazigh. This
three-volume work in Amazigh and Arabic
was published in 1990 (vol. I), 1996 (vol. II),
and 2000 (vol. III). It compiled vocabulary
collected from Morocco to Libya, from Alge-
ria to Chad, and opened it up not only to
Arabic speakers, but also to the Berbers,
who found in this book a recognition of the
richness of their language. This publication
by the Royal Academy of Morocco is the first
step towards achieving complete equality
for the country's original language. Besides
this Dictionnaire Arabe-Berbère, Professor
litical demands. It is an attempt to make
transparent the history of Morocco, before
and after the arrival of the French, before
and after independence. He does this by re-
placing the silenced presence of the Berber-
speaking population with its active pres-
ence as an often unhappy, but always pre-
sent historical player. 
The life of Mohammed Chafik, which has
passed from the French colonial period,
through independence, and into modern
Morocco, makes him an experienced and ir-
refutable advocate for the liberation of
Berber culture. His conclusions are aimed at
a better future for Morocco: the need for a
national debate on the position of the
Berbers, a constitutional recognition of the
language as a national language, a policy
for deprived regions, an active insertion of
the language in education and government,
the erasure of prejudice from the accounts
of the nation's history, opening up the
media to the language of the people, and
the right for parents to register their chil-
dren under their Berber names, to name but
a few.
His academic research and his work as an
emancipator of Berber culture make Mo-
hammed Chafik an obvious choice for the
distinction of the Prince Claus Fund's high-
est award. Yet we might also add one more
thing that distinguishes him: it is what we
might call his cultural vision, which is that of
an Islamic humanist. From the Qur'an he
borrows the statement that the diversity of
languages is a gift from God and quotes an
old saying: 'Learn languages! The more lan-
guages you know, the more men you're
worth.' The idea of turning Arabic into the
only language of Morocco leads to impover-
ishment. The wealth and vitality of a culture
is intrinsically bound with the extent to
which it is able to absorb difference. Profes-
sor Chafik has thus developed a vision of
cultural development as a process that con-
trasts sharply with thinking within a closed
identity. 
The Prince Claus Fund recognizes in Mo-
hammed Chafik an ambassador for culture
and development. By presenting him the
award, the Prince Claus Fund is also endors-
ing a vision of the meaning of language and
languages in the modern world: language is
a mother tongue – which embodies the
wealth of one's own cultural identity – a
contribution to the future in which lan-
guages may be regarded as cultural trea-
sure troves for global development, and the
collective property of humanity.
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Chafik has also produced work on the thirty-
three centuries of Berber culture and has
written several educational books. 
As if this were not reason enough to pre-
sent him with the award, there is also his
tenacious battle for the emancipation of an
original, but marginalized people of Moroc-
co – the Berbers – from the Rif to the Atlas.
Especially the Berbers found themselves
compelled by poor living standards to mi-
grate to foreign lands, including the Nether-
lands. This award is therefore also an ac-
knowledgement of the Moroccan minority
in the Netherlands. Professor Chafik's career
has always been marked by his sense of sol-
idarity with marginalized Berber culture. He
has been an inspirational teacher, a school
inspector, Secretary of State, and a tutor to
the children of the royal family. He is cur-
rently Rector of the Royal Institute of
Amazigh Culture, which was founded in
2001. 
A clear line thus runs through his life, that
of the insertion of Berber culture into the
national and international life of his country.
The written culmination of this work is the
impressive Manifeste Berbère (2000). The
title suggests a political pamphlet. Howev-
er, the piece is much more than a list of po-
Principal 2002 
Prince Claus Award
P r o j e c t
W I T T E  D E  W I T H  C E N T R E
The Middle East is a region that is often overlooked in
present-day exhibitions, and when it is not, the focus
is mainly on traditional culture. The image that is pre-
sented thus denies the fact that contemporary Arab
culture is a pilot region, a political and cultural labora-
tory that is highly complex. It is because of this com-
plexity that Catherine David does not focus exclusive-
ly on 'contemporary art' in her new project, but also
envisages the whole of cultural production, whether
literature, philosophy, or journalism, as well as the im-
ages and the patterns of thinking that currently exist
in the Arab world. This is what lies behind the project's
title: Contemporary Arab Representations.
Contemporary Arab Representations i n c l u d e s
seminars, performances, publications, and
presentations of works by different authors
– visual artists, architects, writers, and poets
– with the aim of encouraging production,
interaction, and exchange between the dif-
ferent cultural centres of the Arab world and
the rest of the world. The project aims to
tackle heterogeneous situations and con-
texts that may sometimes be antagonistic
or conflicting, and thus to acquire more spe-
cific knowledge about what is currently
going on in certain parts of the Arab world,
to look at the complexity of aesthetics in re-
lation to social and political situations, and
to encourage people to think more deeply
about the role currently played by cultural
practices in our own countries.
B e i r u t / L e b a n o n
'Beirut/Lebanon' was the first in a series of
presentations. At present, Lebanon and the
Middle East are essential to an understand-
ing of contemporary culture: the post-war
situation they are living through is complex
– the Ta'if Accords do not guarantee defini-
tive peace, and in this age of globalization,
the country can be seen as an exceptionally
important laboratory for a variety of rea-
sons. Although Lebanon can no longer
serve as a 'model' or 'exception' within the
Arab world, the concern of many Lebanese
intellectuals – immediately after the war –
for analysing unprecedented dynamics,
speeds, and configurations, the reverbera-
tions of which can be heard beyond the
Middle East.
The unfolding of this project has been
presented in different phases. It began with
a seminar at the Universidad Internacional
de Andalucía (UNIA) (22–26 October 2001)
and continued with a colloquium at the
Akademie Schloss Solitude in Stuttgart (7–9
February 2002). Several dossiers have been
published in cultural journals, including the
Arteleku magazine Z e h a r (issue 46/2002),
S p r i n g e r i n (issue 2/2002), and Camera Aus-
tria (issue 78/2002). The project has been
hosted by the F u n d a c i ó Antoni T à p i e s i n
Barcelona (2 May – 14 July 2002) and by
Witte de With, centre for contemporary art
in Rotterdam (14 September – 24 November
2 0 0 2 ) .
The project was accompanied by the pub-
lication T a m á s s 1, which is the first in a series
of publications about current Arab cultural
discourse. T a m á s s 1 includes essays and
projects by Walid Sadek, Jalal Toufic, Saree
Makdisi, Tony Chakar, Bilal Khbeiz, Elias
Khoury, Rabih Mroué, The Atlas Group Pro-
ject/Walid Raad, Marwan Rechmaoui, and
Paola Yacoub & Michel Lasserre. T a m á s s,
which means contact, touch(ing), contigui-
ty, adjacency, or tangency (when combined
as khat t a m á s s and khoutout t a m á s s it can
also mean demarcation line(s) or confronta-
tion line(s)),* seeks to create an open forum
for debate and the exchange of ideas, im-
ages, and projects between different parts
of the Arab world and the rest of the world.
C a i r o / E g y p t
At present, a new phase is being devel-
oped under the title 'Cairo/Egypt'. In the
Arab world, communication is neither fluid
nor easy; freedom of expression is still diffi-
cult. Egypt is an example of a culture that is
affected by a lack of liberty. The project will
encourage the particular strategies that are
undertaken by the participants to achieve a
truly uncensored analysis and critique.
Contemporary Arab Representations w i l l
thus create a new voice among those who
only focus on the glorious past of the Arab
world while totally overlooking or even
denying its present or future. In contrast
with this, it will stimulate progressive pro-
jects in order to show that Islamic extrem-
ism and archaism are not apparent in all as-
pects of Arab society.
with the development and promotion of an
experimental and critical contemporary Arab
culture was sufficient reason to single out a
group of authors who feel the need to meet
and discuss a medium-term cultural project
in their own city and in their personal con-
t e x t .
All the participants in the project aim to
propose representations that can broach
the reality of the city and the present condi-
tions in urban society. And they all realize
that there are no theories or forms that can
encapsulate the phenomenological com-
plexity of contemporary Beirut and Leba-
non. Thus, as Saree Makdisi writes in his arti-
cle 'Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative
and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere',
Lebanon can be understood not simply as a
post-modern state but also as the first ex-
ample of a state on a lease. Indeed, the in-
terest of the country or the region is also
linked to the need to find new instruments
Contemporary Arab
R e p r e s e n t a t i o n s
Laudation address by Andriaan van der Staa, Chair
of the 2002 Prince Claus Awards Committee, in
honour of Mohammed Chafik, recipient of the
Principal 2002 Prince Claus Award.
Prince Claus Awards
Since 1997, the Prince Claus Awards have been presented to people
and organizations to recognize and encourage their exceptional
achievements in the field of culture and development in Africa,
Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. The Fund does not only
honour artists, intellectuals, and cultural organizations for the high
quality of their work. It also looks in particular at the positive
changes they bring to their society and culture. The Principal Award
is given every December during a festive ceremony at the Royal
Palace in Amsterdam.
N o t e
* Rohi Baalbaki, Al-Mawrid. A Modern Arabic-English
D i c t i o n a r y (Beirut: Dar El-Ilm Lilmalayin, 2001).
For further information, please contact Witte de
With, centre for contemporary art, the Netherlands. 
E-mail: info@wdw.nl
T a m á s s 1. Beirut/Lebanon
Price: 25 Euro
Illustrations in colour and black and white
23.5 x 17 cm, 168 pp.
English paperback
ISBN 84-88786-61-1
T a m á s s 2. Cairo/Egypt is forthcoming (May 2003).
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C al l  f o r P ap er s
P . S .  V A N  K O N I N G S V E L D Religious Change in
Pluralistic  Contexts
’Religious Change in Pluralistic Contexts’, an
international congress to be held in Leiden,
the Netherlands (28–30 August 2003), is orga-
nized by the Leiden Institute for the Study of
Religions (LISOR) in cooperation with the Lei-
den Centre for Asian, African, and Amerindian
Studies (CNWS). The central aims of the con-
gress are to present relevant case studies of
religious change and reinterpretation in plu-
ralistic contexts derived from all periods and
geographical areas of human history, and to
contribute to theoretical reflection on the
phenomenon of religious change in pluralis-
tic contexts, so as to contribute ultimately to a
more adequate understanding of this phe-
nomenon in the modern age.
The common experience among most if
not all ethnic minority religions in the West
is the transition from a communitarian sys-
tem to a secular system with Christianity as
the dominant faith, where religions have to
function within the private sphere in the first
place. In Europe, Judaism experienced this
transition primarily in the 19t h century, in the
Emancipation when Jews were granted citi-
zenship in the European nation-states. Islam,
Hinduism, Buddhism, and many other reli-
gious traditions of non-Western origin, in-
cluding African and Arab Christianity, experi-
enced and continue to experience this trans-
formation as a result of their (ongoing) trans-
plantation to Western societies. 
The transformation from one system to an-
other is accompanied by many forms of reli-
gious reinterpretation and change, many of
which may be related directly or indirectly to
regulations (laws, political measures, ju-
risprudence) imposed by the nation-states
in order to integrate religious institutions
into the normative patterns of the dominant
societies. They are often sanctioned by reli-
gious authorities under the influence of the
social and cultural environment of their re-
spective societies. Two dimensions may be
distinguished in this context: (1) the behav-
ioural dimension – e.g. changes in the prac-
tice of religious rituals, feasts, dress, and di-
etary codes, and in the application of reli-
giously based principles of family law; and
(2) the cognitive dimension – e.g. reinterpre-
tations of normative religious traditions and
dogmatic thought under the influence of
dominant social customs and of prevailing
philosophies. 
Scholars of religious studies from all over
the world are invited to submit their propos-
als (of one page maximum) for the congress
before 1 February 2003.  
A D V E R T I S E M E N T
The UCSIA is an independent, international, and
multidisciplinary college focusing on issues of reli-
gion, culture, and society. It is an offspring of the
Saint-Ignatius University College of Antwerp (Uni-
versitaire Faculteiten Sint-Ignatius Antwerpen,
UFSIA). Its main objective is to provide an interna-
tional and interdisciplinary platform for academic
research, education, and social services contribut-
ing to the creation of a better and more just soci-
ety. 
The UCSIA is holding a summer seminar on 'Chris -
tianity, Islam, and Judaism: How to Conquer the Bar-
riers to Intercultural Dialogue?', to be held at
Antwerp University, Belgium, from 15 to 26 Septem-
ber 2003.
If the prospect of clashing civilizations is to be
avoided, a profound understanding of the barriers
to intercultural dialogue is required. The seminar
aims to contribute to building this understanding.
The programme is geared towards gaining scholarly
insight into historical, philosophical, religious, and
socio-economic barriers to peaceful and prosperous
intercultural exchange and cohabitation at local and
global levels.
The seminar will offer a multidisciplinary experi-
ence. Barriers to intercultural and inter-religious dia-
logue are to be explored from different academic
perspectives. Lectures and workshops will focus on
the following themes: peace and conflict, national-
ism and ethnicity, religious minorities, gender,
human rights, secularization, religious identity, and
new religious trends.
The seminar will be of interest to graduate stu-
dents and scholars in the humanities (religious stud-
ies, philosophy, linguistics, history, and literature)
and the social sciences (anthropology, sociology,
law, and economics).
For more information, or to participate, please contact:
Barbara Segaert, Project Coordinator
Univ. of Antwerp, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences,
OASeS, Gratiekapelstraat 10, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium
Tel.: +32 3 220 49 70, Fax: +32 3 220 46 36,
E-mail: barbara.segaert@ua.ac.be 
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UCSIA Summer Seminar 
Please send your proposals to:
Leiden Institute for the Study of Religions (LISOR)
Mrs B. d'Arnaud
E-mail: b.arnaud@let.leidenuniv.nl
Prof. Dr P.S. van Koningsveld is director of LISOR.
E-mail: p.s.van.koningsveld@let.leidenuniv.nl
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The International Institute for
the Study of Islam in the Modern
World (ISIM) promotes and
conducts interdisciplinary
research on contemporary social
and intellectual trends and
movements in Muslim societies
and communities.
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ISIM Fellowships
The ISIM welcomes the following new fellows:
Ph.D. Fellows
– Nadia Sonneveld, M.A.: 'Reinterpretation of
K h u lc in Egypt: Intellectual Disputes, the
Practice of the Courts, and Everyday Life'
Visiting Fellows
– Dr Armando Salvatore: 'Public Islam and the
Nation-State in Egypt: Historical, Conceptual,
and Comparative Dimensions'
– Dr Dominique-Sila Khan: 'A Hidden Heritage:
Islamic Culture in Contemporary Pranami
Communities in India'
Affiliated Fellows
– K.H. Hussein Muhammad: Collection of Islamic
materials in the Leiden University Library and
other libraries in the Netherlands 
– Dr Salman Harun: 'Interpretation of the Qur'an
in the West'
The ISIM invites applications and research
proposals for various programmes.
Applications from candidates in the social
sciences, humanities, and religious studies will
be considered. Applicants should be
competent in academic English. The ISIM
fellowships and their respective application
deadlines are as follows:
– Ph.D. fellowships
(1 March 2003 and 1 September 2003)
– Post-doctoral fellowships
(1 March 2003 and 1 September 2003)
– Visiting fellowships
(1 March 2003 and 1 September 2003)
– Sabbatical fellowships
(1 March 2003 and 1 September 2003)
For more information on the various fellowships and for
application forms, please consult the ISIM website.
ISIM Events
Inaugural Lecture: ISIM Chair
a t t h e University of Amsterdam
Annelies Moors
Date: 13 March 2003
Venue: University of Amsterdam, the
Netherlands 
Conference: The Anthropology
o f Islamic Law 
O r g a n i z e r s : M.K. Masud, Annelies Moors, Léon
B u s k e n s
D a t e : 14–16 March 2003
V e n u e: Leiden University, the Netherlands
Workshop: Gender and Conversion to
Islam 
O r g a n i z e r : Karin van Nieuwkerk 
D a t e : 16–17 May 2003
V e n u e : University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands
Conference: Sufism and the Modern
Urban Middle Class 
O r g a n i z e r s : Martin van Bruinessen, Dadi
Darmadi, Julia Howell, in cooperation with IIAS
and Melbourne University
D a t e : 4–6 September 2003
V e n u e : Jakarta, Indonesia
Workshop: What Happened? Telling
Stories about Law in Muslim Societies
O r g a n i z e r s : Annelies Moors in conjunction with
CEDEJ, IFAO, and Utrecht University
D a t e : October 2003
V e n u e : Cairo, Egypt
For more information on these and other ISIM Events
please consult the ISIM website or contact the ISIM
S e c r e t a r i a t :
Tel: +31 71 527 7905
Fax: +31 71 527 7906
E-mail: info@isim.nl
w w w . i s i m . n l
ISIM Publications
The following ISIM publications are available at the ISIM.
Publications in the ISIM Papers Series include:
– Islam, Islamists, and the Electoral Principle in the Middles East (ISIM Papers 1)
by James Piscatori
– Thinking about Secularism and Law in Egypt (ISIM Papers 2)
by Talal Asad
– S h a r ica, State, and Social Norms in France and Indonesia (ISIM Papers 3)
by John R. Bowen
– 'Traditionalist' Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs (ISIM Papers 4) 
by Barbara D. Metcalf
Special ISIM Publications include:
– Muslim Jurists' Quest for the Normative Basis of S h a r ica (ISIM Inaugural Lecture) 
by Muhammad Khalid Masud
– New Voices of Islam
by Farish A. Noor (Interviews with Muslim Intellectuals)
The following publications are forthcoming:
– Muslims, Minorities, and Modernity: The Restructuring of Heterodoxy
in the Middle East and Southeast Asia (ISIM Chair Inaugural Lecture)
by Martin van Bruinessen
– A Naqshbandi Télémaque 
by Ş e r i f Mardin (ISIM Papers 5)
The ISIM website will soon be relaunched in
order to provide better service and expand
our online information resources. New sec-
tions will include up-to-date listings of ISIM
and non-ISIM events, fellowships, grants,
and a more accessible links section. All ISIM
publications, including the ISIM Newsletter,
the ISIM Papers Series, and the ISIM Annual
R e p o r t will be available online. The new for-
mat will allow users to subscribe directly to
the N e w s l e t t e r and request back issues or
other ISIM publications. We hope that the
new site will become a valuable resource to
researchers and all those interested in
modern Islam. The ISIM welcomes your
feedback and comments.
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